Abstract
In this chapter, I make two major claims, which conflict with most, if not all readings of 1.4.2, First, the vulgar perspective should be divided into two sections, which correspond to, respectively, parts 2 and 3 of Hume’s system of identity. We may refer to these sections as vulgar perspective I, and vulgar perspective II. Second, neither vulgar perspective I nor II should be confused with the three accounts of perfect identity that were explicated in Part II of this book.
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Notes
- 1.
However, this is not to suggest that these two perspectives are mutually exclusive. Rather, we might even characterize them as two “phases” of vulgar thought. In both perspectives, or phases, the vulgar think that objects are what we see, touch, taste, hear and/or feel, i.e. objects are impressions. However, why the vulgar think this is the case clearly shifts, and thus, we see what I characterize as two perspectives, or phases in their thought.
- 2.
The bulk of this chapter has been published in Hume Studies, 33 #1 (2007) 67–90. I am grateful for the feedback that I received when presenting earlier versions of it at the 32nd Hume Society Conference, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada, 2005, Hamilton College, Clinton, NY, 2005, and The Third International Reid Symposium: Scottish Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen Scotland, July 2004.
- 3.
There is an immediate flaw with the vulgar theory presented on T 1.4.2.31; SBN 202 that Hume does not point out until T 1.4.2.43; SBN 209–10: One could not, according to Hume, compare a set of resembling sense impressions if all of them were not immediately present to the senses. According to Hume, we do not remember sense impressions, but instead, ideas of sense impressions (recall Chap. 1). As a result, in the course of his explanation of the vulgar position, Hume implicitly assumes (T 1.4.2.32; SBN 203) and then explicitly states on T 1.4.2; SBN 209–10, that although the vulgar think that they are identifying sense impressions, they are actually relating either a set of ideas with each other or are relating a set of ideas with a current sense impression or impressions. For instance, I might relate all of my memories of my impressions of a motorcycle with my current sense impressions of the motorcycle, and then proceed to mistakenly identify this set of ideas and impressions with the “object” motorcycle. Oddly though, commentators have tended to overlook this somewhat fundamental detail. See for example, Price (1940, pp. 33–44): “Let us now try to state Hume’s meaning more clearly. As before, we must describe the situation entirely in terms of impressions…here again we find that there is an interrupted series of impressions, a series with a gap in it” (p. 35; emphasis added).
- 4.
Hume seems to have Level 1 constancy in mind here, for, as we will see above, the vulgar do not imagine a cause of their perceptions such that in turn, these perceptions appear to be Level 2 constant (and coherent).
- 5.
However, some reflection is clearly involved in what I call vulgar perspective II. But this reflection does not concern the vulgar’s seemingly instinctive inability to distinguish between objects and impressions. Rather, it concerns their attempt to alleviate the contradiction that results from this inability. See Sect. 3 of this chapter for more detail.
- 6.
Although, as noted in the immediately preceding footnote, Hume is fully aware that regardless of what the vulgar claim, these could not be sets of resembling impressions, but instead, they must be sets of resembling ideas or sets of resembling impressions and ideas of impressions.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
To be precise, we should note that initially, Hume tells us that he is looking for dispositions that are either similar or the same as those caused by ideas of perfect identity: “not only [does the relation of resemblance cause] an association of ideas, but also of dispositions, and makes us conceive the one idea by an act or operation of the mind, similar to that by which the conceive the other. This circumstance I have observ’d to be of great moment; and we may establish it for a general rule, that whatever ideas place the mind in the same disposition or in similar ones are very apt to be confounded” (T 1.4.2.32; SBN 203; emphases added). However, shortly after this passage, he seems to restrict his discussion to dispositions that are not just similar, but in fact, are the same: “Now what other objects, besides identical ones [namely, ones that admit of perfect identity], are capable of placing the mind in the same disposition, when it considers them, and of causing the same uninterrupted passage of the imagination from one idea to another?” (T 1.4.2.34; SBN 203; emphasis added) And finally, in his last remark regarding dispositions at this juncture in the Treatise, he retreats to characterizing them as almost the same, and so it would seem, as merely similar: “An easy transition or passage of the imagination, along the ideas of these different and interrupted perceptions, is almost the same disposition of mind with that in which we consider one constant and uninterrupted perception [namely, a perception that enables us to think of an idea as admitting of a perfect identity ]” (T 1.4.2.35; SBN 204; emphasis added, c.f. above, Sect. 4.1.2). However, although I think that we should, at least, be aware of Hume’s oscillation on this point, I don’t think it substantively affects his position regarding the distinction between what I call vulgar perspective I versus vulgar perspective II. As a result, we need not pursue its implications any further.
- 10.
Hume appears to be using ‘ideas’ quite loosely here. For given the context of this sentence, ‘ideas’ could mean a set of resembling perceptions (which could entail impressions and ideas), or it could mean an idea of an object that admits of “perfect identity.”
- 11.
As noted earlier, Hume warned us that he might, after the vulgar, use the word ‘object’ interchangeably with the word ‘perception’ (T 1.4.2.31; SBN 202). Here is a case where he seems to be doing so. For as explained earlier, Hume is clear that sets of resembling perceptions cause dispositions that are similar to, if not the same as, dispositions caused by the ideas of perfect identity. That is, in both cases, perceptions cause these dispositions, not mind-independent “objects,” as Hume seems to imply in the passage noted above. But it may have just been easier for Hume to use the word ‘object’ here—in the spirit of the vulgar—however misleading it might be.
- 12.
Keep in mind that Hume is using the word ‘object’ here interchangeably with ‘perception.’
- 13.
Again, Hume seems to be using the word ‘object’ interchangeably with the word ‘perception’ here—for at no point does he even suggest that the vulgar may somehow apprehend mind-independent “objects” such that they may “fix” their thoughts on them. Rather, the implication is that the vulgar simply focus on one kind of impression for an extended period of time, e.g. a violet impression, without, seemingly, entertaining any interruptions, e.g. looking away, at a chair. This point reminds us of “act/object” problem, discussed in Chap. 7. Recall that this problem is: Are impressions mental “states” or are they “objects” of mental states? In the passages cited above, Hume indicates that perceptions are objects. Certain dispositions (states of mind) survey resembling objects, where, as I have explained throughout, these “objects” are perceptions. However, one might argue that this usage is just an artifact of his attempt to adopt the vulgar position (where he uses the word ‘object’ interchangeably with ‘perception’). But in this case, although perceptions are not mind-independent things, they are discrete, interrupted “things” that are “surveyed” by the mind. In this very general respect, perceptions do appear to be objects of the mind rather than being states of mind. However, it could be argued that regardless, they are discrete experiences, that, as such, are the “objects” of dispositions. And so, in this case, generally speaking, perceptions would be states of mind and objects, as is the case with transcendentally conceived of objects, but for entirely different reasons (recall Chap. 7).
- 14.
Although Hume is not entirely explicit in this regard, we may conclude that by “faculties of mind,” he is referring to the imagination simply because in the next paragraph (T 1.4.2.34; SBN 203–4), he explicitly tells us that the imagination is responsible for moving in an uninterrupted passage from one idea to another as time passes; and so, he is implicitly identifying the “faculties” that “continue” the idea at hand with the imagination: “Now what other objects, besides identical ones, are capable of placing the mind in the same disposition, when it considers them, and causing the same uninterrupted passage of the imagination from one idea to another?” (T 1.4.2.34; SBN 203)
- 15.
At least initially, for as shown in Sect. 3 of this chapter, the vulgar ultimately abandon this approach and turn to what I characterize as vulgar perspective II.
- 16.
Hume uses the word ‘same’ interchangeably with the word ‘uninterrupted’ here. We may conclude that this is the case because previous to this passage, he compares dispositions caused by ideas of perfect identity with dispositions caused by sets of resembling, successive and interrupted perceptions. Concomitantly, given our definition of “perfect identity,” he is comparing dispositions caused by ideas of objects that are both uninterrupted and invariable, with dispositions caused by ideas of objects that are merely invariable. In the passage noted above, he is still comparing these two kinds of dispositions. As a result, it simply follows that the comparison he makes here must be between an idea that is invariable and uninterrupted (and so, admits of perfect identity) with a set of interrupted, resembling and successive perceptions. Thus, when he refers to the object in the passage cited above as the “same invariable object,” he must have meant the “[uninterrupted and] invariable object;” namely, the idea of an object with a perfect identity. Note that for similar reasons, Hume also uses ‘same’ to mean ‘uninterrupted on T 1.4.2.34; SBN 204.
- 17.
As noted in an earlier footnote, here is another instance where Hume uses ‘same’ (as well as, in this case, ‘sameness’) interchangeably with ‘uninterrupted.’
- 18.
Or as Hume puts it: “We find by experience, that there is such a constancy [namely, a resemblance] in almost all the impressions of the senses, that their interruption produces no alteration on them, and hinders them not from returning the same in appearance and in situation as at their first existence. I survey the furniture in chamber; I shut my eyes, and afterwards open them; and find the new perceptions to resemble perfectly those, which formerly struck my senses. This [Rp] resemblance is observ’d in a thousand instances, and naturally connects together our ideas of these interrupted perceptions by the strongest relation, and conveys the mind with an easy transition from one to another. An easy transition or passage of the imagination, along with the ideas of these different and interrupted perceptions, is almost the same disposition of mind with that in which we consider one constant an uninterrupted perception. ‘ Tis therefore very natural for us to mistake one for the other” (T 1.4.2.35; SBN 204; italics and boldness added). Also recall that Hume makes a very similar point just before he launches into his discussion of vulgarly-conceived-of perfect identity: “This circumstance I have observ’d to be of great moment; and we may establish it for a general rule, that whatever ideas place the mind in the same disposition or in similar ones, are very apt to be confounded” (T 1.4.2.32; SBN 203). And still elsewhere: “objects [that place us in the same uninterrupted disposition] are very naturally confounded with [perfectly] identical ones” (T 1.4.2.34; SBN 203).
- 19.
To further support my claim that part 2 of Hume’s 4-part system is meant to be an explication of vulgar perspective I, while part 3 is an explication of vulgar perspective II, note that Hume initially explains the distinction between parts 2 and 3 as follows: “Secondly, Give a reason, why the resemblance of our broken and interrupted perceptions induces us to attribute an identity to them. Thirdly, Account for that propensity, which this illusion gives, to unite these broken appearances by a continu’d existence” (T 1.4.2.25; SBN 200). Notice that even according to this very brief summary, it is clear that each part consists of a separate attempt to account for identity, where part 2 directly turns on “the resemblance of our broken and interrupted perceptions,” and part 3 explains a “propensity” that seems to fall out of the illusory content of the first attempt, particularly, the contradiction it generates. In particular, Hume suggests here, part 3 is an explanation of the vulgar “propensity” to add uninterruptedness (i.e. “continuity”) a second time to their notion of an object. Also, we must ask, if parts 2 and 3 were not meant to be separate accounts, why would Hume divide them as such?
- 20.
It must be noted that to some degree, Price implicitly acknowledges this distinction between vulgar perspective I and vulgar perspective II, loosely identifying them as two “stages” in Hume’s account of identity (see Price, 1940, p. 49). However, in the course of doing so, Price does not acknowledge that Hume is speaking for the vulgar here, not himself, and so, I must distance myself from Price’s reading. In addition, Price does not explicitly acknowledge the role of dispositions, perfect identity, and nor does he think that the unperceived perception that the vulgar are forced to posit in light of the contradiction that falls out of vulgar perspective I is a meant to be a continuous “being.” See Sect. 3.2 of this chapter for more detail.
- 21.
- 22.
I am grateful to Abe Roth for suggesting (i) and (ii) at the 32nd Hume Society Conference (Roth, 2005).
- 23.
Or as Hume puts it: “When we are present [in a vulgar state of mind], we say we feel, or see it. Here then may arise two questions; First, How we can satisfy ourselves in supposing a perception to be absent from the mind without being annihilated. Secondly, After what manner we conceive an object to become present to the mind, without some new creation of a perception or image; and what we mean by this seeing, and feeling, and perceiving” (T 1.4.2.38; SBN 207).
- 24.
Or as Roth puts it: “[By invoking his own theory of mind] Hume can feel free to attribute to the vulgar a belief in perceptions unperceived, and not worry that he’s violating some principle of charity by attributing to them some obvious contradiction” (Roth, 2005, p. 4).
- 25.
C.f. Wright (1983, pp. 65–66) in partial support of the claim that (on behalf of the vulgar) Hume has a single not-necessarily-perceived impression in mind here. However, although Wright initially claims that indeed, such impressions are singular, and thus, constitute the whole object at hand, without explanation he claims that such not-necessarily-perceived impressions are (in the spirit of Price et al.), particular “gap fillers.” Note: “[Hume] claims that the source of our belief in the unperceived and independent existence of our resembling impressions lies in our tendency to image (form an idea of) a single temporally continuous perception when what we actually sense (have an impression of) are two or more temporally discontinuous resembling perceptions. The natural propensity of the imagination leads us to think of our resembling impressions as one continuous appearance … through a kind of ‘confused reasoning’ we combine the contradictory perceptions of imagination and sense, and so judge the unperceived existence of our resembling impressions. We are then forced to think of them as existing in the gap between their appearances” (p. 66; last emphasis added). See also Noonan (1999, p. 181).
- 26.
This is not the same confusion that occurs with vulgar perspective I. Recall that in vulgar perspective I, resembling dispositions (not constant and coherent impressions) prompt us to mistakenly identify the respective causes of those resembling dispositions with each other. In particular, we confuse sets of resembling perceptions and the vulgar notion of perfect identity.
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Rocknak, S. (2013). The Vulgar Attempt to Achieve Perfect Identity. In: Imagined Causes: Hume's Conception of Objects. The New Synthese Historical Library, vol 71. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2187-6_8
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