Re-construction and Conceptual Analysis

  • Manuel BremerEmail author
Part of the Analecta Husserliana book series (ANHU, volume 108)


Traditionally transcendental logic had to deal with the conditions of possibility of judgements, which were presupposed by formal logic. Defined as a purely philosophical enterprise transcendental logic was considered as being a priori delivering either analytic or even synthetic a priori result. In this paper it is argued that this separation from the (empirical) cognitive sciences should be given up. Transcendental logic should be understood as focusing on specific questions. Transcendental logic properly understood, and redefined, should concern itself with the (formal) re-construction of the presupposed necessary conditions and rules of linguistic communication in general. It aims at universality and reflexive closure.


Conceptual Analysis Conceptual Scheme Reflective Equilibrium Logical Pluralism Wide Reflective Equilibrium 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophisches Institut, Universität DüsseldorfDüsseldorfGermany

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