The Philosopher’s Reaction to the Vulgar: Imagined Causes Revisited
In Part II of this book, we saw that Hume thinks that we always imagine ideas of objects that admit of perfect identity—by way of transcendental causation. However, while explaining the “philosopher’s” position in 1.4.2, Hume claims that we only imagine causes in reaction to the vulgar, where we do not employ transcendental causation. In this chapter, we examine the philosophical position in detail. In Sect. 1, I explain why vulgar perspective II falls apart—at the hands of the philosophers. In Sect. 2, I explain why the philosophers think that it is reasonable to think that mind-independent objects exist. In Sect. 3, I explain why Hume thought the philosophers were mistaken.
KeywordsPhilosophical Position Modus Tollens Philosophical System Independent Existence Perfect Identity
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