Options for Securing PCs Against Phishing and Espionage: A Report from the EU-Project “Open Trusted Computing”

  • Arnd WeberEmail author
  • Dirk Weber*


Private and business PC users will continue to experience attacks from viruses and Trojan horses. The latter might, e.g., eavesdrop on banking passwords or send confidential business data to a criminal. It is very difficult to provide protection from such attacks on private information within the current operating systems. Novel approaches to securing such data outside the user’s main operating system, using virtualization techniques are presented here. The transparency and trustworthiness of such approaches are, however, by no means guaranteed. In order to protect users, the development of such approaches could be monitored and influenced at the political level, e.g. by governments procuring such systems.


Trojan Horse Trust Platform Module Malicious Code Trust Computing Virtual Machine Monitor 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



We wish to express our thanks to Dirk Kuhlmann, Armand Puccetti and Matthias Schunter and to all OpenTC-partners: Technikon Forschungs- und Planungsgesellschaft mbH (project coordination, AT); Hewlett-Packard Ltd (technical leader, UK); AMD Saxony LLC & Co. KG (DE); Budapest University of Technology and Economics (HU); Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique – LIST (FR); COMNEON GmbH (DE); Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe GmbH – ITAS (DE); Horst Goertz Institute for IT Security, Ruhr-Universitaet Bochum (DE); IBM Research GmbH (CH); Infineon Technologies AG (DE); INTEK Closed Joint Stock Company (RU); ISECOM (ES); Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (BE); Politecnico di Torino (IT); Portakal Teknoloji (TR); Royal Holloway, University of London (UK); SUSE Linux Products GmbH (DE); Technische Universitaet Dresden (DE); Technische Universitaet Graz (AT); Technische Universitaet Muenchen (DE); Technical University of Sofia (BR); TUBITAK – UEKAE (TR); and University of Cambridge (UK).


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute for Technology Assessment and Systems AnalysisKarlsruhe Institute of TechnologyEggenstein-LeopoldshafenGermany

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