Abstract
A complete philosophy of mathematics must address Paul Benacerraf’s dilemma. The requirements of a general semantics for the truth of mathematical theorems that coheres also with the meaning and truth conditions for non-mathematical sentences, according to Benacerraf, should ideally be coupled with an adequate epistemology for the discovery of mathematical knowledge. Standard approaches to the philosophy of mathematics are criticized against their own merits and against the background of Benacerraf’s dilemma, particularly with respect to the problem of understanding the distinction between pure and applied mathematics and the effectiveness of applied mathematics in the natural sciences and engineering. The evaluation of these alternatives provides the basis for articulating a philosophically advantageous Aristotelian inherence concept of mathematical entities. An inherence account solves Benacerraf’s dilemma by interpreting mathematical entities as nominalizations of structural spatiotemporal properties inhering in existent spatiotemporal entities.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
Plato’s myth of the divided line appears in Republic 509d–513e.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
See Chihara [12, especially pp. 108–13, 317–48].
- 11.
- 12.
Chihara [12, pp. 107–8, 163–217]. Also Chihara [11].
- 13.
- 14.
Quine [37, p. 400] speaks of the higher reaches of set theory as a “mathematical recreation… without ontological rights”.
- 15.
Steiner [43].
- 16.
Aristotle, Physics 263b3–9: “To the question whether it is possible to pass through an infinite number of units [i.e. intervals] either of time or of distance we must reply that in a sense it is and in a sense it is not. If the units [intervals] are actual it is not possible, if they are potential, it is possible.” Hume [21 especially pp. 27–65]. See Jacquette [23].
- 17.
See Cantor, Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Mannigfaltigkeitslehre [10, pp. 181–82].
References
Allen, R.E. 1961. “The Argument from Opposites in Republic V.” The Review of Metaphysics 15:325–35.
Aristotle. 1995. Physics. The Revised Oxford Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton/Bollingen Series LXII.2, Volume 1. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Azzouni, Jody. 1994. Metaphysical Myths, Mathematical Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Balaguer, Mark. 1988. Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Benacerraf, Paul. 1965. “What Numbers Could Not Be.” The Philosophical Review 74:47–73.
Benacerraf, Paul. 1973. “Mathematical Truth.” The Journal of Philosophy 70:661–80; reprinted in Benacerraf and Putnam [7], 403–20.
Benacerraf, Paul and Hilary Putnam, eds. 1983. Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings. 2nd edition. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Boehmer, Philotheus. 1946. “The Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham.” Traditio 4:307–35.
Brouwer, L.E.J. 1913. “Intuitionism and Formalism.” Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 20:81–96.
Cantor, Georg. 1966. Gesammelte Abhandlungen mathematischen und philosophischen Inhalts, mit erluternden Anmerkungen sowie mit Ergngzungen aus dem Briefwechsel Cantor-Dedekind. Edited by Ernst Zermelo. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag.
Chihara, Charles S. 1990. Constructibility and Mathematical Essence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chihara, Charles S. 2004. A Structural Account of Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Detlefsen, Michael. 1993. “Hilbert’s Formalism.” Revue internationale de philosophie 47:285–304.
Field, Hartry. 1980. Science Without Numbers. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Field, Hartry. 1985. “Comments and Criticisms on Conservativeness and Incompleteness.” The Journal of Philosophy 82:239–60.
Field, Hartry. 1989. Realism, Mathematics, and Modality. Oxford: Blackwell.
Field, Hartry. 1992. “A Nominalistic Proof of the Conservativeness of Set Theory.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 21:111–23.
Heyting, Arend. 1956. Intuitionism: An Introduction. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Hilbert, David. 1926. “Über das Unendliche.” Mathematische Annalen 95:161–90.
Hilbert, David. 1928. “Die Grundlagen der Mathematik.” Abhandlungen aus dem Seminar der Hamburgischen Universität 6:65–85.
Hume, David. 1978 (1739–1740). A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by Selby-Bigge; 2nd edition revised by P.H. Nidditch. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jacquette, Dale. 2001. David Hume’s Critique of Infinity. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers.
Jacquette, Dale, ed. 2002. Philosophy of Mathematics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Jacquette, Dale. 2004. “Mathematical Fiction and Structuralism in Chihara’s Constructibility Theory.” (Review of Charles S. Chihara, A Structural Account of Mathematics). History and Philosophy of Logic 25:319–24.
Lee, Edward N. 1966. “On the Metaphysics of the Image in Plato’s Timaeus.” The Monist 50:341–68.
Maddy, Penelope. 1980. “Perception and Mathematical Intuition.” The Philosophical Review 89:163–96.
Maddy, Penelope. 1990. Realism in Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Maddy, Penelope. 1997. Naturalism in Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Maurer, Armand. 1999. The Philosophy of William of Ockham in the Light of Its Principles. Rome: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies.
Mill, John Stuart. 1941 (1843). A System of Logic, Rationative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and Methods of Scientific Investigation. London: Longmans, Gree & Co.
Nehamas, Alexader. 1982. “Participation and Predication in Plato’s Later Thought.” The Review of Metaphysics 36:343–74.
Ockham, William (of). 1974. Ockham’s Theory of Terms, Part I of the Summa Logicae. Translated by Michael J. Loux. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Plato. 1971. Gorgias. Translated with an introduction by Walter Hamilton. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
Plato. 1982. Philebus. Translated with an introduction by Robin A.H. Waterfield. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
Putnam, Hilary. 1967a. “Mathematics Without Foundations.” The Journal of Philosophy 64:5–22.
Putnam, Hilary. 1967b. “The Thesis that Mathematics Is Logic.” In Bertrand Russell: Philosopher of the Century, edited by Ralph Schoenman, 273–303. London: George Allen & Unwin.
Quine, W.V.O. 1986. “Reply to Charles Parsons.” In The Philosophy of W.V. Quine, edited by L. Hahn and P. Schilpp, 396–403. LaSalle: Open Court.
Resnik, Michael. 1981. “Mathematics as a Science of Patterns: Ontology and Reference.” Noûs 16:529–50.
Resnik, Michael. 1988. “Mathematics from the Structural Point of View.” Revue internationale de philosophie 42:400–24.
Resnik, Michael. 1997. Mathematics as a Science of Patterns. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shapiro, Stuart. 1997. Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shapiro, Stuart. 2000. Thinking About Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Steiner, Mark. 1998. The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sweeney, Leo. 1988. “Participation in Plato’s Dialogues: Phaedo, Parmenides, Sophist, Timaeus.” The New Scholasticism 62:125–49.
Van Atten, Mark. 2004. On Brouwer. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Philosophers Series.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2012 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Jacquette, D. (2012). Applied Mathematics in the Sciences. In: Trobok, M., Miščević, N., Žarnić, B. (eds) Between Logic and Reality. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 25. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2390-0_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2390-0_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-007-2389-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-007-2390-0
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)