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EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009 pp 55–65Cite as

Modeling Scientific Evidence: The Challenge of Specifying Likelihoods

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Part of the book series: The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings ((EPSP,volume 1))

Abstract

One aim of confirmation theory is to represent the objective character of scientific evidence. Here I explore two challenges that must be overcome by probabilistic models of confirmation in order to succeed in this aim: the foundation challenge and the specification challenge. I discuss Sober’s recent approach to confirmation and his response to these challenges. I argue that while Sober makes real progress, neither challenge is completely overcome. The specification challenge is particularly difficult, undermining the general argument that the law of likelihood provides a more objective model of confirmation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Fitelson (2007) for a formal comparison of these two approaches and discussion of some problem cases.

  2. 2.

    Whether these theorems deliver is controversial. See Earman (1992); Hawthorne (2011) for discussion.

  3. 3.

    See, for example, Royall (1997) for a standard formulation of likelihoods in statistics.

References

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Acknowledgements

Thanks to Branden Fitelson for pointing me towards Bayarri and DeGroot’s work on likelihoods. Thanks also to the audience at EPSA 2009 in Amsterdam for useful discussion.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Tufts University, Medford, MA, 02155, USA

    Patrick Forber

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  1. Patrick Forber
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Correspondence to Patrick Forber .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. De Boelelaan 1105, HV Amsterdam, 1081, Netherlands

    Henk W. de Regt

  2. PO Box 90153, Tilburg, 5000 LE, Netherlands

    Stephan Hartmann

  3. Bristol, BS8 1TB, United Kingdom

    Samir Okasha

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Forber, P. (2012). Modeling Scientific Evidence: The Challenge of Specifying Likelihoods. In: de Regt, H., Hartmann, S., Okasha, S. (eds) EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2404-4_6

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