• Paul Weirich
Conference paper
Part of the The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings book series (EPSP, volume 1)


Bayesians typically take probabilities as rational degrees of belief. Some Bayesians define degrees of belief to ensure conformity with standard axioms of probability. According to a common definition, degrees of belief are the values of a function P obeying the axioms of probability such that, if gambles have the same stakes, an agent prefers a gamble that p to a gamble that q if and only if P(p) > P(q). Other Bayesians take degrees of belief to express propositional attitudes not defined in terms of preferences. According to their account, definition does not make degrees of belief obey the probability axioms. These Bayesians undertake to show, using normative principles, that rational degrees of belief nonetheless meet those axioms.


Objective Probability Logical Truth Ideal Agent Epistemic Justification Doxastic Attitude 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MissouriColumbiaUSA

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