Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Meeting the Challenges and Balancing the Competing Interests in Creating a Legal and Regulatory Framework

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Law and Regulation of Commercial Mining of Minerals in Outer Space

Part of the book series: Space Regulations Library ((SPRL,volume 7))

  • 2364 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter attempts to balance the various competing interests to create a legal and policy position that may be acceptable to most members of the international community. Through balancing such interests, it will be possible for new legal principles to be adopted in regulating the exploration and exploitation of mineral resources from celestial bodies. This is particularly the case in relation to the resolution of the present impasse over the common heritage of mankind doctrine and the provision of temporary property rights for such purposes notwithstanding the non-appropriation principle, which are the two legal principles that pose the greatest barriers to the creation of a new regulatory framework.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 189.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 249.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 249.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the “Moon Agreement”), opened for signature on 18 December 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3; 18 I.L.M. 1434 (entered into force on 11 July 1984). See Eric Husby, Sovereignty and Property Rights in Outer Space (1994) 3 Detroit Coll. L. J. Int’l. L. & Prac. 359 at 362 and Kevin V. Cook, The Discovery of Lunar Water: An Opportunity to Develop a Workable Moon Treaty (1999) 11 Georgetown Int’l. Envt’l. L. Rev. 647 at 677.

  2. 2.

    Cook, supra note 1, at 677 and Grier C. Raclin, From Ice to Ether: The Adoption of a Regime to Govern Resource Exploitation in Outer Space (1986) 7 J. Int’l. L. & Bus. 727, at 728–730.

  3. 3.

    Thomas M. Franck and Dennis M. Sughrue, Symposium: The International Role of Equity-as-Fairness (1993) 81 Georgetown L. J. 563 at 590–594 and Kemal Baslar, The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law (1998) at 264–265.

  4. 4.

    See, for example, Michael J. Listner, The Ownership and Exploitation of Outer Space: A Look at Foundational Law and Future Legal Challenges to Current Claims (2003) 1 Regent J. Int’l. L. 75; Stephen D. Mau, Equity, the Third World and the Moon Treaty (1984) 8 Suffolk Transnat’l. L. J. 221; and Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Key Objections to the Moon Treaty (2003), National Space Society Chapters Network, <http://www.nsschapters.org/hub/pdf/MoonTreatyObjections.pdf>, 28 April 2003, last accessed on 28 November 2009.

  5. 5.

    Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (the “Outer Space Treaty”), opened for signature on 27 January 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205; 18 U.S.T. 2410; T.I.A.S. 6347; 6 I.L.M. 386 (entered into force on 10 October 1967).

  6. 6.

    Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature on 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 1980 U.K.T.S. 58 (entered into force on 27 January 1980), Article 30(2). For the States that have signed but not ratified the Moon Agreement, they are nevertheless required to refrain from acts that would defeat its object and purpose: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 18.

  7. 7.

    This was part of the motivation for some States Parties to the Moon Agreement, most notably Australia and Chile, to seek an examination of it by the Legal Sub-committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: U.N. Doc. COPUOS/LEGAL/T.632, 3 April 2000, at 3.

  8. 8.

    United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature on 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3; 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force on 16 November 1994).

  9. 9.

    Moon Agreement, Article 11.

  10. 10.

    See, for example, Reynolds, supra note 4.

  11. 11.

    Moon Agreement, Article 11.

  12. 12.

    See Stacey A. Davis, Unifying the Final Frontier: Space Industry Financing Reform (2001) 106 Com. L. J. 455 and William Lee Andrews III, A Mighty Stone for David’s Sling: The International Space Company (2003) 1 Regent J. Int’l. L. 5.

  13. 13.

    Outer Space Treaty, Article II. See Stephen Gorove, Sovereignty and the Law of Outer Space Re-examined (1977) 2 Ann. Air & Sp. L. 311 at 316; Ezra J. Reinstein, Owning Outer Space (1999) 20 Nw. J. Int’l. L. & Bus. 59; and Rosanna Sattler, Transporting a Legal System for Property Rights: From the Earth to the Stars (2005) 6 Chi. J. Int’l. L. 23; Leslie I. Tennen, Second Commentary on Emerging System of Property Rights in Outer Space (2003) United Nations, Proceedings of the United Nations / Republic of Korea Workshop on Space Law 342 at 343; and Patricia M. Sterns and Leslie I. Tennen, Privateering and Profiteering on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies: Debunking the Myth of Property Rights in Space (2003) 31 Adv. Space Res. 2433.

  14. 14.

    See generally Nandasiri Jasentuliyana and Roy S. Lee (eds.), Manual on Space Law (1979), vol. 1.

  15. 15.

    See Tennen, supra note 13 and Reinstein, supra note 13.

  16. 16.

    See Frederick Arnold, Toward a Principled Approach to the Distribution of Global Wealth: An Impartial Solution to the Dispute over Seabed Manganese Nodules (1980) 17 San Diego L. Rev. 557; Elisabeth Mann Borgese, A Constitution for the Oceans: Comments and Suggestions Regarding Part XI of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (1978) 15 San Diego L. Rev. 371; James R. Silkenat, Solving the Problem of the Deep Seabed: The Informal Composite Negotiating Text for the First Committee of UNCLOS III (1977) 9 N. Y. U. J. Int’l. L. & Pol’y. 177; Robert B. Krueger, Policy Options in the Law of the Sea Negotiations (1978) 6 Int’l. Bus. Lawyer 89; and Robert F. Pietrowski, Jr., Hard Minerals on the Deep Ocean Floor: Implications for American Law and Policy (1978) 19 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 43.

  17. 17.

    Convention on the Law of the Sea, Annex III, Article 13.

  18. 18.

    Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (the “1994 Agreement”), opened for signature on 28 July 1994, 1836 U.N.T.S. 3; 33 I.L.M. 1309 (entered into force on 28 July 1996), Annex, Section 8.

  19. 19.

    James Otto, Craig Andrews, Fred Cawood, Michael Doggett, Pietro Guj, Frank Stermole, John Stermole and John Tilton, Mining Royalties: A Global Study of Their Impact on Investors, Government and Civil Society (2006), at 35–37.

  20. 20.

    See Eiji Ogawa and Takatoshi Ito, On the Desirability of a Regional Basket Currency Arrangement (2002) 16 J. Japan. & Int’l. Econ. 317; Hali J. Edison and Erling Vårdal, Optimal Currency Baskets for Small, Developed Economies (1990) 92 Scand. J. Econ. 559; and Lars Hörngren and Anders Vredin, Exchange Risk Premia in a Currency Basket System (1989) 125 Rev. World Econ. 311.

  21. 21.

    Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 144.

  22. 22.

    1994 Agreement, Annex, Section 5.

  23. 23.

    See, for example, Mark Orlove, Spaced Out: The Third World Looks for a Way in to Outer Space (1989) 4 Conn. J. Int’l. L. 597.

  24. 24.

    Since 1995, most States have enacted patent protection laws that provide protection from the date of grant of the patent to 20 years from the filing date of the application: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, opened for signature on 15 April 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (entered into force on 1 January 1995), Article 33.

  25. 25.

    Wassenaar Arrangement, Basic Documents (2009), at <http://www.wassenaar.org/publicdocuments/2009/Basic%20Documents%20-%20Jan%202009.pdf>, 20 January 2009, last accessed on 30 November 2009.

  26. 26.

    The Member States of the Wassenaar Arrangement are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States: Wassenaar Arrangement, Participating States, at <http://www.wassenaar.org/participants/index.html>, last accessed on 28 November 2009; and the MTCR Partners are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States: Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR Partners, at <http://www.mtcr.info/english/partners.html>, last accessed on 28 November 2009.

  27. 27.

    See Colin B. Picker, A View from 40,000 Feet: International Law and the Invisible Hand of Technology (2002) 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 149.

  28. 28.

    Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 170. See Reynolds, supra note 4 and Stephen E. Doyle, Using Extraterrestrial Resources Under the Moon Agreement of 1979 (1998) 26 J. Sp. L. 111.

  29. 29.

    Outer Space Treaty, Article IX.

  30. 30.

    Moon Agreement, Article 7(1).

  31. 31.

    See, for example, Paul G. Dembling and Swadesh S. Kalsi, Pollution of Man’s Last Frontier: Adequacy of Present Space Environmental Law in Preserving the Resource of Outer Space (1973) 20 Neth. Int’l. L. Rev. 125; Marta Miklody, Some Remarks to the Legal Status of Celestial Bodies and Protection of Environment (1982) 25 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Sp. 117; and Raymond T. Swenson, Pollution of the Extraterrestrial Environment (1985) 25 A. F. L. Rev. 70.

  32. 32.

    Outer Space Treaty, Article IX.

  33. 33.

    Moon Agreement, Article 7(1).

  34. 34.

    Carl Q. Christol, The Modern International Law of Outer Space (1982), at 140.

  35. 35.

    Dembling and Kalsi, supra note 31, at 141.

  36. 36.

    See Hannah Devlin, Evidence of Life on Mars Lurks Beneath Surface of Meteorite, NASA Experts Claim, The Times (London), 27 November 2009, at <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/science/space/article6934078.ece>, last accessed on 30 November 2009.

  37. 37.

    See George S. Robinson, Earth Exposure to Martian Matter: Back Contamination Procedures and International Quarantine Regulations (1976) 15 Colum. J. Transnat’l. L. 17.

  38. 38.

    See, for example, R. Lynne Allen, Brett Gladman, J. J. Kavelaars, Jean-Marc Petit, Joel W. Parker and Philip D. Nicholson, Discovery of a Low-Eccentricity, High Inclination Kuiper Belt Object at 58 AU (2006) 640 Astrophysics J. 83 and Jane X. Luu and David C. Jewitt, Kuiper Belt Objects: Relics from the Accretion Disk of the Sun (2002) 30 Ann. Rev. Astron. & Astrop. 63.

  39. 39.

    See, for example, Leonard David, Space Weapons for Earth Wars, at <http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/technology/space_war_020515-1.html>, 15 May 2002, last accessed on 30 November 2009 and Robert Preston, Dana J. Johnson, Sean J. A. Edwards, Michael D. Miller and Calvin Shipbaugh, Space Weapons, Earth Wars (2002), at Appendix C.

  40. 40.

    General Assembly Resolution 47/68. See also Jason Reiskind, Toward a Responsible Use of Nuclear Power in Outer Space – The Canadian Initiative in the United Nations (1981) 4 Ann. Air & Sp. L. 461.

  41. 41.

    NPS Principles, Principle 3.

  42. 42.

    See Michael J. Patterson, John E. Foster, Thomas Haag, Vincent K. Rawlin, George C. Soulas and Robert F. Roman, NEXT: NASA’s Evolutionary Xenon Thruster (2002), paper presented at the 38th Joint Propulsion Conference and Exhibition, 7–10 July 2002, in Indianapolis, IN, USA and Ivana Hrbud, Melissa van Dyke, Mike Houts and Keith Goodfellow, End-to-End Demonstrator of the Safe Affordable Fission Engine (SAFE) 30: Power Conversion and Ion Engine Operation, paper presented at the Space Technologies Applications International Forum Conference, 3–7 February 2002, Albuquerque, NM, USA.

  43. 43.

    See, for example, Roger M. Myers, Eric J. Pencil, Vincent K. Rawlin, Michael Kussmaul and Katessha Oden, NSTAR Ion Thruster Plume Impact Assessments, paper presented at the 31st Joint Propulsion Conference and Exhibition, 10–12 July 1995, in San Diego, CA, USA; John S. Synder, John R. Anderson, Jonathan L. van Noord and George C. Soulas, Environmental Testing of the NEXT PM1 Ion Engine, paper presented at the 43rd Joint Propulsion Conference and Exhibition, 8–11 July 2007, in Cincinnati, OH, USA; and James S. Sovey, Joyce A. Dever and John L. Power, Retention of Sputtered Molybdenum on Ion Engine Discharge Chamber Surfaces, paper presented at the 27th International Electric Propulsion Conference, 14–19 October 2001, in Pasadena, CA, USA.

  44. 44.

    See Ricky J. Lee and Catherine Doldirina, Legal and Policy Issues Arising from the Use of Nuclear and Radioisotopic Power Sources and Propulsion Systems in Outer Space, paper presented at the 60th International Astronautical Congress, 12–16 October 2009, in Daejeon, Republic of Korea.

  45. 45.

    See Robert Everett Bostrom, The United States’ Legislative Response to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea Deadlock (1979) 2 B. C. Int’l. & Comp. L. J. 409 and Charles Douglas Oliver, Interim Deep Seabed Mining Legislation: An International Environmental Perspective (1981) 8 J. Legis. 73.

  46. 46.

    Outer Space Treaty, Article IX.

  47. 47.

    See Edmund L. Andrews, Tiny Tonga Seeks Satellite Empire in Space, The New York Times, 28 August 1990, at A1; Albert N. Delzeit and Robert F. Beal, The Vulnerability of the Pacific Rim Orbital Spectrum Under International Space Law (1996) 9 N. Y. Int’l. L. Rev. 69; and Jonathan Ira Ezor, Costs Overhead: Tonga’s Claiming of Sixteen Geostationary Orbital Sites and the Implications for U.S. Space Policy (1993) 24 L. & Pol’y. Int’l. Bus. 915.

  48. 48.

    See, for example, Jannat C. Thompson, Space for Rent: The International Telecommunication Union, Space Law and Orbit/Spectrum Licensing (1996) 62 J. Air L. & Com. 279 and Henry Wong, The Paper “Satellite” Chase: The ITU Prepares for Its Final Exam in Resolution 18 (1998) 63 J. Air L. & Com. 849.

  49. 49.

    See, for example, Milton Friedman, The Reduction of Fluctuations in the Incomes of Primary Producers: A Critical Comment (1954) 64 Econ. J. 698; David Bevan, Paul Collier and Jan Willem Gunning, Temporary Trade Shocks in Developing Countries: Consequences and Policy Responses (1991); Jeffrey M. Davis, The Economic Effects of Windfall Gains in Export Earnings 1975–1978 (1983) 11 World Dev. 119; and Angus Deaton and Ron Miller, International Commodity Prices, Macroeconomic Performance and Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa, at Princeton University, <http://www.princeton.edu/~deaton/downloads/International_Commodity_Prices.pdf>, October 1995, last accessed on 29 November 2009.

  50. 50.

    See John C. Panzar, A Methodology for Measuring the Costs of Universal Service Obligations (2000) 12 Info. Econ. & Pol’y. 211 and Kenneth Katkin, Communication Breakdown? The Future of Global Connectivity After the Privatisation of INTELSAT (2005) 38 Vand. J. Transnat’l. L. 1323.

  51. 51.

    United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and the Small Island Developing States, Criteria for Identification of LDCs, at <http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/59/>, last accessed on 27 November 2009.

  52. 52.

    The 49 LDCs are Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Timor Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia: United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and the Small Island Developing States, Least Developed Countries: Country Profiles, at <http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/62/>, last accessed on 27 November 2009.

  53. 53.

    Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, opened for signature on 27 December 1945, 2 U.N.T.S. 134 (entered into force on 27 December 1945), Article I.

  54. 54.

    Ibid., Article V(4).

  55. 55.

    Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, opened for signature on 27 December 1945, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 (entered into force on 27 December 1945), Article I.

  56. 56.

    Ibid., Article XII.

  57. 57.

    See Brian M. Hoffstadt, Moving the Heavens: Lunar Mining and the “Common Heritage of Mankind” in the Moon Treaty (1994) 42 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 575 at 615.

  58. 58.

    Ibid.; and Elena P. Kamenetskaya, On the Establishment of a World Space Organisation: Some Considerations and Remarks (1989) 32 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Sp. 358.

  59. 59.

    Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (the “Liability Convention”), opened for signature on 29 March 1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 187, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. 7762; 1975 A.T.S. 5 (entered into force on 1 September 1972), Article XIX.

  60. 60.

    Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature on 1 December 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 71; 12 U.S.T. 794; 19 I.L.M. 860 (entered into force on 23 June 1961), Article IX.

  61. 61.

    Final Act and Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, opened for signature on 15 April 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154; 33 I.L.M. 1144 (entered into force on 1 January 1995), Article XII.

  62. 62.

    Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Articles III and XII(5).

  63. 63.

    Agreement on the International Telecommunications Satellite Organisation, opened for signature on 20 August 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3810 (entered into force on 12 February 1973), Articles V and Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organisation, opened for signature on 3 September 1976, 31 U.S.T. 1; T.I.A.S. 905 (entered into force on 16 July 1979), Articles 5.

  64. 64.

    Agreement on the International Telecommunications Satellite Organisation, Article III and Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organisation, Article 3. See Alan Beesley, Edward McWhinney Q.C., Dallas W. Smythe, Barry Mawhinney and A. E. Gotlieb, The Legal Problems of International Telecommunications with Special Reference to INTELSAT (1970) 20 Uni. Toronto L. J. 287; and Steven A. Levy, INTELSAT: Technology, Politics and the Transformation of a Regime (1975) 29 Int’l. Org. 655.

  65. 65.

    Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Article III.

  66. 66.

    James B. Morell, The Law of the Sea: An Historical Analysis of the 1982 Treaty and its Rejection by the United States (1992); David Silverstein, Proprietary Protection for Deepsea Mining Technology in Return for Technology Transfer: New Approach to the Seabed Controversy (1978) 60 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y. 135; and Yuwen Li, Transfer of Technology for Deep Seabed Mining: The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and Beyond (1994).

  67. 67.

    Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature on 9 December 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force on 12 January 1951), Article 11 and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature on 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force on 23 March 1976), Article 48.

  68. 68.

    Charter of the United Nations, opened for signature on 26 June 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. xvi; 1946 U.K.T.S. 67 (entered into force on 24 October 1945), Article 2(4). Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations states that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

  69. 69.

    Ibid., Article 2(7). Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations provides that “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”

  70. 70.

    Ibid., Article 25.

  71. 71.

    Ibid., Articles 41–42.

  72. 72.

    Outer Space Treaty, Article III.

  73. 73.

    Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections (Yugoslavia v. Bosnia and Herzegovina) [2003] I.C.J. Rep. 7. See also Ricky J. Lee, Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Yugoslavia v. Bosnia and Herzegovina) [2003] Aus. Int’l. L. J. 205 and John R. Crook, The 2003 Judicial Activity of the International Court of Justice (2004) 98 Am. J. Int’l. L. 309.

  74. 74.

    See Morell, supra note 66; Stanley B. Rosenfield, The Moon Treaty: The United States Should Not Become A Party (1980) 74 Am. Soc’y. Int’l. L. Proc. 162; Carl Q. Christol, The 1979 Moon Agreement: Where Is It Today? (1999) 27 J. Sp. L. 1; Doug Bandow, UNCLOS III: A Flawed Treaty (1981) 19 San Diego L. Rev. 475; and Steven J. Molitor, The Provisional Understanding Regarding Deep Seabed Matters: An Ill-Conceived Regime for U.S. Deep Seabed Mining (1987) 20 Cornell Int’l. L. J. 223.

  75. 75.

    Outer Space Treaty, Article XIV.

  76. 76.

    Moon Agreement, Article 19.

  77. 77.

    Charter of the United Nations, Article 4.

  78. 78.

    Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, opened for signature on 13 January 1993, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163; 32 I.L.M. 800 (entered into force on 29 April 1997), Article XX and Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, opened for signature on 16 November 1945, 4 U.N.T.S. 275 (entered into force on 4 November 1946), Article II(1).

  79. 79.

    Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organisation, opened for signature on 16 October 1945, 12 U.S.T. 980 (entered into force on 1 November 1945), Article II(2) and Statutes of the World Tourism Organisation, opened for signature on 27 September 1970, 27 U.S.T. 2211 (entered into force on 2 January 1975), Article 5.

  80. 80.

    Membership to the International Fund for Agricultural Development requires approval by the Governing Council, in which voting rights are based on membership and financial contribution: Agreement Establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development, opened for signature on 20 December 1976, 28 U.S.T. 8435; 15 I.L.M. 922 (entered into force on 30 November 1977), Articles 3 and 6. Membership subject to approval by a simple majority of the General Conference upon recommendation by the Board of Governors: Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, opened for signature on 26 October 1956, 276 U.N.T.S. 3; 8 U.S.T. 1093 (entered into force on 29 July 1957), Articles IV and V.

  81. 81.

    Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature on 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3; 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force on 16 November 1994) and Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, opened for signature on 28 July 1994, 1836 U.N.T.S. 3; 33 I.L.M. 1309 (entered into force on 28 July 1996).

  82. 82.

    In this context, Occupation Permits are granted for areas that are not being explored or mined but are occupied for ancillary purposes, such as an electric power plant.

  83. 83.

    Moon Agreement, Article 7.

  84. 84.

    Final Act and Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, opened for signature on 15 April 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154; 33 I.L.M. 1144 (entered into force on 1 January 1995) and the Convention on the Law of the Sea, Annex VI – Statute of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature on 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3; 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force on 28 July 1994). See Shabtai Rosenne, Establishing the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (1995) 89 Am. J. Int’l. L. 806.

  85. 85.

    The Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea; the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes; and the Statute of the International Court of Justice, opened for signature on 26 June 1945, 1945 U.K.T.S. 67 (entered into force on 24 October 1945).

  86. 86.

    The Appellate Body of the WTO similarly only has appellate jurisdiction and no original jurisdiction: WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Article 17(1). The International Court of Justice has original jurisdiction and no appellate jurisdiction, though it does have competence to hear applications for revisions to judgments where a decisive fact is newly discovered: Statute of the International Court of Justice, Articles 36 and 61.

  87. 87.

    WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Article 17(4).

  88. 88.

    Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 287.

  89. 89.

    Ibid.

  90. 90.

    Andronico O. Adede, The System for Settlement of Disputes under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1987), at 53–54.

  91. 91.

    Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 189.

  92. 92.

    WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Article 17(1); Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Article 2; and Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 3.

  93. 93.

    See, for example, Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Articles 2(1) and 4(1); WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Article 17(3); and Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 2.

  94. 94.

    Members are of the ITLOS are elected by a two-thirds majority of a meeting of the State Parties to the Convention on the Law of the Sea, provided that a quorum of two-thirds of the State Parties is constituted and the vote represents a simple majority of State Parties: Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Article 4(4). Members of the Appellate Body of the WTO are appointed by the Dispute Settlement Body: WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Article 17(2). Members of the International Court of Justice are elected by an absolute majority of the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations, with the two votes conducted independently of each other: Statute of the International Court of Justice, Articles 8 and 10.

  95. 95.

    The same structure exists for the ITLOS: Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Article 5(1) and (2). The members of the Appellate Body of the WTO are elected for terms of 4 years, of which three of the seven original members are to be limited to a 2-year term as determined by lot: WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Article 17(2). Similarly, the International Court of Justice adopts a similar structure, with judges elected to terms of 9 years, with five of the original judges elected for 3 year terms and another five of that number elected for 6 year terms as determined by lot: Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 13(1) and (2).

  96. 96.

    This is also the case for the ITLOS, the Appellate Body of the WTO and the International Court of Justice: Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Article 5(1); WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Article 17(2); and Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 13(1).

  97. 97.

    Similar restrictions apply to members of the ITLOS, the Appellate Body of the WTO and the International Court of Justice: see Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Article 7; WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Article 17(3); and Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 16.

  98. 98.

    The same applies to members of the ITLOS and the International Court of Justice: Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Article 10 and Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 19. No equivalent provision exists in the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. Examples of the diplomatic immunities and privileges enjoyed can be found in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, opened for signature on 18 April 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force on 24 April 1964); and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, opened for signature on 24 April 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (entered into force on 19 March 1967).

  99. 99.

    Similar restrictions apply to members of the ITLOS, the Appellate Body of the WTO and the International Court of Justice: see Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Article 8; WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Article 17(3); and Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 17.

  100. 100.

    This is the provision for the removal of the members of the ITLOS: Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Article 9. Judges of the International Court of Justice may be removed from office by the unanimous decision of the other judges if a particular judge is considered not to comply with the conditions or qualifications of that office: Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 18.

  101. 101.

    Michael C. Wood, International Seabed Authority: The First Four Years (1999) 3 Max Planck U.N.Y.B. 173 at 214.

  102. 102.

    The Economist, Crunch! Budget Problems at the World Trade Organisation, The Economist, 4 April 1998.

  103. 103.

    Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 171.

  104. 104.

    Rodolfo C. Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the Former ASEAN Secretary-General (2006), at 33.

  105. 105.

    Katharina Pichler Coleman, International Organisations and Peace Enforcement: The Politics of International Legitimacy (2007), at 125–126.

  106. 106.

    Article 17 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that “The expenses of the Organisation shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly”. Rule 160 of the General Assembly Rules of Procedure provides that the Committee on Contributions is to advise the General Assembly on the scale of assessment upon which the apportionment of the financial contributions are based, which is to be reviewed regularly: General Assembly Resolution 58/1(B). On 21 December 2007, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a biennial budget of US$4.17 billion for 2008–2009: United Nations, “Concluding Main Part of Session, General Assembly Adopts $4.17 Billion Budget” (press release, 21 December 2007), at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10684.doc.htm>, last accessed on 19 May 2008. See also Warren Hoge, Despite U.S. Opposition, United Nations Budget is Approved, The New York Times, 23 December 2007, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/23/world/23nations.html>, last accessed on 4 May 2008.

  107. 107.

    See Irving B. Kravisand and Michael W. S. Davenport, The Political Arithmetic of International Burden Sharing (1963) 71 J. Pol. Econ. 309; Gi-Heon Kwon, The Declining Role of Western Powers in International Organisations: Exploring a New Model of U.N. Burden Sharing (1995) 15 J. Pub. Pol’y. 65; Michele Fratianni and John Pattison, The Economics of International Organisations (1982) 35 Kyklos 244; and J. Diamond and J. R. Dodsworth, Normative and Positive Theories of International Cost Sharing: The Case of the Netherlands (1977) 124 De Economist 403.

  108. 108.

    The United Nations has adopted a similar approach, prescribing the minimum contribution of a Member State to be one-thousandth percent (0.001%) of its operating budget, though in order to avoid imposing an overly high financial burden on some countries, a prescribed ceiling of one hundredth precent (0.01%) is imposed for least developed States: United Nations, Briefing on Methodology of the Scale of Assessment (2006), at <http://www.un.org/ga/61/fifth/scale-method.pps>, last accessed on 19 May 2008.

  109. 109.

    The United Nations has adopted a similar approach, to cap the contribution of the United States, the largest economy in the world as measured by gross domestic product, at twenty-two percent (22%) of its operating budget: ibid.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Sydney, Australia

    Dr. Ricky J. Lee

Authors
  1. Dr. Ricky J. Lee
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ricky J. Lee .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2012 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Lee, R.J. (2012). Meeting the Challenges and Balancing the Competing Interests in Creating a Legal and Regulatory Framework. In: Law and Regulation of Commercial Mining of Minerals in Outer Space. Space Regulations Library, vol 7. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2039-8_6

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation