Moral Responsibility and Jointly Determined Consequences
In Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, John Fischer and Mark Ravizza argue against incompatibilist principles of moral responsibility and offer a compatibilist account of moral responsibility. The book has sparked much discussion and criticism. In this article I point out a significant flaw in Fischer and Ravizza’s negative arguments against the incompatibilist Principle of the Transfer of Non-Responsibility. I also criticise their positive argument that moral responsibility for consequences depends on action-responsiveness. In the former case I argue that their putative counterexamples against Transfer NR and Transfer NR* are underdescribed but once fully described depend upon consequence-particulars and not consequence-universals as they claim. In the latter case I argue that their account is unable to cope with quite ordinary cases of jointly determined consequences.
KeywordsMoral Responsibility Internal Mechanism Joint Enterprise Corporate Entity Joint Responsibility
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