Abstract
The natural outbreaks of disease and pandemics are transnational threats that create international challenges when detection and containment are not timely due to scarce human and material resources. Whether the cause of those outbreaks is natural or intentional in origin, the main goal of consequence management operations is to save lives. The consequence management process is a continuum of inter-connected phases such as planning, preparation, response, and recovery. The rapid advances of life sciences and the emergence of dual-use technologies such as synthetic biology and nanotechnology pose additional challenges in terms of planning for the unknown potential threats whether they may be synthetic microorganisms with unpredictable dissemination patterns or nanoscale-manipulated biological agents evading current detection capabilities. The US National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats is emphasizing prevention while continuing to support the national preparedness goals and response/recovery capabilities. The recent policies, guidelines, and recommendations on overhauling the biological risk management in the United States are a proactive stance to a rapidly changing global environment. They include optimization of the current oversight frameworks and active engagement of the industry and academia in order to reduce the risk that individuals with ill intent may exploit the commercial application of nucleic acid synthesis technology to access genetic material derived from or by encoding Biological Select Agents or Toxins. We are also actively seeking to increase our knowledge of health effects of various types of nanomaterials, and how to assess, control, and prevent harmful exposure, taking into consideration the numerous gaps that currently exist with regard to the distinct behavior of nanoparticles compared to the same chemical or material at “macro-scale”. Fundamentally, a biological incident, whether it is of natural, accidental, or deliberate origin, constitutes a public health problem and the United States is engaged with the international community to enhance our collective capability to address emerging health security threats.
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Notes
- 1.
The NSABB is a Federal advisory committee providing advice to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Director of the National Institutes of Health, and the heads of all Federal entities that conduct, support or have an interest in life sciences research. The purpose of the NSABB is to provide, as requested, advice, guidance, and leadership regarding biosecurity oversight of dual use research, defined as biological research with legitimate scientific purpose that may be misused to pose a biologic threat to public health and/or national security. Additional information on the NSABB can be found at www.biosecurityboard.gov
- 2.
National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, Proposed Framework for the Oversight of Dual Use Life Sciences Research: Strategies for Minimizing the Potential Misuse of Research Information (Washington, DC: June 2007), oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/biosecurity_documents.html
- 3.
National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/National_Strategy_for_Countering_BioThreats.pdf
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The views, opinions, findings, and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Health and Human Services or its components, or the official policy or position of the Department of State, or the U.S. Government.
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Perkins, D., Nordmann, B. (2012). Emerging Technologies: Biosecurity and Consequence Management Implications. In: Vaseashta, A., Braman, E., Susmann, P. (eds) Technological Innovations in Sensing and Detection of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Threats and Ecological Terrorism. NATO Science for Peace and Security Series A: Chemistry and Biology. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2488-4_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2488-4_2
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