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Reasons and the Problem of the Socratic Elenchos

  • Alejandro SantanaEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 117)

Abstract

In this essay, I address what Vlastos called the problem of the Socratic elenchos. Vlastos stated the main question of the problem as follows: “how is it that Socrates claims to have proved a thesis is false when, in point of logic, all he has proved is that the thesis is inconsistent with the conjunction of agreed-upon premises for which no reason has been given in that argument?”1 This problem has long been important to solve, but it has been the subject of a good deal of controversy: not only is there controversy about how to solve the problem but there is also controversy about whether there is a genuine problem in the first place.2

Keywords

Majority Opinion Reasonable Expectation Mutual Agreement Epistemic Reason Initial Claim 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Bibliography

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of PortlandPortlandUSA

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