Our Thoughts and Their Objects
This chapter is about how we as adults use language to represent these qualified things. I first show that the objects of our true thoughts are what Chrysippus called obtaining propositions, which is what we now call facts. Then I look at four kinds of thought and the kinds of fact they represent. I start with two kinds of thought that are unique in that they are guaranteed to be true, according to Chrysippus, namely sense perceptions and preconceptions. I argue that sense perceptions represent so-called simple facts and that all conceptions represent the sort of non-simple facts that can be captured in conditionals. I then look at two kinds of thought that are indispensable when we engage in philosophy, namely thoughts about imaginary objects and arguments. I argue that we must form thoughts about imaginary objects when we define things, but that we must do this in such a way as to not come to believe that Platonic forms really exist. I also argue that we must use arguments to get access to facts that are otherwise hidden to us, and that we get access to such facts as soon as we master a skill well enough to be able to see that an established fact is a sign of a hidden one.