Commitments

  • Kaarlo Miller
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 321)

Abstract

In this paper various kinds of both individual and social commitment are analyzed. My starting point is Cohen and Levesque’s (hereafter C&L) work within AI. Their main philosophical source has been Bratman (especially 1987), and they in turn have been a major source of inspiration for further research both in philosophy and in AI. In what follows I have a “persistent goal” to make the notion applicable to human agents. I have tried, first, to account for the openness and flexibility of our commitments, and, second, to allow for the possibility that they are broken. On the other hand, when discussing the collective case, I argue that there is not one kind of joint (collective, social) commitment, but many, which form a hierarchial structure.

Keywords

Joint Action Philosophical Study Social Commitment Internal Commitment Mutual Knowledge 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kaarlo Miller
    • 1
  1. 1.University of HelsinkiFinland

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