Identity in Physics: Properties, Statistics and the (Non-)Individuality of Quantum Particles
The issue whether or not the most fundamental entities described by non-relativistic quantum mechanics are individual objects is of interest for both philosophers and metaphyiscians, and has received a great deal of attention lately. Even though there is no universal consensus, the most popular view seems to be that quantum particles are not individual objects. This paper offers a critical analysis of recent arguments in support of this position, and a defence of the more traditional alternative.
KeywordsQuantum Statistic Entangle State Quantum Particle Primitive Identity Counterpart Theory
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