Abstract
There is good reason to believe that scientific realism requires a commitment to the objective modal structure of the physical world. Causality, equilibrium, laws of nature, and probability all feature prominently in scientific theory and explanation, and each one is a modal notion. If we are committed to the content of our best scientific theories, we must accept the modal nature of the physical world. But what does the scientific realist’s commitment to physical modality require? We consider whether scientific realism is compatible with Humeanism about the laws of nature, and we conclude that it is not. We specifically identify three major problems for the best-systems account of lawhood: its central concept of strength cannot be formulated non-circularly, it cannot offer a satisfactory account of the laws of the special sciences, and it can offer no explanation of the success of inductive inference. In addition, Humeanism fails to be naturalistically motivated. For these reasons, we conclude that the scientific realist must embrace natural necessity.
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Notes
- 1.
We take natural necessity to be that to which one is committed when one accepts realism about laws of nature as something over and above regularities among actual events.
- 2.
Psillos [19] develops a hybrid causal descriptivist theory of reference and applies it to various cases of abandoned theoretical terms. While he is officially a Humean, there is a question as to whether the causal theory of reference is viable if one denies that causation may be a singular relation between language users and events.
- 3.
See [11] and the reply by Monton and van Fraassen.
- 4.
Barry Loewer’s theory of probability is a development of Lewis’s.
- 5.
While a number of authors have concerned themselves with problems for the MRL account stemming from the notions of simplicity and strength, we are aware of none that have specifically addressed this problem of circularity. See [4].
- 6.
It is worth noting that, in his explanation of why this is the case, Psillos appeals to the notion of physical impossibility, which is circular for the Humean, as he explicates the notion of physical impossibility in terms of what is incompatible with the laws.
- 7.
For a greater discussion of the Life universe, see [5].
- 8.
For the Humean.
- 9.
Again, we are disregarding the problem of distinguishing accidental regularities that hold eternally from lawlike regularities.
- 10.
Since non-Humeans about laws accept natural necessity, they are not susceptible to this problem. Non-Humeans can simply deny that there are any deviant possible worlds by ascribing necessary connections to pairs or collections of properties that feature in the relevant regularities.
- 11.
Quiddities are to properties what haecceities are to individuals.
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Berenstain, N., Ladyman, J. (2012). Ontic Structural Realism and Modality. In: Landry, E., Rickles, D. (eds) Structural Realism. The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 77. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2579-9_8
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