Fetal Interests, Fetal Persons, and Human Goods

  • Christopher TollefsenEmail author
Part of the Philosophy and Medicine book series (PHME, volume 111)


The geography of the debate concerning practices destructive of the youngest members of the human species is by now rather well worked out. Of the questions to be answered, there is first the following: are you, the readers of this essay, and I, the author, and others substantially like us, essentially human beings, living biological organisms of the species Homo sapiens? Or are we some other kind of entity, a person, perhaps, or a mind, a brain, or a soul? This is a question of metaphysics.1


Natural Kind Moral Status Common Good Person View Moral Community 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of South CarolinaColumbiaUSA

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