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Anti-realist Classical Logic and Realist Mathematics

  • Greg Restall
Chapter
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 23)

Abstract

I sketch an application of a semantically anti-realist understanding of the classical sequent calculus to the topic of mathematics. The result is a semantically anti-realist defence of a kind of mathematical realism. In the paper, I begin the development of the view and compare it to orthodox positions in the philosophy of mathematics.

Keywords

Logical Consequence Classical Logic Mathematical Object Intuitionist Logic Sequent Calculus 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgements

This paper has a webpage: http://consequently.org/writing/antirealist. Check there to post comments and to read comments left by others. Thanks to Dan Isaacson for hospitality during my visit to Wolfson College and the Philosophy Faculty at Oxford University, and to Allen Hazen, Dan Isaacson, Øystein Linnebo and Alexander Paseau, the audience at the (Anti)Realism conference in Nancy, and two anonymous referees, for helpful comments and discussion. This research is supported by the Australian Research Council, through grant DP0343388.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Historical and Philosophical StudiesMelbourneAustralia

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