Abstract
We have noted in Part II how helpful the red/green distinction from Chapter 4 proves to be in the apodeictic syllogistic. But, as we saw in Chapter 11, choosing red terms seems to make Q-propositions empty and so would make QQQs trivial in a very undesirable way. It is undesirable because it leaves us always trying to syllogize from false premises, and whatever modern logic has to say about that, it does not suit Aristotle’s scientific method.
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Bibliography
McCall, S. 1963, Aristotle’s Modal Syllogisms. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company.
Waterlow [Broadie], S. 1982, Passage and Possibility: A Study of Aristotle’s Modal Concepts. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Patterson, R. 1995, Aristotle’s Modal Logic. Essence and Entailment in the Organon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Rini, A. (2010). Realizing Possibilities. In: Aristotle's Modal Proofs. The New Synthese Historical Library, vol 68. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0050-5_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0050-5_12
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