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I Was Once a Fetus: That Is Why Abortion Is Wrong

  • Alexander R. PrussEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Philosophy and Medicine book series (PHME, volume 111)

Abstract

I am going to argue that abortion is wrong in the same circumstances in which it is wrong to kill an adult. To argue further that abortion is always wrong would require showing that it is always wrong to kill an adult or that the circumstances in which it is not wrong—say, capital punishment—never befall a fetus. Such an argument will be beyond the scope of this paper, but since it is wrong to kill an adult human being for the sorts of reasons for which most abortions are performed, it still follows that most abortions are wrong.

Keywords

Human Dignity Essential Property Mental Life Human Animal Representational State 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyBaylor UniversityWacoUSA

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