Abstract
Recent debates over the nature of causation, casual inference, and the uses of causal models in counterfactual analysis, involving inter alia Nancy Cartwright (Hunting Causes and Using Them), James Woodward (Making Things Happen), and Judea Pearl (Causation), hinge on how causality is represented in models. Economists’ indigenous approach to causal representation goes back to the work of Herbert Simon with the Cowles Commission in the early 1950s. The paper explicates a scheme for the representation of causal structure, inspired by Simon, and shows how this representation sheds light on some important debates in the philosophy of causation. This structural account is compared to Woodward’s manipulability account. It is used to evaluate the recent debates – particularly, with respect to the nature of causal structure, the identity of causes, causal independence, and modularity. Special attention is given to modeling issues that arise in empirical economics.
Prepared for the International Conference on the Philosophy of Economics and Biology at the National Tsing Hua University, Hsinchu, Taiwan, 24–25 March 2011; it is a substantial revision of a paper first presented at the conference on Modeling the World: Perspectives from Biology and Economics, Helsinki, 28–30 May 2009. I am grateful to François Claveau and two anonymous referees for comments on an earlier draft. I acknowledge the support of the US National Science Foundation (grant no. NSF SES-1026983).
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
A more formal presentation of the structural account is given in Hoover (2001, Chap. 3).
- 3.
The model is drawn from Hamilton (1995).
- 4.
Which in fact suggested the scheme of distinguishing parameters by subscripts: for example, α BC was the parameter multiplying the variable C in the canonical equation for B.
- 5.
- 6.
Causal identity can be thought of as a metaphysical property of the world and as a property of a model or representation. Elsewhere I have argued in favor of a perspectival realism in which a successful model tells us the truth about the world from a particular point of view (Hoover 2012b, see also 2012c), which reduces the force of a distinction between the metaphysics and the properties of the model.
- 7.
I have written V where Woodward writes V, to remain consistent with the notation of Sect. 2 above.
- 8.
- 9.
I write “coefficients,” not “parameters” as Cartwright does, since she assumes that they are functions of other things, violating the usage established in Sect. 2.3 above.
- 10.
This makes the inessential, but in this case harmless, assumption that the equations are linear in variables.
- 11.
My view here as a shift from my earlier understanding of the causal significance of comparative static analysis (Hoover 2001, p. 102).
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Hoover, K.D. (2013). Identity, Structure, and Causal Representation in Scientific Models. In: Chao, HK., Chen, ST., Millstein, R. (eds) Mechanism and Causality in Biology and Economics. History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2454-9_3
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