Preference from Priorities: Dynamic Logic

  • Fenrong Liu
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 354)


In the preceding two chapters, a rich notion of priority-based preference has been studied in stable situations. Various ways of deriving preferences from a priority sequence have been proposed, both under complete and under incomplete information. In this chapter we take up one of the main themes of this book, and address the dynamics of changes in preferences in this richer setting. What we find is that our earlier methods for plain betterness orderings generalize in an obvious manner, with a few adaptations. Therefore, this chapter will be short, since the connection, once seen, is straightforward.


Belief Revision Preference Change Belief Change Dynamic Logic Soft Information 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTsinghua UniversityBeijingChina PRC

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