Perspectival Act Utilitarianism

  • John F. Horty
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 351)


This paper explores a problem involved in defining the act utilitarian notion of a “right action” within the framework of stit semantics. The problem is there seem to be two different, and conflicting, ways of defining this idea, both intuitively attractive. Previous work has addressed this problem by developing separate theories to account for our conflicting intuitions. This paper shows that the problem can also be addressed through a single theory that allows actions to assessed from different perspectives.


Conditional Optimality Unique History Utilitarian Theory Dominance Sense Conditional Dominance 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy Department and Institute for Advanced Computer StudiesUniversity of MarylandCollege ParkUSA

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