Trust Management Through Hardware Means: Design Concerns and Optimizations

  • Apostolos P. Fournaris
  • Daniel M. Hein
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering book series (LNEE, volume 105)


Trust in security demanding software platforms is a very important feature. For this reason, Trusted computing group has specified a TPM hardware module that can enforce and guaranty a high trust level to all the platform’s involved entities. However, the TPM’s features can not be fully exploited in systems under extreme physical conditions. To solve this problem, the use of a special purpose hardware module, physically connected to a host security system’s device acting as a local trusted third party, has been proposed in literature. In this chapter, we describe the hardware structure of such a hardware module, called Autonomous Attestation Token (AAT) and discuss hardware resource constrains, security bottlenecks that can stem from improper design of its various components integrated in the AAT’s structure. We conclude that the efficiency of the AAT system is closely related to the efficiency of its public key encryption–decryption unit (RSA encryption–decryption module). In this book chapter, we address these issues by describing a design methodology toward a low hardware resources (small chip covered area) and side channel attack resistant RSA hardware architecture. The described hardware architectures’ implementations provide very optimistic results of very low chip covered area and high computation speed thus verifying the efficiency of the proposed algorithms and architecture design approach.



The work reported in this paper is supported by the European Commission through the SECRICOM FP7 European project under contract FP7 SEC 218123


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Electrical and Computer EngineeringUniversity of PatrasPatrasGreece
  2. 2.Institute for Applied Information Processing and CommunicationsGraz University of TechnologyGrazAustria

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