Abstract
The distinction between the natural and the artificial lies at the core of the philosophy of technology. Much of what we say in this field turns on one’s position with respect to that distinction. For example, if one endorses the distinction then one is in a position to argue against certain technological innovations such as gene splicing on the grounds that they are unnatural.
Appeared in Philosophical Dreams. Oneonta Studies in Philosophy, edited by Douglas Schrader. SUNY/Oneonta Press, 2003. Reprinted by permission of the editor.
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- 1.
Thanks to my former colleague Mark Gifford for help on this.
References
Antigone. 1947. The Theban Plays, pp. 135–136. Trans. E.F. Watling. Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books.
Kerford, G.B. 1987. “The Nomos-Phusis Controversy (Ch. 10)”. In The Sophistic Movement, pp. 111–130. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Pitt, J.C. (2011). Working the Natural/Artificial Distinction. In: Doing Philosophy of Technology. Philosophy of Engineering and Technology, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0820-4_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0820-4_7
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