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What in Truth Divides Historians and Philosophers of Science?

  • Kenneth L. Caneva
Chapter
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 263)

Abstract

Let me begin with a little personal history and two anecdotes.

I entered Princeton’s graduate program in the History and Philosophy of Science in the fall of 1967. The program embraced students formally enrolled in either the history or the philosophy department. We on the history side were neither required nor especially encouraged to take philosophy courses, and very few of us did. Nor did we see many philosophers in our history of science seminars. The director of the program, Thomas Kuhn, rarely offered a philosophy of science seminar but was heavily involved on the history of science side. Kuhn’s office and those of the other history of science professors were together in a separate building housing the program headquarters. That was also where our seminars were held. I neither knew nor cared where the philosophers were.

Keywords

Natural Kind Philosophy Department Career Line Science Professor Epistemic Warrant 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of North Carolina at GreensboroGreensboroUSA

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