Abstract
One aim of confirmation theory is to represent the objective character of scientific evidence. Here I explore two challenges that must be overcome by probabilistic models of confirmation in order to succeed in this aim: the foundation challenge and the specification challenge. I discuss Sober’s recent approach to confirmation and his response to these challenges. I argue that while Sober makes real progress, neither challenge is completely overcome. The specification challenge is particularly difficult, undermining the general argument that the law of likelihood provides a more objective model of confirmation.
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Acknowledgements
Thanks to Branden Fitelson for pointing me towards Bayarri and DeGroot’s work on likelihoods. Thanks also to the audience at EPSA 2009 in Amsterdam for useful discussion.
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Forber, P. (2012). Modeling Scientific Evidence: The Challenge of Specifying Likelihoods. In: de Regt, H., Hartmann, S., Okasha, S. (eds) EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2404-4_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2404-4_6
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