Abstract
In this chapter, I critically assess the thesis that the discovery of mirror neurons (MNs) provides empirical support for the simulation theory (ST) of social cognition. This thesis can be analyzed into two claims:
(i) MNs are involved in understanding others’ intentions or emotions.
(ii) The way in which they do so supports a simulationist viewpoint.
I will be giving qualified support to both (i) and (ii). Starting with (i), I will present theoretical and empirical points in support of the view that MNs play a substantial role and are perhaps necessary although not sufficient for understanding at least some intentions or emotions.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Adolphs, R. 2003. Cognitive neuroscience of human social behaviour. National Review of Neuroscience 4(3): 165–178.
Adolphs, R., F. Gosselin, T.W. Buchanan, D. Tranel, P. Schyns, and A.R. Damasio. 2005. A mechanism for impaired fear recognition after amygdala damage. Nature 433: 68–72.
Baron-Cohen, S. 1995. Mindblindness: An essay on autism and theory of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Barsalou, Lawrence. 1999. Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22: 577–609.
Barsalou, Lawrence. 2009. Simulation, situated conceptualization, and prediction. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London: Biological Sciences 364: 1281–1289.
Barsalou, Lawrence, W. Kyle Simmons, Aron Barbey, and Christine Wilson. 2003. Grounding conceptual knowledge in modality-specific systems. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7(2): 84–91.
Bastiaansen, J.A.C.J., M. Thioux, and C. Keysers. 2009. Evidence for mirror systems in emotions. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 364: 2391–2404.
Buccino G., F. Binkofski, G.R. Fink, L. Fadiga, L. Fogassi, V. Gallese, R.J. Seits, K. Zilles, G. Rizzolatti, and H.-J. Freund. 2001. Action observation activates premotor and parietal areas in a somatotopic manner: An fMRI study. European Journal of Neuroscience 13: 400–404.
Carruthers, P. 2009. How we know our minds: The relationship between metacognition and mindreading. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32: 121–182.
Castelli, F., C. Frith, F. Happé, and U. Frith. 2002. Autism, Asperger syndrome and brain mechanisms for the attribution of mental states to animated shapes. Brain 125(8): 1839–1849.
Csibra, G. 2008. Action mirroring and action understanding: An alternative account. In Sensorimotor foundation of higher cognition: Attention and performance, eds. P. Haggard, Y. Rossetti, and M. Kawato, 435–458. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Frith, C., and T. Singer. 2008. The role of social cognition in decision-making. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 363: 3875–3886.
Gallese V., and A. Goldman. 1998. Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2: 493–501.
Gallese, V., C. Keysers, and G. Rozzolatti. 2004. A unifying view of the basis of social cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8(9): 396–403.
Goldman, A. 1993. The psychology of folk psychology. In Readings in philosophy and cognitive science, ed. A. Goldman, 347–380. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Goldman, A. 2006. Simulating minds: The philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mindreading. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goldman, A. 2008. Mirroring, mindreading and simulation. In Mirror neuron system: The role of mirroring processes in social cognition, ed. J.A. Pineda, 311–330. New York: Humana Press.
Gopnik, A. 1993. The illusion first-person knowledge of intentionality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16: 1–14.
Gordon, R. 1995. Simulation without introspection or inference from me to you. In Mental Simulation: Evaluations and applications, eds. T. Stone and M. Davies, 53–67. Oxford: Blackwell.
Gordon, R. 2007. Ascent routines for propositional attitudes. Synthese 159: 151–165.
Heal, J. 1986. Replication and functionalism. In Language, mind and logic, ed. J. Butterfield, 135–150. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Heiser, M., M. Iacoboni, F. Maeda, J. Markus, and J. Maziotta. 2003. The essential role of Broca’s area in imitation. European Journal of Neuroscience 17: 1123–1128.
Iacoboni, M., I. Molnar-Szakacs, V. Gallese, G. Buccino, J.C. Mazziotta, and G. Rizzolatti. 2005. Grasping the intentions of others with one’s own mirror neuron system. PLoS Biology 3: 529–535.
Jacob, P. 2008. What do mirror neurons contribute to human social cognition? Mind and Language 23(2): 190–223.
Jacob, P. 2009. The tuning-fork model of human social cognition: A critique. Consciousness and Cognition 18(1): 229–243.
Johnson-Frey, S.H. 2004. The neural basis of complex tool use in humans. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8: 71–78.
Keysers, C., B. Wicker, V. Gazzola, J.L. Anton, L. Fogassi, and V. Gallese. 2004. A touching sight: SII/PV activation during the observation and experience of touch. Neuron 42: 335–346.
Leslie, A. 2000. Theory of mind as a mechanism of selective attention. In The new cognitive neurosciences, ed. M. Gazzaniga, 1235–1247. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Mahon, B.Z., A. Caramazza. 2005. The orchestration of the sensory-motor systems: clues from neuropsychology. Cognitive Neuropsychology 22(2/3): 480–494.
Mukamel, R., A.D. Ekstrom, J. Kaplan, M. Iacoboni, and I. Fried. 2010. Current Biology 20: 750–756.
Newman-Norlund, R., H. van Shie, A. van Zuijlen, and H. Beckering. 2007. The mirror system is more active during complementary compared with imitative action. Nature Neuroscience 10(7): 817–818.
Oberman L., P. Winkielman, and V.S. Ramachandran. 2007: Face to face: Blocking facial mimicry can selectively impair recognition of impair emotional expressions. Social Neuroscience, 2(3–4): 167–178.
Pobric, G., and A. Hamilton. 2006. Action understanding requires the left inferior frontal cortex. Current Biology 16: 524–529.
Prinz, Jesse. 2002. Furnishing the mind: Concepts and their perceptual basis. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Rizzolatti, G., and L. Craighero. 2004. The mirror-neuron system. Annual Reviews of Neuroscience 27: 169–192.
Rothi, L.J.G., C. Ochipa, and K.M. Heilman. 1991. A cognitive neuropsychological model of limb praxis. Cognitive Neuropsychology 8: 443–458.
Singer, T., B. Seymour, J. O’Doherty, H. Kaube, R.J Dolan, and C. Frith. 2004: Empathy for pain involves the affective but not sensory components of pain. Science 303: 1157–1162.
Wicker, B., C. Keysers, J. Plailly, J. Royet, V. Gallese, and G. Rizzolatti. 2003. Both of us disgusted in my insula: The common neural basis of seeing and feeling disgust. Neuron 40: 655–654.
Wolpert, D.M. 1997. Computational approaches to motor control. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 1: 209–216.
Wolpert, D.M., K. Doya, and M. Kawato. 2003. A unifying computational framework for motor control and social interaction. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, London B 358: 593–602.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2012 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
About this paper
Cite this paper
Michael, J. (2012). Mirror Neurons and Social Cognition: An Expanded Simulationist Framework. In: de Regt, H., Hartmann, S., Okasha, S. (eds) EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2404-4_19
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2404-4_19
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-007-2403-7
Online ISBN: 978-94-007-2404-4
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)