Study on Accounting Shenanigan in Universities Using Improved Game Theory

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering book series (LNEE, volume 107)


The accounting shenanigan is one of the most terrible causes responded to the graft and corruption phenomena. The graft and corruption definitely do a deadly hazard to the social trust and integrity. It is therefore critical for the governments and organizations to punish severely the accounting shenanigan and prevent the impending graft and corruption phenomena to build honest social and working environments. However, most economic corruptions occurred in universities is caused by accounting shenanigan. The necessary of accounting shenanigan module analysis and detection is urgent. To investigate the accounting shenanigan in universities can not only eliminate economic corruption but also ensure the healthy of the finance management. For this reason, a new method to model and analyze the accounting shenanigan in universities based on the improved game theory is proposed in this paper. The evolutionary game between universities and Supervisor was investigated. The analysis results show that the financial management system using in the universities is not effective to avoid accounting shenanigans. However, by reasonable strategies, the supervise efficiency is improved, and the universities will abide by the accounting standards. As a result, the university financial management system can be consummated to eliminate accounting shenanigans.


Accounting shenanigan University Game theory 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Tourism College of ZhejiangHangzhouChina

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