Debating (Neo)logicism: Frege and the Neo-Fregeans

  • Majda Trobok
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 25)


The paper’s aim is to determine and discuss in which sense, if any, Frege’s and neo-Fregean logicism are responding to the epistemological challenge concerning our arithmetical knowledge. More precisely the paper analyses what the epistemological significance of Frege’s logicist programme amounts to, namely, the objective justificatory connections obtaining between arithmetical and logical statements. It then contrasts this result with the self-understanding of the neo-Fregeans who allegedly follow Frege’s steps, but in fact take a rather different direction.


Mathematical Knowledge Epistemic Normativity Implicit Definition Abstraction Principle Arithmetical Statement 
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Acknowledgments Portions of this were presented at the conference in Dubrovnik in May 2010. Many thanks to the participants for their comments: Stewart Shapiro, Per Martin-Löf, Alan Wier, Berislav Žarnić, Stephen Reed. Many thanks as well to Nenad Smokrović and especially to Nenad Miščević.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of RijekaRijekaCroatia

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