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Right to Personal Identity: The Challenges of Ambient Intelligence and the Need for a New Legal Conceptualization

Abstract

Ambient intelligence, profiling techniques and the convergence between digital and physical environments, among other technological progresses, promise to revolutionize the way we live and interact in society. In this article I will focus upon how those technologies will put into question the classical and static ideas we have about ourselves and about our own identities. As such, and in order to face the various challenges posed by future and emerging technologies to the definition and establishment of personal identity, I will elaborate on a novel, needed and comprehensive conceptualization of the right to personal identity. The analysis of the right to personal identity includes a brief account of its legal evolution, emphasizing its main theoretical predecessors. Such historical digression encompasses also the main contributions to the conceptualization of this legal disposition delivered by the modern doctrine of personality law, constitutional law and human rights legal framework. After such analysis, I will then examine the main challenges posed to the right to personal identity by new and forthcoming technological developments, namely the ones brought by the vision of ambient intelligence. Having acknowledged those challenges, I will then strive to demonstrate the pressing need to rethink the right to personal identity. As such, after a critical analysis of the configuration of the right to identity made by the Italian jurisprudence, one of the most active legal systems in the theorization of this juridical figure, I will propose a renewed conceptualization of the right to personal identity. In the ambit of such theorization, I will present a list of different “sub-rights” which should be accommodated under the umbrella of the right to identity, namely the right to be forgotten and the right to multiple identities.

Keywords

  • Personal Data
  • Personal Identity
  • Human Person
  • Private Life
  • Genetic Identity

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Such distinction has been advanced in philosophy by Paul Ricoeur (Paul Ricœur, Oneself as Another (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992). More recently, and within the field of legal studies, such distinction has been re-captured by Mireille Hildebrandt (Mireille Hildebrandt, Privacy and Identity, In Privacy and the Criminal Law, edited by Erik Claes, Antony Duff, and Serge Gutwirth (Antwerpen: Intersentia ; Oxford : Hart Pub. [distributor], 2006). According to the latter, “[i]dem (sameness) stands for the third person, objectified observer’s perspective of identity as a set of attributes that allows comparison between people, as well as a unique identification, whereas ipse (self) stands for the first person perspective constituting a ‘sense of self’. Their intersection provides for the construction of a person’s identity” Mireille Hildebrandt, Profiling and Ami, In The Future of Identity in the Information Society : Challenges and Opportunities, edited by Kai Rannenberg, Denis Royer, and André Deuker (Berlin ; London: Springer, 2009), 274.

  2. 2.

    As we shall see in the following, an important aspect of the right to personal identity is the correct recognition and representation of oneself in the eyes of others. In this sense, the right to personal identity has operated (in some legal systems, at least) under the assumption that a lack of recognition or misrepresentation by others weakens a person’s sense of identity, by projecting an erroneous and flawed image of that person.

  3. 3.

    There is, moreover, a kind of symbiotic and reinforcing relationship between these two different dimensions. As explained by Marshall, “the other’s recognition of a person’s identity makes the person aware of their specificity and difference from all others on an ongoing dynamic basis thus forging a stronger sense of identity” (Jill Marshall, Personal Freedom through Human Rights Law?: Autonomy, Identity and Integrity under the European Convention on Human Rights, International Studies in Human Rights, V. 98. (Leiden ; Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), 96.

  4. 4.

    Sergio Niger, “Il Diritto All’identità Personale,” In Diritto All’anonimato. Anonimato, Nome E Identità Personale, edited by Giusella Finocchiaro (Padova: Cedam, 2008), 116.

  5. 5.

    The technological progress and its implications to the theme of identity can be illustrated by a multiplicity of different advancements, such as the establishment and widespread of the internet, the developments observed in the scientific areas of genetics and genomics, as well as the discoveries made in the field of neuroscience.

  6. 6.

    The enshrinement of the concept and definition of ‘genetic identity’ in Human Rights Law is a good example of such trend.

  7. 7.

    In fact, law already made use of a series of personal identity features during the medieval period. For an overview of the early modern European history of identification practices and identity insignia (such as seals, stamps, portraits, badges, clothes, signatures and coats of arms), see Valentin Groebner, Who Are You? : Identification, Deception, and Surveillance in Early Modern Europe (Brooklyn, NY: Zone Books, 2007).

  8. 8.

    Jean-Claude Kaufmann, L’invention De Soi : Une Théorie De L’identité, Collection Individu Et Société. (Paris: Armand Colin, 2004).

  9. 9.

    Giorgio Pino, “The Right to Personal Identity in Italian Private Law: Constitutional Interpretation and Judge-Made Rights,” In The Harmonization of Private Law in Europe, edited by M. Van Hoecke and F. Ost (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), 225.

  10. 10.

    Hélène Boussard, “Individual Human Rights in Genetic Research: Blurring the Line between Collective and Individual Interests,” In New Technologies and Human Rights, edited by Thérèse Murphy (Oxford ; New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), 250.

  11. 11.

    This aspect of the right to identity – the body of rules governing the means by which one can be identified through different elements pertaining to one’s identity – is still (and increasingly more) important nowadays. With the incessant pace of technological improvement, the ways through which any person can be identified have grown exponentially (photo, camera surveillance, electronic data, biometrics, etc). In fact, the corner stone of the Data Protection legal regime, the concept of personal data, is precisely defined according to the possibility of identifying a given person, that is, as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person” (article 2 of Directive 95/46/EC).

  12. 12.

    The conceptualization of personality rights as a separate group of private rights is firmly established in Europe (on the European Continent), being present also in other jurisdictions, as for example in the USA and South Africa.

  13. 13.

    Personality rights, in fact, can be traced back to Roman Law, namely to the actio iniuriarum, which provided a detailed scheme of personality protection, including the rights to corpus (physical mental integrity), libertas (physical freedom) and fama (reputation). For more details, see J. Neethling, J. M. Potgieter, and P. J. Visser, Neethling’s Law of Personality (Durban: Butterworths, 1996), 3–4.

  14. 14.

    Personality rights “are private law (subjective) rights which are by nature non-patrimonial and highly personal in the sense that they cannot exist independently of a person since they are inseparably bound up with his personality” Johann Neethling, “Personality Rights: A Comparative Overview,” Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 38, 2 (2005): 223. For more details on the nature of personality rights, see Neethling, “Personality Rights: A Comparative Overview”, 223 ss.

  15. 15.

    Neethling, “Personality Rights: A Comparative Overview,” 210.

  16. 16.

    In fact, the right to identity has been recognized eo nomine in countries such as Italy, France, Switzerland and South Africa.

  17. 17.

    Neethling, Potgieter, and Visser, Neethling’s Law of Personality, 39.

  18. 18.

    Ibid.

  19. 19.

    This aspect, as we shall see in continuation, has been further developed and elaborated by the international human rights legal framework.

  20. 20.

    Moreover, as Werro notes, “it is now recognized that defining the scope of personality rights is no longer a question of private law only, but also, and perhaps primarily, a question of constitutional and European law” (Franz Werro, “The Right to Inform V. The Right to Be Forgotten: A Transatlantic Clash,” In Liability in the Third Millenium; Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No. 2, ed. Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi, et al. (Baden-Baden: F.R.G., 2009), 289).

  21. 21.

    The contribution of the Italian doctrine for the development of the right to personal identity precedes, as a matter of fact, its juridical recognition. In this respect, the work of De Cupis on the autonomization of this legal right is particularly relevant. See Adriano De Cupis, Il Diritto All’ Identità Personale (Milano: A. Giuffrè, 1949).

  22. 22.

    For a detailed overview of the construction of the right to identity by the Italian jurisprudence, see Giorgio Pino, Il Diritto All’identità Personale : Interpretazione Costituzionale E Creatività Giurisprudenziale, Ricerca; (Bologna: Il mulino, 2003).

  23. 23.

    The landmark case that introduced the right to identity in Italy is the Pretura Roma 6-5-1974 (Pangrazi and Silvetti v. Comitato Referendum). Pino summarizes the case in the following manner: “The facts of the case are quite interesting. In the days of the referendum propaganda about the abrogation of divorce in Italy, the anti-divorce committee, for the purpose of its campaign, used the picture of a man and a woman working in the country. The picture was meant to evoke a ‘traditionalist’ atmosphere (and old-style family) and was of course associated with an anti-divorce message. The problem was that, first of all, the picture was taken without the consent of the people portrayed; in the second place, they were not married; finally, and what is more, they were in favour of the existing divorce legislation” (Pino, “The Right to Personal Identity in Italian Private Law: Constitutional Interpretation and Judge-Made Rights,” 234).

  24. 24.

    In this regard, Pino observes that “it is possible to regard the introduction of the right to personal identity as an interesting example of a common-law technique in a civil-law system, such as that in Italy” (Ibid.).

  25. 25.

    “[A]ccording to which Italy “acknowledges and protects the fundamental rights of the human being, both as an individual and as a member of social groups” (Ibid., 228).

  26. 26.

    Ibid., 225.

  27. 27.

    Ibid., 226.

  28. 28.

    Niger, “Il Diritto All’identità Personale,” 116.

  29. 29.

    Rafaelle Tommasini, “L’identitá Dei Sogetti Tra Apparenza E Realtà: Aspetti Di Una Ulteriore Ipotesi Di Tutela Della Persona,” In Il Diritto Alla Identità Personale edited by Guido Alpa, Luca Boneschi, and Mario Bessone (Padova: CEDAM, 1981), 82–83.

  30. 30.

    Pino, “The Right to Personal Identity in Italian Private Law: Constitutional Interpretation and Judge-Made Rights,” 226. According to the cited scholar, such quote corresponds to the commonest definition of the right to personal identity, which can be read in the decision of the Corte di Cassazione, I, 22.6.1985, n. 3769, in Nuova giurisprudenza civile commentate, I, 1985, pp.647–654.

  31. 31.

    Ibid., 235.

  32. 32.

    As Pino observed, “the growing interest in the legal protection of the various aspects of human personality … characterizes the evolution of almost every single European legal system in the second half of this century”, (Ibid., 226).

  33. 33.

    Neethling, Potgieter, and Visser, Neethling’s Law of Personality, 19.

  34. 34.

    The full text of the Article is as follows:

    1. 1.

      Everyone has the right to respect for his private life and family life, his home and his correspondence.

    2. 2.

      There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health and morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

  35. 35.

    For further details on the inclusion of Article 8 of the Rights of Child Convention, as a result of a proposal by Argentina, see Sharon Detrick, editors. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. A Guide to The “Travaux Préparatoires” (Dordrecht, Boston, MA, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1992).

  36. 36.

    Clare Sullivan, “Privacy or Identity?,” Int. J. Intellectual Property Management 2, 3 (2008): 296.

  37. 37.

    Ibid.

  38. 38.

    Ibid., 297.

  39. 39.

    (2003) EMLR 15 ECHR, 57 citing P.G. and J.H v United Kingdom ECHR 2001-IX

  40. 40.

    While both underline the importance of the social context in which identity must thrive, for the Italian jurisprudence the “social” was the stage where identity was projected and could be ascertained, whereas for the ECtHR jurisprudence, the social is the main factor creating and shaping identity itself.

  41. 41.

    In theory, and taking into account the scope and the latitude of these rights, it should be the other way around, that is, the more specific right to private life included within the more general and transversal right to free development of personality. Furthermore, it is somewhat paradoxical that the emphasis on the social context is done through a right to private life. In fact, the way in which the concept of private life has been constantly broadened reveals a number of problems (which, nevertheless, go beyond the scope of this article).

  42. 42.

    Marshall, Personal Freedom through Human Rights Law? : Autonomy, Identity and Integrity under the European Convention on Human Rights, 3.

  43. 43.

    Ibid.

  44. 44.

    For a more profound view on this particular issue, see Ibid., chapter 7.

  45. 45.

    Stressing the same idea, the Glover Report for the European Commission has argued that “a life where the biological parents are unknown is like a novel with the first chapter missing” (Jonathan Glover, Ethics of New Reproductive Technologies : The Glover Report to the European Commission, Studies in Biomedical Policy (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1989), 37). See also Emily M. Jackson, Regulating Reproduction : Law, Technology and Autonomy (Oxford ; Portland, OR: Hart, 2001).

  46. 46.

    Jackson, Regulating Reproduction : Law, Technology and Autonomy, 214–215.

  47. 47.

    Human genetics, in fact, can be seen “as the ‘new’ engine of the modern construction of human rights” (Boussard, “Individual Human Rights in Genetic Research: Blurring the Line between Collective and Individual Interests,” 246).

  48. 48.

    Ibid., 249.

  49. 49.

    Ibid., 259.

  50. 50.

    Neethling, Potgieter, and Visser, Neethling’s Law of Personality, 6.

  51. 51.

    Stefano Rodotà sustains, in this regard and in a somewhat humorous manner, that private law has been saved by technology (Stefano Rodotà, “Lo Specchio Di Stendhal: Riflessioni Sulle Riflessioni Dei Privatisti,” Rivista critica del diritto privato 15(1997): 5).

  52. 52.

    ISTAG report 1999, in which the term “ambient intelligence” was, for the first time, coined (Information Society Technologies Advisory Group (ISTAG), “Orientations for Workprogramme 2000 and Beyond,” (1999).

  53. 53.

    For further details on the vision of Ambient Intelligence, see Emile Aarts, Rick Harwig, and Martin Schuurmans, “Ambient Intelligence,” In The Invisible Future : The Seamless Integration of Technology into Everyday Life, edited by Peter J. Denning (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2001). E. H. L. Aarts and Stefano Marzano, The New Everyday : Views on Ambient Intelligence (Rotterdam: 010 Publishers, 2003). Werner Weber, Jan M. Rabaey, and E. H. L. Aarts, Ambient Intelligence, 1st ed. (Berlin ; New York, NY: Springer, 2005). Giuseppe Ph D. Riva, Ambient Intelligence : The Evolution of Technology, Communication and Cognition Towards the Future of Human-Computer Interaction, Emerging Communication, 1566–7677 (Amsterdam ; Oxford: IOS Press, 2005). Handbook of Ambient Intelligence and Smart Environments, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Springer, 2009). Norberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade, “Technology and Metaphors: From Cyberspace to Ambient Intelligence,” Observatorio (OBS*) Journal 4, 1 (2010).

  54. 54.

    Summarising this group of features, Hildebrandt describes AmI as an adaptive, smart environment which “should always be one step ahead of the user, like a butler who unobtrusively anticipates his master’s wishes even before the master becomes aware of them” (Hildebrandt, “Profiling and Ami,” 287).

  55. 55.

    It is important to stress that many of these changes are already under motion (through the web 2.0. mobile applications, augmented realities and location-based services), having AmI an accelerating (and aggravating) effect.

  56. 56.

    The Future Group Report (2008), written by the Informal High Level Advisory Group on the Future of European Home Affairs Policy, has used the expression “tsunami” of data to illustrate the massive amounts of data expected to be produced by RFID systems and sensor technologies (Hildebrandt, “Profiling and Ami,” 274).

  57. 57.

    Many times, and to some extent, people will not even know about or be aware of the collection and processing of such information.

  58. 58.

    Alongside this change there will also be another important one: the blurring between private and public spaces, as both the public and the private spheres will increasingly become ever more entangled and intertwined. In this regard, and along the same lines, Nissenbaum has argued that the digitalisation of our environment has blurred the borders between the private and the public spheres, while also decreasing the anonymity traditionally associated with many public spaces (Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, Washington Law Review 79, 1 (2004).

  59. 59.

    Information Society Advisory Group (ISTAG), “Ambient Intelligence: From Vision to Reality” (2003), 8. An illustrative example of the symbiosis between the physical and the digital world is given by emerging notions of “virtual residence” and “digital territories” developed by the European Commission’s Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS). Regarding the concept of digital territories, “the underlying premise is that citizens should be empowered to create, shift, and sustain borders in order to develop and sustain their personal identity” (Hildebrandt, “Profiling and Ami,” 302).

  60. 60.

    Kai Rannenberg, Denis Royer, and André Deuker, The Future of Identity in the Information Society : Challenges and Opportunities (Berlin ; London: Springer, 2009), 23. As I shall point out afterwards, it is the spill-over of typical features pertaining to digital and virtual identities (such as multiplicity and permanent availability) that justifies a re-conceptualization of the right to personal identity, namely through the incorporation of the right to multiple identities and the right to be forgotten.

  61. 61.

    S. Rodotà, “Data Protection as a Fundamental Right,” In Reinventing Data Protection?, edited by Serge Gutwirth, et al. (Dordrecht ; London: Springer, 2009), 81.

  62. 62.

    Phenomena recurrently observed in the Internet and its paraphernalia of communication and interaction platforms: social networks, virtual worlds, blogs – spaces which offer different “lives” and “existences”.

  63. 63.

    Rannenberg, Royer, and Deuker, The Future of Identity in the Information Society : Challenges and Opportunities, 1.

  64. 64.

    Thierry Nabeth, “Identity of Identity,” In The Future of Identity in the Information Society : Challenges and Opportunities, edited by Kai Rannenberg, Denis Royer, and André Deuker (Berlin; London: Springer, 2009), 53.

  65. 65.

    Ibid., 54.

  66. 66.

    “Profiling is the process of ‘discovering’ correlations between data in databases that can be used to identify or represent a human or nonhuman subject (individual or group) and / or the application of profiles (sets of correlated data) to individuate and represent an individual subject or to identify a subject as a member of a group or a category.” Mireille Hildebrandt and Serge Gutwirth, Profiling the European Citizen : Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives (New York, NY: Springer, 2008), 19.

  67. 67.

    I shall come back to this important aspect when evaluating critically the conceptualization of the “Italian” right to personal identity in light of the new technological developments brought by the AmI scenario.

  68. 68.

    People nowadays (and many times unconsciously) generate multiple identities. Besides the different identities one may have and develop in the physical world (according to the context in which one is: at work, at home, with family, etc), people are increasingly undertaking different identities (virtual and partial) through their email accounts, online forums, social networks and virtual worlds.

  69. 69.

    David-Olivier Jaquet-Chiffelle et al., “Virtual Persons and Identities,” In The Future of Identity in the Information Society : Challenges and Opportunities, edited by Kai Rannenberg, Denis Royer, and André Deuker (Berlin ; London: Springer, 2009), 76.

  70. 70.

    Ibid.

  71. 71.

    Patrick Boumard, Georges Lapassade, and Michel Lobrot, Le Mythe De L’identité. Apologie De La Dissociation (Paris: Economica-Anthropos, 2006)., cited in P. De Hert, “A Right to Identity to Face the Internet of Things,” (at portal.unesco.org/ci/fr/files/25857/12021328273de_Hert-Paul.pdf/de%2BHert-Paul.pdf. Also on the CD of Commission Nationale française pour l’Unesco, Ethique et droits de l’homme dans la societé d’information. Actes, synthèse et recommandations, 13–14 septembre 2007, Strasbourg., 2008), 14.

  72. 72.

    Pino, “The Right to Personal Identity in Italian Private Law: Constitutional Interpretation and Judge-Made Rights,” 226.

  73. 73.

    Hildebrandt and Gutwirth, Profiling the European Citizen : Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives.

  74. 74.

    Pino, “The Right to Personal Identity in Italian Private Law: Constitutional Interpretation and Judge-Made Rights,” 234–235.

  75. 75.

    Ibid., 235.

  76. 76.

    Jon Elster, The Multiple Self, Studies in Rationality and Social Change. (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

  77. 77.

    Vlatko Vedral, Decoding Reality : The Universe as Quantum Information (Oxford ; New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010), 92–93.

  78. 78.

    Thomas C. Schelling, “Ethics, Law, and the Exercise of Self-Command,” In The Tanner Lectures on Human Values Iv, edited by M. Sterling McMurrin (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1983), cited in Elster, The Multiple Self.

  79. 79.

    Jaquet-Chiffelle et al., “Virtual Persons and Identities,” 77.

  80. 80.

    For a profound analysis of these new forms of identity, see David-Olivier Jaquet-Chiffelle, Emmanuel Benoist, Rolf Haenni, Florent Wenger, and Harald Zwingelberg “Virtual Persons and Identities” in “The Future of Identity in the Information Society”, p.75–117

  81. 81.

    Nabeth, “Identity of Identity,” 38.

  82. 82.

    Elliott, Concepts of the Self, 8.

  83. 83.

    M. Wigan, “Owning Identity – One or Many – Do We Have a Choice?,” Technology and Society Magazine, IEEE 29, 2 (2010).

  84. 84.

    The right to be forgotten is implicitly recognized in a number of different legislative acts and legal instruments in France, namely in article 40 of the “Loi nº 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’ informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés,” as well as in article 226-20 of the French Penal Code.

  85. 85.

    The right to oblivion (il diritto all’oblio) is deemed to be implicitly enshrined in articles 7 and 11 of the Personal Data Protection Code (Legislative Decree n.196 dated 30 June 2003), as well as in a number of jurisprudential decisions (Italian Supreme Court [Corte Suprema di Cassazione], 18 October 1984, n.5259; Court of Rome [Tribunale di Roma], 27 November 1996, etc).

  86. 86.

    Pino, “The Right to Personal Identity in Italian Private Law: Constitutional Interpretation and Judge-Made Rights,” 237.

  87. 87.

    It is interesting to note that the right to be forgotten is not protected in the United States, being clearly overshadowed by the right to inform and the right to free speech. Such fact results from the ever-broadening view of the First Amendment’s protection of a free press and a clear preference for the latter over the privacy interests of individuals. For more details on the clash between Europe and the US concerning the tension between the right to inform and the right to be forgotten, see Werro, “The Right to Inform V. The Right to Be Forgotten: A Transatlantic Clash.”

  88. 88.

    Niger, “Il Diritto All’identità Personale,” 125.

  89. 89.

    Following this point of view, Niger observes that the need to protect one’s projection in the reality of society, taking into account what one is and expresses through her present social presence, assumes enormous importance. The past of a person, as long as not necessary to define someone’s actual and current social presence, should remain in oblivion, namely when its remembrance may alter her present position (Sergio Niger, “Il Diritto All’ Oblio,” In Diritto All’anonimato: Anonimato, Nome E Identitá Personale, edited by Giusella Finocchiaro (Padova: Cedam, 2008) – author’s translation.

  90. 90.

    A paradigmatically example of the preservation of a collective memory associated with new technologies (in this case within the so-called web 2.0) is reflected in the recent announcement made by the US Library of Congress. The world’s largest library has announced that it will archive digitally every public tweet since Twitter’s inception, back in March 2006 (Christopher Bean, Posterity. How Future Historians Will Use the Twitter Archives, http://www.slate.com/id/2251429/., accessed October 2, 2004). Twitter is a website which offers a social networking and microblogging service, enabling its users to send and read other user’s messages called tweets (Wikipedia contributors, “Twitter,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twitter (accessed October 2, 2010).

  91. 91.

    Werro, “The Right to Inform V. The Right to Be Forgotten: A Transatlantic Clash,” 291.

  92. 92.

    In fact, and within European data-protection laws, one of the fundamental principles orienting the protection of individuals in this area has been the increasing limitations and restrictions upon data retention. For more details on the issue of data retention and the right to oblivion, see Jeremy Warner, “The Right to Oblivion: Data Retention from Canada to Europe in Three Backward Steps,” University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal 2, 1 (2005).

  93. 93.

    In this sense, French Senators Yves Détraigne and Anne-Marie Escoffier have recently put forward a draft proposal for a “Law to Better Guarantee the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age” which explicitly recommends the establishment of a “droit à l’oubli numérique.” Such legislative proposal is designed to regulate the storage of data, establishing a maximum retention period for personal data and including a right to delete information, guaranteed free of charge. “Proposition de loi sénatoriale visant à mieux garantir le droit à la vie privée à l’heure numérique”, recorded by the Senate Presidency on Nov. 6, 2009, is available, in French, at http://www.senat.fr/leg/ppl09-093.html

  94. 94.

    In Italy, the MEP Carolina Lussana has presented in Parliament a controversial draft proposal for a law that regulates the right to oblivion. Such proposal would prevent the storage and availability of information on the Internet concerning people already under investigation or facing charges in a criminal process. The proposed bill (proposta di legge n.2455: nuove disposizione per la tutela del diritto all’oblio su internet in favore delle persone già sottoposte a indagini o imputate in un processo penale), submitted to the Italian Parliament on May 20, 2009 is available, in Italian, at http://www.camera.it/_dati/leg16/lavori/stampati/pdf/16PDL0025880.pdf

  95. 95.

    Jeffrey Rosen, “The Web Means the End of Forgetting,” New York Times, July 21 2010.

  96. 96.

    Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 229.

  97. 97.

    Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Delete : The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).

  98. 98.

    Ibid., 171.

  99. 99.

    Rosen, “The Web Means the End of Forgetting.”

  100. 100.

    Ibid.

  101. 101.

    In this context, Niger affirms that the right to identity represents the foundational reference of the right to oblivion (“Il diritto all’identità personale rappresenta, quindi, la matrice prima del diritto all’oblio”, in Niger, “Il Diritto All’ Oblio,” 67)

  102. 102.

    Pino stresses the same idea by qualifying the right to personal identity as a multiform, adaptable right (Ibid.)

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de Andrade, N.N.G. (2011). Right to Personal Identity: The Challenges of Ambient Intelligence and the Need for a New Legal Conceptualization. In: Gutwirth, S., Poullet, Y., De Hert, P., Leenes, R. (eds) Computers, Privacy and Data Protection: an Element of Choice. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0641-5_4

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