Neither Logically Omniscient nor Completely Irrational Agents: Principles for a Fine-Grained Analysis of Propositional Attitudes and Attitude Revision

  • Daniel Vanderveken
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 351)


Contemporary logic is confined to a few paradigmatic attitudes such as belief, knowledge , desire and intention . My purpose in this chapter is to present a general approach of propositional attitudes of any cognitive or volitive mode. In my view, one can recursively define the set of all psychological modes of attitudes. As Descartes anticipated, the two primitive modes are those of belief and desire . Complex modes are obtained by adding to primitive modes special cognitive and volitive ways or special propositional content or preparatory conditions.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Département de PhilosophieUniversité du QuébecTrois-RiviéresCanada

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