Attunement and Disorientation: The Moods of Philosophy in Heidegger and Sartre

  • Stephen Mulhall
Part of the Contributions To Phenomenology book series (CTPH, volume 63)


This essay employs Heidegger’s philosophical analysis of the moodedness of human understanding of the world in order to evaluate the significance of the moods in and through which specifically philosophical understanding is achieved in the phenomenological tradition. First, Heidegger’s Being and Time is shown to be critically informed by the moods of anxiety and perplexity; then boredom is shown to be the determining mood of his Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics; and finally, the significance of shame as a topic within, and a mode of attunement of, Sartre’s Being and Nothingness is assessed.


Projective Dimension Nonhuman Animal Fundamental Ontology Articulated Unity Regional Ontology 
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  1. Heidegger, Martin. 1962. Being and Time. Trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  2. Heidegger, Martin. 1995. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. Trans. W. McNeill and N. Walker. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.Google Scholar
  3. Mulhall, Stephen. 2005. Heidegger and Being and Time, 2nd ed. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  4. Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1958. Being and Nothingness. Trans. Hazel Barnes. London: Routledge.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.New CollegeOxfordUK

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