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Structural Assumptions, Newton’s Scientific Method, and the Universal Law of Gravitation

  • Ori Belkind
Chapter
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 264)

Abstract

In previous chapters Galilean spacetime and Newton’s Laws of Motion were reconstructed from a geometry of motions and the structure of physical systems. Once a geometry of PUMs and a structure governing physical systems were assumed, the basic physical concepts and laws of motion of Newtonian mechanics were derived. The main benefit of this reconstruction so far is in providing an economic presentation of the foundation of Newtonian mechanics, and in revealing new conceptual connections between material properties such as mass and the structure of spacetime.

Keywords

Gravitational Force Background Assumption Empirical Claim Structural Assumption Centripetal Acceleration 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of RichmondRichmondUSA

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