Abstract
Recently, scholars of ancient skepticism have raised what I call the Tranquility Charge: skeptical investigation aims at tranquility rather than at the discovery of truths; therefore it cannot count as genuine investigation. I argue that the Tranquility Charge, which was not raised in antiquity, rests on too simple a notion of investigation. Investigation need not aim at the discovery of truths. It must, however, be guided by epistemic norms that respond to the value of truth. On this premise, Pyrrhonian investigation can count as genuine investigation. First, it inherits a complex conception of investigation shaped by Socrates and Plato, whose philosophizing does not always immediately aim at the discovery of truths, though it certainly responds to the value of truth. Second, the motivation of investigation can be distinct from its aim. The Pyrrhonist’s motivation, namely that the mind is disturbed by discrepancy, reflects by itself concern with the truth. Third, it is a commonplace that the value of truth is associated with two aims rather than one: the acceptance of truths and the avoidance of falsehoods. The latter is prominent in skeptical investigation. The skeptics’ interlocutors share this preoccupation with the avoidance of the false, a preoccupation that, in its own way, reflects the value of truth.
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Notes
- 1.
I am exclusively concerned with the version of Pyrrhonian skepticism that Sextus presents. For some earlier skeptics, Sextus reports, suspension of judgment is, in addition to tranquility, the end of investigation (PH 1.30). However, Sextus does not incorporate this view into his own account of the skeptic’s end.
- 2.
For a forceful version of the Tranquility Charge see Striker (2001). See also Palmer (2000) and Perin (2006). The Tranquility Charge is not among the standard ancient anti-skeptical moves. It is a modern complaint against Pyrrhonism. Perin considers PH 2.1–12 an ancient instance of the objection (2006, p. 338 n. 2). But PH 2.1–12 raises a different problem (cf. Adversus Mathematicos (AM) 8.337–36a): the skeptic cannot investigate without mastering concepts and thereby, inconsistently, holding some assumptions. Cf. Brunschwig (1994), Vogt (2006), and Grgic (2008). Perin accepts the Discovery Premise and argues that the skeptic aims at two values: truth and tranquility. Palmer argues that skeptical investigation is second-order investigation: the skeptic does not search for the truth, but investigates the theories of the dogmatists. This way of untying the connection between investigation and truth does not seem compelling: what would be the point of investigating dogmatic theories? Even though different theories are critically explored, skeptical investigation must be concerned with thinking about the questions at issue, and thus must have some relationship to the truth.
- 3.
Striker (2001) points out that the philosophizing of an Academic skeptic is much like what many of us do today as philosophers.
- 4.
I shall assume that truth is plausibly considered the epistemically fundamental value, in the sense that it explains other epistemic values. Cf. for example Sosa (2007, p. 54).
- 5.
I cannot explore all facets of the conception of philosophy that Sextus engages with. For example, Pyrrhonism seems in various ways inspired by Pre-Socratic philosophizing, where central ideas are often expressed in enigmatic, dense, and almost obscure ways. This mode of formulating one’s ideas influences the so-called skeptical formulae, such as “no more,” “I determine nothing,” and so on (PH 1.187–209). However, for the present purposes, the Socratic-Platonic tradition seems most important.
- 6.
I am adopting the term “conversion story” from Striker (2001). The term must, of course, be taken with some caution. It nicely captures that the skeptic undergoes a life-changing experience when she first becomes a skeptic. However, we need to keep in mind that skepticism is not a state of mind acquired once and for all. The skeptic must continually produce her skepticism through a life of investigation.
- 7.
- 8.
In M 11.110–67, a major part of one of Sextus’ treatises on ethics, it appears as if skepticism were actually confined to ethics. Sextus invokes the dogmatic idea that happiness consists of having good things. Based on this premise, it is essential to the good life to know what is good and what is bad (110). Now add the premise that all unhappiness is disturbance, and that all disturbance comes from intense pursuit or avoidance of that which is deemed good or bad (112–3). The combination of these premises implies that life is inevitably miserable (at least as long as it is assumed that good and bad things can be lost). Perhaps this state of affairs could lead one to a kind of value-skepticism; only the absence of value judgments can prevent the turmoil of intense pursuit and avoidance. But as Bett (1997, pp. 128–81) argues, this is a distinctively different, and probably earlier strand of Pyrrhonism from the skepticism of the Outlines, which is the skepticism that we are most immediately concerned with here. Perin (2006, p. 342; cf. p. 352) too notes that PH 1.25–9 does not fit well into Sextus’ skepticism.
- 9.
McPherran (1989, pp. 135–71, esp. 158) argues that the physiology of belief causes disturbance. He argues that the Stoics view the mind as actively in motion when it assents, and that the skeptics invoke this idea. Furthermore, he suggests that this goal-directed motion creates the disturbing experience of belief. Suspension resolves the disturbance and generates a smooth movement. McPherran seems right to me in emphasizing the physiology of thought. However, the disruption seems to come with conflict or anômalia, not with a particular cognitive activity like assent.
- 10.
Annas and Barnes (2000) and Perin (2006, p. 343) translate “archê” as “causal principle.” This translation suggests that the driving force behind skeptical investigation is causal, rather than rational. However, our translation should not prejudge this question. The Greek archê can mean “source” or “origin.” In Hellenistic epistemology, where dogmatists think of the mind as physiological, any cognitive process can be described in causal terms, and Sextus’ ways of putting things are often parasitic on this framework. However, this does not imply that such movements of the mind could not be described as rational.
- 11.
Sextus says that the experience that appearances are in conflict is not just the experience of the skeptics, or of philosophers. It is the experience of all of mankind (PH 1.210).
- 12.
The Stoics define impressions as imprints or alterations of a physical soul; rational impressions (i.e., the impressions of adult human beings) are a sub-class of impressions; they are thought processes (DL 7.49–51 = SVF 2.52, 55, 61 = LS 39A). Impression, impulse and assent are movements of the soul (Plutarch, Against Colotes 1122A–F = LS 69A); cf. Stobaeus 2.86, 17–87, 6 (= SVF 3.169, part = LS 53Q). Epicurus conceives of the soul as a fine-structured body, and of thought processes as occurring in this body (Letter to Herodotus 63–7 = LS 14A).
- 13.
With a view to particular impressions, the skeptic engages in something like belief-formation, but gets stuck. Suppose that belief is an attitude to a proposition that is truth-directed: to believe a proposition is to accept it with the aim of thereby accepting a truth. (This is a formulation discussed by Velleman 2000, p. 251.) The skeptic never arrives at the point of actually accepting an impression. However, her attitude in examining theses and arguments is still truth-directed in the sense in which belief is truth-directed.
- 14.
This translation is an improvement over Bury, who translates in terms of probability.
- 15.
Paul Horwich writes: “there is no substantial difference between identifying a proposition as false and disbelieving it. So, refusing to believe what we identify as false is just refusing to believe what we disbelieve” (2006, p. 354). I think that something like this is the core of how Sextus relates believability to truth and “disbelievability” to falsehood.
- 16.
I am grateful for feedback on this point to Nandi Theunissen, who raised some related concerns.
- 17.
Compare this to contemporary discussions about skepticism, which often proceed by setting out so-called skeptical paradoxa. That is, it is assumed that, on the one hand, we are committed to, for example, thinking that there are other minds, and on the other hand, there is a skeptical argument to the effect that there are no other minds. The argument looks valid, and thus we find ourselves in a paradox. We can only sustain this state of mind (of finding ourselves in a paradox) by focusing on the skeptic argument. Once we turn away and back into our ordinary lives and other concerns, it loses its grip on us, and we easily accept the thought that there are other minds.
- 18.
Hume (1999) makes a version of this observation with respect to the arguments concerning skepticism. He thinks that, once we stop focusing on these arguments, they lose their grip on us and we fall back into our ordinary knowledge claims. In some sense, this is lucky, since – according to Hume – all life would otherwise perish. But “[n]ature is always too strong for principle” (Enquiry concerning Human Understanding XII ii).
- 19.
Bury translates “in its essence” and “as far as what the dogmatists say is concerned.” Perin compares the expression to qualifiers like “as of yet” (achri nun) (2006, p. 349), suggesting that the skeptic “only” suspends as far as the arguments are concerned. But that seems misleading – it is not as if the skeptic, in some other respect, did not suspend. Suspension is not qualified by relating to arguments. Rather, it is generated by focus on the arguments.
- 20.
For a similar interpretation of the expression, cf. Brunschwig (1995). Annas and Barnes translate “as far as the argument goes.”
- 21.
These options are taken (roughly) from Velleman (2000, p. 251).
- 22.
The main arguments in this debate can be found in the following texts. Phase 1 (Arcesilaus): 7.46, 54; Cicero Acad. 1.40–1 and 2.77–8; SE M 7.247–52; SE M 7.402–10. Phase 2 (Carneades): DL 1.177; Cicero, Acad. 2.57 and 2.83–5; SE M 7.253. Many of the relevant passages are collected in chapter 40 in Long and Sedley (1987). Cf. Vogt (2010).
- 23.
DL 7.46 (= SVF 2.53, part = LS 40C); Cicero, Academica 1.40–1 (= SVF 1.55, 61, 60, part = LS 40B).
- 24.
Cicero, Academica 2.77–8 (= LS 40D).
- 25.
One line of argument says: all sense perceptions are true because nothing can refute them (the senses cannot refute each other, no particular sense perception can refute another sense perception, reason cannot refute the senses because reason has its starting-point in the senses) (Lucretius 4.469–521 = LS 16A and DL 10.31–2 = LS 16B). Another line of argument is the one I am focusing on above – it ultimately seems more promising to me: every sense perception is true insofar as sense perception does not yet involve judgment; perceptions are facts, just like pain, and in this sense true (DL 10.31–2).
- 26.
When Epicureans explain the details of this conception, it is clear that they talk to skeptics, and with skeptical examples in mind (things taste differently to different people, the tower that looks round from a distance and square from nearby, and so on). Schofield (2007) suggests that there is an exchange of arguments between Epicurean epistemology and Aenesidemus’ skepticism. While I cannot argue for this view here, I think that Pyrrhonian engagement with Epicurean epistemology is much underrated, and runs through several strands of Pyrrhonism. Skeptical arguments often target a philosophy that does not declare cognitive impressions to be criteria of truth, but more radically, sense perception – that is, they address themselves towards philosophers with Epicurean views.
- 27.
Epicurus, Letter to Pythocles 85–8 (= LS 18C) and Lucretius 6.703–11 (= LS 18E).
- 28.
Horwich mentions (but does not endorse) a rationale for considering the value of avoiding falsehoods prior to the value of pursuing truth that seems rather similar to the skeptic preference: “[…] once someone has decided to investigate a certain question – whatever it may be – then his not getting the answer right would surely be subject to criticism. But are we really obligated to investigate all questions – to believe every single truth?” (2006, p. 348). Also, an unqualified “pursue truth” norm might be less plausible than an unqualified “avoid falsity” norm.
- 29.
The idea that one should avoid rashness comes up in a number of contexts, for example PH 1.205, 236–7, 3.235.
- 30.
This distinction is of course employed by different philosophers and schools. It would take up too much space and lead too far away from my topic to explore whether Sextus invokes, as I think he does, the Epicurean distinction. However, not much in my present argument hangs on this point.
- 31.
When the skeptic “is coldened” or “sweetened,” he shall not say that he is not (PH 1.13). Such passive experiences are, in Sextus, the realm of the evident.
- 32.
“To every argument an equal (equally weighty) argument is opposed” is one of the skeptic’s formulae. Sextus does not trace this to any dogmatic theories. However, if asked whether this kind of norm is a piece of dogmatism, he certainly could. It has a long ancestry in Socratic and sophistic disputations, as well as in Peripatetic practices of training in argument.
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Acknowledgments
This paper started as a guest presentation on “Socrates and the Skeptics” in Philip Mitsis’ graduate seminar on Socrates in the Fall 2007 (NYU). I am indebted to the students and faculty who attended the seminar meeting, as well as to the students in my Spring 2009 Skepticism class and reading group for very helpful discussion. Jens Haas provided valuable feedback on the written version of the paper, as did Diego Machuca and the referee of the press; I am very grateful to all of them.
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Vogt, K.M. (2012). The Aims of Skeptical Investigation. In: Machuca, D. (eds) Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy. The New Synthese Historical Library, vol 70. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1991-0_3
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