Abstract
In this paper I contrast the very modest view of the main ‘consideration’ supporting scientific realism taken by Poincaré and others with the much more ambitious argument developed by Stathis Psillos using some ideas of Hilary Putnam’s and of Richard Boyd’s. I argue that the attempt to produce a more ambitious argument not only fails, but was always bound to fail.
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© 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
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Worrall, J. (2011). The No Miracles Intuition and the No Miracles Argument. In: Dieks, D., Gonzalez, W., Hartmann, S., Uebel, T., Weber, M. (eds) Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1180-8_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1180-8_1
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Online ISBN: 978-94-007-1180-8
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