Abstract
The cognition’s subject intentionally finds out the idea carried by the object or event when cognizing it. That is to say, the idea passively contained in the object is not illuminated by itself, but as a result of focus of human’s-subject’s attention on it. In the conception of Ishragism it is called illumination, but in phenomenology it is intentionality. The phenomenon differs from the object itself in the point that not the whole complex of passive ideas but only one of them is illuminated, and in considered context it replaces the object. But the rest is the collection of passive ideas which remains dark to the subject and is called “thing in itself” by Kant. In this meaning darkness could also be understood as non-being. Thus, in fact “thing in itself” as it is presented in Kant’s conception, is not something that remains untouchable, dark for the human being, but is assessed as a dark part standing in every concrete cognition process. In this approach, relying on synthesis of agnosticism and phenomenology, a new model of knowledge appears. Transcendentality is being relativized and conditioned by intentionality.
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Khalilov, S. (2011). Intentionality and Transcendentality. In: Tymieniecka, AT. (eds) Transcendentalism Overturned. Analecta Husserliana, vol 108. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0624-8_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0624-8_6
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