Self-Evaluation – Philosophical Perspectives

  • Anita Konzelmann Ziv
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 116)


Self-evaluation is not a technical term in philosophy.1 Rather, it is common to associate the expression “self-evaluation” with contexts of psychologically oriented supervision where individuals or groups are encouraged to evaluate themselves for the purpose of getting clear about their goals, their motivations and possibilities of improving their performances.2 The present volume is an attempt to add philosophical weight to the concept of self-evaluation. The philosophical perspective associates “self-evaluation” instantly with long-standing key topics of philosophical research such as the metaphysics of the self, the nature of self-reference and the nature of values. “Self-evaluation” seems to be a notion conceptually close to Socrates’ seminal “Know thyself” which, down to the present day, has been inducing an unceasing stream of reflection under the key notes of “self-consciousness” and “self-knowledge”.


True Belief Reactive Attitude Social Emotion Evaluative Judgment Shared Intention 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of GenevaGenevaSwitzerland

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