Intending and Trying: Tuomela vs. Bratman at the Video Arcade
I have long been an admirer of Raimo Tuomela’s work in the philosophy of action. In this paper I will address a disagreement between Tuomela and Michael Bratman about intention and trying. I will argue that each disputant is partly right and partly wrong.
KeywordsVideo Game Intentional Action Strong Consistency Simple View Golf Ball
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