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Realism and Reductionism

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Interpreting Physics

Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 289))

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Abstract

Philosophical discussions of many problems implicitly presuppose an interpretation of physics. This chapter considers the changes in four problematic issues consequent upon a change in the interpretation of physics. The first is continuity. Interpreting the language of classical physics as a specialized extension of an ordinary language core allows for an underlying continuity in the historical development of physics, rather than a series of paradigm shifts. The second problematic concerns realism. We distinguish the functional realism, implicit in ordinary language and its extensions, from theories concerning a correspondence with objective reality. Functional realism banks on public objects and is adequate to the practice of physics. The third problem area concerns emergence and reduction. Traditional global reductionism relies on a metaphysics that is an idealization of distinctive features of classical physics. Physics, as interpreted here, does not support the traditional program of global reductionism, but accepts reductionism as a default position between levels and allows the possibility of emergence. The final problem concerns the human order and the mind-body problem. We outline a way in which the human order, which has epistemological primacy, relates to the quantum order, which has ontological primacy.

Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe on instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an instinct.

F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality: An Essay in Metaphysics, p. x.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Penrose (2004) gives a very detailed account of the interplay of physical ideas and mathematical formulations in the development of physics and a brief summary of its significance in section 34.2.

  2. 2.

    Georgi (1993), Manohar (1996) and Kaplan (2005) present general accounts of effective field theory. The tower of theories is explored in Kane (2000, chap. 3). The philosophical significance of effective theories has been treated in Hartmann (2001), and Castellani (2002).

  3. 3.

    The ‘reasonable man’ became established in legal tradition chiefly through the influence of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes See Menand (2001, p. 343). Liability for damages in tort cases involves presuppositions about the expectations a reasonable man would have and the precautions he would take.

  4. 4.

    A Companion to Continental Philosophy (Critchley et al. 1998) has 56 articles surveying the overall development. None of these treat physics or the type of information physics supplies.

  5. 5.

    Hacking (1983) shifted the realism debates from a focus on theories to a focus on experiments and the use of entities as tools. I believe that in functional scientific realism the emphasis should be on entities accepted as public objects, some of which may serve as experimental tools. Franklin (1981, 1983, 1986) and Galison (1987) emphasize the role of experimental traditions in setting up and interpreting experiments.

  6. 6.

    This simple labeling slights the subtlety of her neo-Kantian analysis. However her analysis, like Kant, slights the role of language in concept formation.

  7. 7.

    See Putnam (1987, 1990). Conant’s introduction to (1990) contains a survey of Putnam’s development as does Norris (1999) and Putnam (2004).

  8. 8.

    Fine’s NOA was developed in his (1986) and elsewhere.

  9. 9.

    Pinker (2007, pp. 208–225) analyzes primitive notions of causality reflected in dead or submerged metaphors operative in many different ordinary languages. The conjecture is that the primitive notion involved a conflict between an antagonist using force to change the natural state of an agonist. Hanson (1961, chap. 3) presented an influential argument against the extension of the ordinary notion of causality to scientific explanations.

  10. 10.

    Surveys of these developments may be found in Kim (1990), Moser and Trout (1995) and Block et al. (1997).

  11. 11.

    A more detailed account including these differences can be found in MacKinnon (2009).

  12. 12.

    Surprisingly, Thomas Aquinas set the methodology for conducting such arguments in an unprejudical fashion. In his methodology natural philosophy begins with the assumption that all beings are material beings and postulates non-material beings only if this proves inadequate. The reasons he found this assumption inadequate in explaining motion and concept formation are no longer viable.

  13. 13.

    John Searle’s New York Review article of March 6, 1997 led to an exchange between Chalmers and Searle, ibid, May 15, 1997, pp. 60–61.

  14. 14.

    See Tarlaci (2010) for an historical survey of attempts to invoke quantum mechanics in explaining brain processes.

  15. 15.

    Such a position has been developed in Bitbol (2007).

  16. 16.

    Churchland (1981), reproduced in many anthologies. When confronted with criticisms, such as the inconsistency involved in defending a belief that beliefs do not exist, he has broadened the status of folk psychology to a pervasive framework.

  17. 17.

    Her published article is available online at http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/Falk/Referees. It contains an extensive bibliography. Initial reactions are summarized in Scientific American, 291 (Aug. 2003, 30–32).

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    Edward Mackinnon

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Mackinnon, E. (2012). Realism and Reductionism. In: Interpreting Physics. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 289. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2369-6_8

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