Introduction

  • V. F. Hendricks
  • K. F. Jørgensen
  • S. A. Pedersen
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 322)

Abstract

The study of epistemic attitudes — in particular knowledge and belief — dates at least back to the Scholaticism of the Middles Ages. The formal study of the same attitudes was then largely initiated by von Wright’s seminal paper from the (37). The formal systematic study of knowledge and belief saw the light of day by Hintikka’s book by the same name Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions from (16). Hardly a publication in epistemic logic has surfaced since without reference to this ground-breaking investigation. More recent monographs dedicated to epistemic and/or doxastic logic1 include notably (22), (25), (3), (19), (35), (6), (30), (12), (14), and (11).

Keywords

Modal Logic Common Knowledge Belief Revision Accessibility Relation Epistemic Logic 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • V. F. Hendricks
    • 1
  • K. F. Jørgensen
    • 1
  • S. A. Pedersen
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and Science StudiesRoskilde UniversityDenmark

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