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A Mysterious Kind of Causation: The Second Account of Transcendental Perfect Identity

  • Stefanie Rocknak
Chapter
Part of the The New Synthese Historical Library book series (SYNL, volume 71)

Abstract

Traditionally, scholars have argued that 1.4.2 may be split into two general sections: one that concerns the “vulgar” conception of objects, and another that concerns the “philosophical” conception of objects. I argue that there is a third position: Hume’s, which includes two more accounts of how we transcendentally conceive of perfect identity. We examine one of those accounts of perfect identity here (which constitutes Hume’s second account of how we transcendentally conceive of perfect identity) and the other in  Chap. 7 (which constitutes Hume’s third account of how we transcendentally conceive of perfect identity). In  Chaps. 8 and  9, I show why all three instances of how we transcendentally conceive of perfect identity are not to be confused with the vulgar position on objects, nor with the philosophical position.

Keywords

External Object Distinct Object Causal Reasoning Coherent Impression Great Regularity 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stefanie Rocknak
    • 1
  1. 1.Hartwick CollegeOneontaUSA

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