Argument Structure: pp 1-38 | Cite as

# An Approach to Argument Macrostructure

## Abstract

Argument macrostructure concerns the overall support structure of statements as wholes in arguments. We may distinguish the standard approach through circles and arrows due to Beardsley and Thomas from Toulmin’s layout of arguments. Although Thomas has shown how the standard approach may accommodate arguments with suppositions, representing the structure of arguments replying to objections needs extension of the method through incorporating elements of the Toulmin model. We indicate how the two approaches may be synthesized. Questions analogous to those Toulmin uses to motivate introduction of distinct elements in his model may be used to motivate distinct argument structures on the standard approach. Questions motivating further structural distinctions can be straightforwardly formulated. These questions raise evaluative issues, connecting structural analysis with evaluation. We conclude the chapter by comparing and contrasting our method with Wigmore’s chart method and Pollock’s inference graphs.

## Keywords

Inference Rule Modal Qualifier Argument Structure Defense Attorney Epistemic Probability## References

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