Perceptual Intimacy and Conceptual Inadequacy: A Husserlian Critique of McDowell’s Internalism

  • Frode Kjosavik
Part of the Contributions to Phenomenology book series (CTPH, volume 49)


In this paper, I shall employ Husserl’s notion of intuitions as “intentions” to deal with a tension within our thought on thought itself, namely, the opposition between “coherentism”, on the one hand, and what Sellars has dubbed “the Myth of the Given”, on the other. This is of course a topic that John McDowell has put on the philosophical agenda in a very fruitful way in his famous John Locke Lectures (McDowell 1994),1 but I shall argue that there is a severe weakness in his semi-Kantian approach to the dilemma, and that a phenomenologically refined version of internalism is called for.


Conceptual Content Infinite Regress Color Shade Nose Shape Sensory Content 
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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Frode Kjosavik
    • 1
  1. 1.Agricultural University of NorwayNorway

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