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Intending and Trying: Tuomela vs. Bratman at the Video Arcade

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Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 321))

Abstract

I have long been an admirer of Raimo Tuomela’s work in the philosophy of action. In this paper I will address a disagreement between Tuomela and Michael Bratman about intention and trying. I will argue that each disputant is partly right and partly wrong.

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References

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© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Mele, A.R. (2003). Intending and Trying: Tuomela vs. Bratman at the Video Arcade. In: Sintonen, M., Ylikoski, P., Miller, K. (eds) Realism in Action. Synthese Library, vol 321. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1046-7_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1046-7_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-3775-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-007-1046-7

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