Abstract
This article discusses recent studies on social norm enforcement and altruistic punishment in experimental economics and neuroeconomics. It focuses on the neurobiological explanation of the psychological motivational causes behind punishment, and defends the view that the moral assessment of punishment behavior requires external reasoning about whether the punitive act is governed by a moral concern for the other, or by an excessive and immoral demand to override the other’s individual rights. Hence, the moral assessment of punishment centers on the distinction of (a) punishment as a means of establishing justice and (b) punishment as an excess of sheer violence. As a paradigm case for the real importance of this distinction the article refers to the torture scandal detected in the American prison of Abu Ghraib/Iraq.
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Notes
- 1.
See Fehr & Fischbacher (2003), 785.
- 2.
See a more detailed analysis of the three different notions of altruism in biology, psychology, and economics in Clavien & Klein (2010). The authors investigate the contribution of experimental economics and neuroeconomics to the debate on psychological altruism, and point out that so far there is neither evidence for nor against psychological altruism in economic experiments.
- 3.
See the difference between biological and psychological altruism in Sober & Wilson (1998).
- 4.
An introduction in behavioral game theory can be found in Camerer (2003).
- 5.
See Camerer & Fehr (2004), 55.
- 6.
Glimcher et al. (2009) give a short introduction into the history and development of neurobiological studies in economics and refer to the axiomatic approach of neoclassical economics as one of the main causes of this development.
- 7.
An overview of the field experiments on social preferences can be found in Henrich et al. (2004). This book documents a global study on the validity of cooperation and fairness norms in social exchange practices. It shows that the economic assumption that individuals exhibit purely selfish preferences in their behavior is violated in all of the fifteen small-scale societies that have been investigated.
- 8.
See Glimcher et al. (2009) for how wide-spread the approach of neuroeconomics is and the different research questions it can be applied to.
- 9.
See Gintis (2007).
- 10.
Glimcher et al. (2009), 6.
- 11.
See Henrich & Henrich (2006), 223-224.
- 12.
See Fehr & Fischbacher (2004), 185.
- 13.
- 14.
For a philosophical concept of social norms which is in accordance with game theory, see Bicchieri (2006). Bicchieri also integrates various psychological dispositions in her model of norms as preferences of the individual. Thus, her account might also be very valuable for the study of norms in neuroeconomics.
- 15.
Fehr & Gächter (2002), 137.
- 16.
Ibid.
- 17.
The claim that social reciprocity (prosocial norm enforcement) provides the best explanation for the evolution of punishing behaviors has been defended in Carpenter et al. (2004).
- 18.
- 19.
- 20.
Fehr & Gächter (2002).
- 21.
Ibid., 139.
- 22.
All of the participants in the experiment were undergraduate students from the University of Zurich.
- 23.
See Fehr & Gächter (2002), 137.
- 24.
A definition of proximate causes of evolution can be found in Mayr (1961), 1503.
- 25.
De Quervain et al. (2004).
- 26.
Ibid., 1257.
- 27.
- 28.
- 29.
For a distinction between motive and motivation see the article on “Altruistic Emotional Motivation” by Christine Clavien in this volume.
- 30.
See Taguba (2004). The Taguba Report on the torture scandal in Abu Ghraib judges the behavior of the prison guards from the point of view of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949).
- 31.
See the discussion in Denner (2004).
- 32.
The norm is antisocial only with respect to the wider group of people that includes the guards as well as the prisoners. With respect to the population of the guards alone, the norm is actually prosocial, because it increases their status. Hence, the fact that a particular action is prosocial with respect to a limited peer group does not say that it is morally unproblematic in general.
- 33.
See Henrich et al. (2004).
- 34.
See the experiments related to punishment in prison in Milgram (1963). As far as I can see, the experimental economic study of punishment has not been related to this social psychology study of the excess of physical punishment.
- 35.
See the behavioral experiment on egalitarian motives in Dawes et al. (2007). For future research, it would be necessary to investigate the neurobiological underpinnings of this behavioral model of egalitarian motives.
- 36.
See Masclet & Villeval (2008).
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Klein, R.A. (2012). The Neurobiology of Altruistic Punishment: A Moral Assessment of its Social Utility. In: Plaisance, K., Reydon, T. (eds) Philosophy of Behavioral Biology. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 282. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1951-4_14
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