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The Commercial Monopoly in Sports Mega-Events

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Ambush Marketing & the Mega-Event Monopoly

Part of the book series: ASSER International Sports Law Series ((ASSER))

Abstract

This chapter will examine the commercial arrangements relating to sports mega-events between sports organisations and their commercial partners, primarily the sponsors who spend hundreds of millions of dollars to associate their products and services with these international spectacles. It will commence with a brief discussion of how the commercial exploitation through sponsorship of these events works, after which I will provide some brief description of the (short) history of the development of the modern mega-vent sponsorship model in the Olympic Games context. The final section of the chapter will examine how sponsorship works, and will then focus on a central concept in the evaluation of the legality of ambush marketing and of the law’s responses to it, namely sponsorship exclusivity to events. The legal implications of such exclusivity will be further examined in Chap. 6.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Tomlinson 2005, p. 59, 60.

  2. 2.

    See the report dated 6 January 2011, available online at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/01/06/uk-soccer-asian-congress-blatter-idUKTRE70525X20110106.

  3. 3.

    From Scott, M ‘FIFA crisis: Storm clouds gather as big hitters fight to clear names’, 29 May 2011 in The Guardian—available online at the time of writing at http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2011/may/29/fifa-crisis-storm-clouds-gather?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487.

  4. 4.

    Schenk, S Safe Hands: Building Integrity and Transparency at FIFA Report by Transparency International (August 2011) at 2—copy available at the time of writing for download on their web site at http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2011/2011_08_16_independent_group_fifa_reform.

  5. 5.

    See, for example, the arguably rather arrogant view of Michael Payne, former marketing director of the International Olympic Committee, writing in Payne 2006, p. 187:

    ‘[B]y the time the athletes and media arrived at Salt Lake [for the 2002 winter Olympic Games], the world found what it wanted: a city and an organising committee that fully understood its responsibilities in staging the Games; that they were mere custodians of the Olympic brand, and were tasked with nurturing it, polishing it and eventually returning it back to the [International Olympic Committee]—stronger, and in better shape, than when they had received it’.

  6. 6.

    It is interesting to note what (it is submitted) may amount to a rather blatant recent example of the way in which the pursuit of profit has assumed a dominant role over the promotion of sport for the greater good: The South African organisers of the 2010 FIFA World Cup apparently experienced difficulty in negotiations with FIFA regarding ticket prices for the event. While the local organisers (and other forums across Africa) had insisted that tickets should be affordable to the masses, FIFA apparently pegged the prices, insisting on the maximisation of profits in order to finance their own activities for the four years until the next World Cup in 2014. Apparently, FIFA emphasised the fact that the event is a FIFA event and that South Africa has little bargaining power in this respect—even to the point of stating that the organisation could take away the World Cup if they chose (from a briefing to the parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Sport and Recreation, Cape Town, 14 June 2005). It appears that there is widespread dissatisfaction amongst host countries of the FIFA World Cup in respect of the organisation’s history of imposing rigid demands on hosts in the interest of maximising FIFA profits from the event. On a study tour to France by members of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Sport and Recreation (visit undertaken in June 2005, to investigate issues surrounding France’s hosting of the FIFA World Cup in 1998 with a view to preparations for World Cup 2010 in South Africa), members of the delegation were specifically warned by the Director-General of the French Football Federation that FIFA was imposing increasingly rigid regulations in this regard (e.g. that the organisation would receive all the revenues from television rights for the event). The delegation was reportedly advised that South Africa should not agree to a blanket acceptance of all FIFA’s rules and conditions, in order to ensure that the country would derive sufficient economic benefit from the event. See the minutes of the discussion of the Committee, 11 August 2005 (available online at http://www.pmg.org.za/viewminute.php?id=6094).

  7. 7.

    Compare the latest in a number of critical exposes, British investigative journalist Andrew Jennings’s Foul! The Secret World of FIFA: Bribes, Vote Rigging and Ticket Scandals, Harper Sport, London, 2006; see also (in respect of the International Olympic Committee) Jennings’s The New Lords of the Rings Pocket Books 1996.

  8. 8.

    See Crow and Hoek 2003, p. 2; Johnson 2007, p. 4; see also the discussion in Pound 2006, Chap. 6.

  9. 9.

    See Walters 2004, p. 17.

    According to recent reports (see The Observer, 12 February 2007), at the time of writing BSkyB and Setanta Sports are reportedly paying £1.7 billion to hold the exclusive rights to screen live matches of the English Premiership in Britain for the next 3 years. Broadcasters in 208 other countries have reportedly recently doubled their payments to secure English Premiership rights, to a combined £625 million.

  10. 10.

    See the report available online at the time of writing at http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/premier-league/premier-league-nets-16314bn-tv-rights-bonanza-1925462.html.

  11. 11.

    Fortunato and Martin 2011.

  12. 12.

    See the report available online on the web site of the Asser Sports Law Centre at http://www.sportslaw.nl (last visited 8 March 2006).

  13. 13.

    See http://www.sportbusiness.com/news/167610/olympic-tv-revenue-to-increase.

  14. 14.

    Nick Harris ‘£1.78bn: Record Premier League TV deal defies economic slump’ The Independent, 7 February 2009—available online at the time of writing at http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/premier-league/163178bn-record-premier-league-tv-deal-defies-economic-slump-1569576.html.

  15. 15.

    See the short article by Andrew Braithwaite and Sonya Pennington ‘Image Rights: Do they exist and who should own them?’, available online at http://www.sportandtechnology.com/page/0035.html [last accessed 27 February 2007].

  16. 16.

    Taken from Pilger, J ‘Why sharks should not own sport’ on the truth-out web site at http://www.truth-out.org/why-sharks-should-not-own-sport58820.

  17. 17.

    See the report by Vranicka, S ‘Tiger scores a comeback’, 6 October 2011, The Wall Street Journal—available online at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203388804576613220984785418.html.

  18. 18.

    Burton and Chadwick 2009, p. 3.

  19. 19.

    Ibid.

  20. 20.

    Gannon 2010, p. 67.

  21. 21.

    Rupert Murdoch (Fox, Sky and Star TV networks) has at times had holdings in British and German football clubs, major league baseball teams in the United States and rugby league clubs in Australia. Silvio Berlusconi was at one time the principal owner of AC Milan football club, and has also had a major stake in Sportal, the Internet sport company. Canal Plus, the French television station, owned the Paris St. Germain football club. See Mark Marqusee ‘Sport as Apocalypse’, available online at http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1716/17161100.htm.

    See also Downward and Dawson 2000, p. 37.

  22. 22.

    E.g. Manchester United football club and the New York Yankees baseball franchise, both of which have entered the Internet and broadcasting business. See, in general, Sect. 2.5 of the final report of the Sports Directorate of the Netherlands Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, entitled The Balance Between the Game and the Money (2000).

  23. 23.

    Philip Knight, founder of the Nike Corporation, characterised sport in the mid-1990s as ‘the dominant entertainment in the world’. Gratton and Taylor 2000, p. 3 remarked the following in 2000:

    ‘Sport is now recognised as an important sector of economic activity, part of the increasingly important leisure industry which accounts for over a quarter of all consumer spending and over 10% of total employment in the UK, and brings in over £20 billion per annum in foreign exchange. Sport is not the largest sector of the leisure industry, but it is among the fastest growing’.

    In respect of commercialisation of sporting competition, Downward and Dawson 2000, pp. 36, 37 identify sports leagues’ main sources of revenue (historically) as gate receipts, merchandising, sponsorship, the sale of TV rights, transfer fees and the sale of match schedules to the gaming industry.

  24. 24.

    Andrews 2004, p. 3.

  25. 25.

    For more on these developments and their legal implications, see Louw 2009, par. 353–364, 406–412, 485–490.

  26. 26.

    See discussion of the apparent development of a ‘sports event organiser’s right’ in Chap. 10.

  27. 27.

    See the discussion in section Chap. 5.

  28. 28.

    As it has been put, succinctly, in the American context:

    ‘Both patent and copyright law limit competition and therefore increase or at least stabilize prices for a product or service. Patents and copyrights are the only constitutionally mandated monopolies, created with the recognition that unfettered competition would drain creators of their financial incentive to create’. Vaidhyanathan 2003, p. 87

  29. 29.

    The International Olympic Committee of the 1970 s, for example, has been described as an organisation ‘with an extremely limited product increasingly in global demand’—see Magdalinski and Nauright 2004, p. 193.

  30. 30.

    FIFA is no stranger to controversy surrounding the sale of tickets to its World Cup events. The European Competition Commission ruled against the French local organising committee (the CFO) established by FIFA and the French football federation for purposes of the hosting of the 1998 FIFA World Cup in France, in respect of its mandate in respect of ticket sales. The Commission ruled that the CFO had infringed Article 82 of the EC Treaty (see discussion in the text below) by applying discriminatory arrangements in the sale of tickets to the general public, which involved the imposition of unfair trading conditions on consumers outside France which resulted in the limitation of the market to the prejudice of such consumers—Commission Decision of 20 July 1999, Case IV/36.888—1998 Football World Cup); see the discussion in Gardiner et al. 2006, pp. 360–362.

  31. 31.

    It was reported on 7 April 2010 that competition authorities had raided the offices of South African Airways and its low-cost local subsidiary Mango Airlines in order to obtain evidence in respect of such collusion investigation (and it was speculated that these two companies were at risk of losing indemnity for their participation in such investigation on the basis of alleged withholding of evidence).

  32. 32.

    As has been observed: ‘Simply put, [sponsorship] exclusivity is difficult to control, but it would be impossible without contractual stipulations’. Graham et al. 1995, p. 103.

  33. 33.

    Roche 2000, p. 1.

  34. 34.

    O’Reilly, N; McCarthy, L; Seguin, B; Lyberger, M ‘Sponsorship and the Super Bowl: A longitudinal analysis’ (2005) at 55—available online at the time of writing at http://luxor.acadiau.ca/library/ASAC/v26/03/26_03_p052.pdf

  35. 35.

    In guidelines published by the AIPPI’s Working Committee, Project Q210 (‘The protection of major sports events and associated commercial activities through trademarks and other IPR’; in a call for country reports compiled for purposes of a draft resolution to be submitted to the AIPPI Exco meeting in Buenos Aires, October 2009)—available online at the time of writing at https://www.aippi.org/download/commitees/210/WG210English.pdf.

  36. 36.

    Nemeth 2010.

  37. 37.

    McDaniel and Kinney 1998.

  38. 38.

    Horne and Manzenreiter 2006, p. 3.

  39. 39.

    Ibid. 2.

  40. 40.

    Ibid. 5.

  41. 41.

    Ibid. 3.

  42. 42.

    Compare the following classification:

    ‘Mega-sporting events include specialist world-level international sports competitions (e.g. the World Cup competitions in soccer, athletics, rugby and Grand Prix events for horseracing and motor racing) and also the ‘world regional-level’ versions of these events. These are mainly connected to the multi-sport Olympics, such as the Asian Games, the Pan-American Games and the Commonwealth Games, and to a lesser degree to the world-level specialist events such as the European zone competition for the soccer World Cup’. Malfas et al. 2004, p. 211.

  43. 43.

    In 2011 the NCAA agreed to a 14-year, USD 10.8 billion deal with CBS and Turner Sports for the US broadcast rights.

  44. 44.

    Johnson 2008, p. 29.

  45. 45.

    Broadcasting rights to sports mega-events will not be considered in this book.

  46. 46.

    With event-related revenue the single largest source of income for the organisation (at 93% of the total for the relevant period).

  47. 47.

    Source: FIFA Annual Financial Report 2010—available online at the time of writing at www.fifa.com.

  48. 48.

    Compare Article 74 of the FIFA Statutes (August 2009 version, currently in force at the time of writing), and discussion in Chap. 3. See also the description of FIFA in the preamble to the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa By-laws as published by the eThekwini Municipality for the host city of Durban, which describes FIFA as ‘both the world governing body of association football and the lawful owner of the world-wide Marketing Rights, Media Rights and all other commercial rights in respect of the [World Cup] Competition’. Such description does, of course, not qualify such ‘rights’ in respect of their nature and status (i.e. the personal nature—read: unenforceability against third parties—of contractual rights flowing from commercial agreements with sponsors). FIFA’s web site (at www.fifa.com) proclaims that ‘The FIFA World Cup and all other FIFA competitions are privately funded—without state subsidies for either FIFA or the Local Organising Committee. FIFA carries the costs of staging the Event and in exchange retains all commercial rights’.

  49. 49.

    Gardiner et al. 2006, p. 458 explain the value of sports sponsorship for sponsors as follows:

    ‘[T]he sponsor’s association is with the sponsored party’s sports event and also with the emblems, logos and mascots (the event marks) that identify and distinguish the particular sports body and its event … Sports sponsorship results in a transfer of the essential values and properties of the sponsored party and its events to the sponsor’s business organisation and, ultimately, to its products and/or services, thereby raising the sponsor’s profile and standing in the community (offering public relations opportunities and advantages) and amongst its existing and potential customers … [The value of sports sponsorship] also lies in the fact that the sponsor is given exclusivity in the particular product or service category in respect of which the sponsorship rights are granted by the owner of the rights’.

  50. 50.

    In Sect. 2.4 in this chapter and in Chap. 6.

  51. 51.

    It should be noted in passing that the bid processes in respect of commercial rights to major events are not always transparent and have, allegedly, at least once in the past been manipulated in an apparently anti-competitive manner by FIFA executives in respect of the football World Cup (See discussion of the bid process for the sale of television broadcasting rights to the 2002 and 2006 FIFA World Cups in Jennings 2006, Chap. 7). It has also been reported that Match Event Services, which was FIFA’s exclusive official accommodation provider for the 2010 World Cup and no stranger to controversy, was apparently appointed without any tender process. Rob Rose writes (in Schulz-Herzenberg 2010, pp. 99, 100) as follows:

    ‘While [Match Event Services] officially warns accommodation providers to keep room rates low because tourists are ‘sensitive to pricing’, an investigation by the author has confirmed that tourists will have to pay Match 1000% more than they would normally pay for accommodation in certain cases, such as for units at South Africa’s Kruger National Park. Match Event Services is owned entirely by a family-owned UK-registered company called Byrom PLC. The circumstances of its appointment remain cloudy: there was never any public tender for the multi-million rand contract, for example. Riding on those coat-tails is the closely linked Match Hospitality, which has FIFA’s official stamp of approval to provide exclusive hospitality packages to large companies seeking to impress clients at the South African event. Not only does Match Hospitality refuse to disclose its exact shareholding structure, but it has emerged that one of the four shareholders in the company is Infront Sports and Media, a company headed by Philippe Blatter—nephew and godson of the FIFA supremo’.

  52. 52.

    The Olympic Charter in force from 11 February 2010 (currently in force at the time of writing).

  53. 53.

    See the response by John Coates (president of the Australian Olympic Committee and Executive Board Member of the International Olympic Committee) to an article by Malcolm Maiden (‘The Olympic monopoly and why it harms sport’, Sydney Morning Herald, 20 November 2009—available online at the time of writing at http://www.smh.com.au/business/the-olympic-monopoly-and-why-it-harms-sport-20091119-iowz.html), available online at the time of writing on the web site of the Australian Olympic Committee at http://corporate.olympics.com.au/news.cfm?ArticleID=10495.

  54. 54.

    See the discussion in Sect. 2.4.

  55. 55.

    Former Olympic marketing manager Michael Payne has also been emphatic in stressing the importance of sponsorship exclusivity for the success of the Olympic commercialisation model—see Payne 2006, pp. 142, 143.

  56. 56.

    The version available at the time of writing on the web site of http://www.gamesmonitor.org.uk in respect of the 2012 London Olympics, in Section IV: Ambush Marketing Prevention, at p. 13 (this document refers to an updated version of the Manual which was scheduled for publication in July 2005, although such updated version (if it exists) is not available online at the time of writing).

  57. 57.

    The sponsor or other purchaser of rights should generally obtain a warranty from the event organiser that it is entitled to hold the event at the venue, that it controls access to the event, and that it own trademarks and other relevant intellectual property rights relating to the event (and, in addition, an undertaking from the event organiser that it will take specific steps to combat unauthorised commercial exploitation of the event, for example by means of ticket terms regulating access and participation agreements regarding teams and athletes)—see Becker 2006, p. 23.

  58. 58.

    Gardiner et al. 2006, p. 449.

  59. 59.

    Ibid.

  60. 60.

    See Burrell, T ‘FIFA’s money grab a blatant foul’, Daily News, 12 April 2010.

  61. 61.

    See, specifically, the discussion in Chap. 8.

  62. 62.

    Organisations such as the International Olympic Committee and FIFA enter into long-term contracts which span multiple major events with their most attractive high profile sponsors (e.g. VISA is currently involved in a long-term agreement with FIFA as a ‘FIFA Partner’ in the financial services segment until the year 2014; Coca-Cola earlier entered into a 16-year deal with FIFA at a cost of USD 500 million).

  63. 63.

    Vassallo et al. 2005, p. 1354.

  64. 64.

    Fortunato and Richards 2007, p. 34.

  65. 65.

    Marina Palomba, legal director of the UK’s Institute for Advertising Practitioners, quoted in a report entitled ‘UK businesses upset over London Olympics Law’, 25 August 2005, available online at the time of writing on the web site of www.GamesBids.com at http://www.gamesbids.com/eng/other_news/1125074698.html.

  66. 66.

    See discussion of sponsorship exclusivity in relation to mega-events in Sect. 2.4.

  67. 67.

    Fortunato and Richards, p. 36.

  68. 68.

    See the discussion in Sect. 2.3.

  69. 69.

    Seguin et al. 2005.

  70. 70.

    Magdalinski and Nauright 2004, p. 194.

  71. 71.

    Compare the voluminous Major Sporting Events Bill 2009 of the Parliament of Victoria in Australia (the status of which in the legislative process is at the time of writing unknown to the author). This document runs to over 200 sections, dealing with safety at sporting events, ambush marketing, ticketing etc. By way of illustration of the types of ambush marketing conduct prohibited by this Bill, compare the wording of section 38, which provides that it is an offence for a person to use protected event logos or images or protected event references without authorisation, if such use would (inter alia) ‘suggest a sponsorship-like arrangement to a reasonable person’ (section 38(1)(e) of the Bill).

  72. 72.

    The New Zealand Rugby Football Union failed to secure co-hosting rights to the 2003 IRB Rugby World Cup due to its inability to guarantee “clean stadia” for the event to the IRB. As part of New Zealand’s successful bids to host the 2011 Rugby World Cup and the 2015 ICC Cricket World Cup a commitment was given to ensure adequate provisions were in place to protect sponsors. New Zealand subsequently passed much-criticised and very extensive anti-ambush marketing legislation in the form of the Major Events Management Act, 35 of 2007. Since the promulgation of the Act three events have to date been identified as protected events, namely the 2011 Rugby World Cup, the FIFA U-17 Women’s World Cup and the FIBA U-19 World Championship—see the report by Ironside “Ambush Marketing Law Passes First Test”—available online at the time of writing at http://www.baldwins.com/ambush-marketing-law-passes-first-test (posted 2009-09-04). The Hon Trevor Mallard, New Zealand’s Minister for the Rugby World Cup, was quoted as explaining the need for this legislation as follows:

    ‘[T]he legislation will make New Zealand more attractive to major event organisers. Without it, New Zealand’s success when bidding for similar events in the future, may be at risk. It is impossible to host major events these days without enormous financial contributions from large sponsors. These companies will not provide sponsorship dollars if others are allowed to manipulate public perceptions by falsely suggesting a link with these events’.

    From the undated (last updated 2009-09-16) report entitled “Proposed Ambush Marketing Bill Explained” http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentTOC41944.aspx. Kelbrick 2008, pp. 38, 39 refers to the criticism voiced by the New Zealand Law Society in response to the promulgation of this very extensive Act. The Law Society recognised that the justification for the Act was that some major international events could not be hosted unless such legislation existed, and suggested (which suggestion was not accepted) that an event should only be declared a protected event in terms of the Act if the relevant Minister is satisfied that this is necessary in order to secure hosting rights in respect of the specific event—from the New Zealand Law Society Submission on the Major Events Management Bill (see Kelbrick 2008, p. 39, note 74).

    In respect of the position in Australia, Curthoys and Kendall 2001 observe the following (at par. 43) in showing that the relevant legislative amendments prior to the Sydney 2000 Olympics were, primarily, in order to serve the commercial interests of event organisers and their sponsors:

    ‘The [Sydney 2000 Games (Indicia and Images) Protection Act] itself is a comment on the power of the advertising dollar associated with the Olympic symbol and the Sydney 2000 Games—this intersection being made explicit in sub-section 3 of the Act which provides:

    1. (1)

      The objects of this Act are:

      1. (a)

        to protect, and to further, the position of Australia as a participant in, and a supporter of, the World Olympic and Para-Olympic movements; and

      2. (b)

        to the extent that it is within the power of the Parliament to assist in protecting the relations and ensuring the performance of the obligations of the Sydney 2000 Games bodies with and to the World Olympic and Para-Olympic movements, in relation to the holding of the Sydney 2000 Games.

    2. (2)

      These objects are to be achieved by facilitating the raising of licensing revenue in relation to the Sydney 2000 Games through the regulation of the use for commercial purposes of the indicia and images associated with the Games’.

  73. 73.

    Andriychuck 2009, p. 133.

  74. 74.

    See Bacalao-Fleury 2011, p. 200.

  75. 75.

    Stuart and Scassa 2011, par. 18.

  76. 76.

    From personal correspondence, December 2011.

  77. 77.

    Act 12 of 2006.

  78. 78.

    For more on the FIFA 2010 bid guarantees, see Davies 2009, pp. 38–40.

  79. 79.

    M and G Media Ltd v 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa Organising Committee Ltd South Gauteng High Court Case No. 09/51422 (unreported at the time of writing) at par. 123.

  80. 80.

    Guarantee 12 as contained in the Phase II Questionnaire as part of the UEFA European Football Championship 2012 Final Tournament bid requirements.

  81. 81.

    M and G Media Ltd v 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa Organising Committee Ltd supra at par. 107.

  82. 82.

    Schwab 2006, p. 8.

  83. 83.

    Tripodi and Sutherland 2000, pp. 412–422.

  84. 84.

    Mike du Toit, partner of South African firm ENS, as quoted in a report entitled ‘Sporting Chance’, available on the web site of the International Bar Association at http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=1a43e1e6-e207-4aa7-a21f-6d0435bba7e7.

  85. 85.

    Johnson 2007, p. 26.

  86. 86.

    Heshka is a law professor at the Thompson Rivers University in British Columbia, and has published on ambush marketing and the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympic Games—from personal correspondence with the author, December 2011.

  87. 87.

    Montagnon, R and Smith, J ‘Marketing, advertising and the Olympics: How to avoid falling at the first hurdle’, April 2010, available online at the time of writing at http://www.herbertsmith.com/NR/rdonlyres/24175EF6-DA81-4B1B-8C75-F39DEACC4DD2/14743/FeatureOlympicswithcopy.pdf.

  88. 88.

    See the report dated 2 June 2010 available online at the time of writing at http://www.v-brazil.com/world-cup/2014/cbf-files-lawsuits-for-ambush-marketing/.

  89. 89.

    Kelbrick 2008.

  90. 90.

    Martin Stopper as quoted by Doreen Carvajal in the International Herald Tribune, 31 May 2006.

  91. 91.

    See discussion in Chap. 3.

  92. 92.

    As discussed in Sect. 4.4.5 in Chap. 4.

  93. 93.

    Dalton Odendaal, as quoted in an April 2008 BBC report (available online at the time of writing at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7364391.stm).

  94. 94.

    ‘IOC vows to continue ambush marketing crackdown’, 22 June 2010, available online at the time of writing at http://www.sports-city.org/news_details.php?news_id=12128&idCategory=1.

  95. 95.

    David Becker was quoted as follows in an interview available online at http://www.sportzpower.com/?q=content/interview-david-becker-head-legal-icc-0&page=0%2C1:

    ‘We did review the procedures and guidelines during the 2010 FIFA World Cup and have taken valuable lessons from them. We are determined to strike the right balance between protecting our sponsors and recognising the public’s rights to interact with and enjoy the event. Our team will be carefully accessing every situation and dealing with each case according to our established protocols. A common-sense approach will be taken based on the individual circumstances of each case’.

  96. 96.

    From a posting (‘How the World Cup ambushed itself’, 18 June 2010) on marketing guru Kim Skildum-Reid’s blog at http://blog.powersponsorship.com.

  97. 97.

    From an address presented by Professor David Vaver, Reuters professor of Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law, Oxford University, at the Victoria University of Wellington, 30 August 2000—available online at the time of writing at http://kirra.austlii.edu.au/nz/journals/VUWLawRw/2001/2.html.

  98. 98.

    Lesa Ukman, writing (16 February 2010) on the IEG sponsorship blog available online at http://www.sponsorship.com/About-IEG/Sponsorship-Blogs/Lesa-Ukman/February-2010/The-Other-Side-Of-The-Current-Ambush-Marketing-Deb.aspx.

  99. 99.

    ‘Ambush marketing: War minus the shooting’, The Economist, 16 February 2006, available online at the time of writing at http://www.economist.com/node/5536128.

  100. 100.

    See discussion in Chap. 7.

  101. 101.

    The CBS rejection letter noted that ‘CBS Standards and Practices has reviewed your proposed Super Bowl ad and concluded that the creative is not within the Network's Broadcast Standards for Super Bowl Sunday’.

  102. 102.

    See the short piece available online at the time of writing at http://www.deep-alliance.com/?p=624. Canadian law professor Jon Heshka explains that Colbert was also the official sponsor of the US Speed-skating team and had raised more than USD 300,000 for the team, and he suggests that VANOC would have been outgunned by Colbert and they wisely chose not to go after him (from personal correspondence with the author, December 2011).

  103. 103.

    A survey was conducted by the Chief Marketing Officer (CMO) Council (a six-month qualitative and quantitative research campaign, ‘Doing Away With Foul Play in Sports Marketing’, aimed at sensitising sports sponsors and franchises to trademark trespassing, property rights violations and online scams, frauds and infringements) with the assistance of MarkMonitor. The CMO Council surveyed more than 180 senior-level sports marketers across relevant industries for an assessment of how brands are safeguarding themselves and whether those measures are effective. The study also drew from interviews with executives at top leagues and corporate sponsors. See Gannon, N ‘Foul play in sports branding—the marketer’s perspective’ October/November 2010 World Trademark Review 67.

  104. 104.

    Gannon 2010, p. 68.

  105. 105.

    See the discussion in Sect. 5.2.2 of Chap. 5.

  106. 106.

    Bikoff et al. 2010, p. 91.

  107. 107.

    Chase and Kernit 2010, p. 386 recount a case in the USA involving the United States Olympic Committee:

    ‘[I]n United States Olympic Committee v. Asics America Corporation [No. CV-08-00522 Complaint (C.D. Cal. 9th May, 2008)], the USOC sued Asics for running multiple print and Internet advertisements supporting its endorsed athletes’accomplishments in connection with the 2008 Olympics… [T]hese advertisements included a print advertisement featuring a photograph of Asics-endorsed marathoner Ryan Hall that stated: “Good luck in the 2008 Summer Olympic Games. From all your fans at Asics”, as well as congratulatory messages on Asics’ website for its endorsers making the US Olympic team. Although the USOC voluntarily dismissed its complaint, the parties apparently settled their differences, as Asics subsequently entered into a multi-year agreement with USA Field Hockey, the national governing body for field hockey affiliated with the USOC, to become the “Official Partner and Exclusive Sponsor of footwear, apparel, and accessories”’.

  108. 108.

    McKelvey and Grady 2008, p. 581. See further Chap. 5.

  109. 109.

    For discussion of the London Olympic and Paralympic Games Act, 2006, see Sect. 4.4.3 in Chap. 4.

  110. 110.

    Marina Palomba, legal director of the UK’s Institute for Practitioners in Advertising, as quoted in ‘Olympics Bill to blitz ‘ambush advertising’’, Daily Telegraph, 9 July 2005.

  111. 111.

    Ibid.

  112. 112.

    Government Gazette No. 32878 Vol. 535 (18 January 2010).

  113. 113.

    The Merchandise Marks Act, 1941 (as amended in 2002), discussed in Chap. 4 and elsewhere in this book.

  114. 114.

    Which will be discussed in more detail in Chap. 4 and elsewhere in this book.

  115. 115.

    James 2010, p. 10.

  116. 116.

    Palomba, M ‘Is ambush marketing dead?’ Reed Smith Advertising Compliance Team Client Alert No. 10-097 (May 2010)—available online at the time of writing at http://www.advertisingcompliancelaw.com/uploads/file/10-097%20ReACTS%20-%20Is%20ambush%20marketing%20dead.PDF.

  117. 117.

    Article 49(b) of the London 2012 Host City Contract further provides as follows:

    ‘Payments to be made by the IOC or certain third parties: The City and/or the OCOG shall bear all taxes, whether they be withholding taxes, customs duties, value added taxes or any other indirect taxes, whether present or future, due in any jurisdiction on a payment to be made by the IOC or any third party owned and/or controlled by the IOC, including without limitation Olympic Broadcasting Services and Meridian Management SA, with respect to the revenues generated in relation to the Games, including without limitation pursuant to any agreement with an Olympic sponsor, supplier, licensee, broadcaster or other commercial partner. The amount of a payment to be made by the IOC or any of the above-noted third parties pursuant to this Contract shall not be increased by any taxes due on such payment. If the IOC or such third party is liable for the payment of such tax, the net payment received by the City, the NOC or the OCOG shall be reduced by an amount corresponding to such tax or, if the payment to the City, the NOC or the OCOG has already been made, the tax subsequently paid by the IOC or such third party shall be reimbursed in full to the IOC or such third party by the City, the NOC or the OCOG, as the case may be’.

  118. 118.

    Another example of such a provision for tax exemption can be found in section 16(1) of Jamaica’s.

    ICC Cricket World Cup West Indies 2007 Act, 2006:

    ‘Income arising from [Cricket World Cup 2007] earned by:

    1. (a)

      CWC 2007 Inc., ICC and its members, [ICC Development (International) Ltd], [Global Cricket Corporation Ltd] and [the West Indies Cricket Board] and its members and their respective advisers not ordinarily resident in Jamaica;

    2. (b)

      a member of a squad;

    3. (c)

      a CWC 2007 official; or

    4. (d)

      the staff of ICC, IDI or GCC, shall be exempt from taxes of every description’. See also article 21 of the Russian Federation’s ‘Olympic and Paralympic Law’ (Federation Law 310-FZ) for the hosting of the 2014 Sochi winter Olympic Games, which adds the following to Part Two of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation:

    ‘The organisations who are foreign organisers of the Olympic Games and the Paralympic Games according to Article 3 of the Federal Law “On the Organisation and Holding of the XXII Olympic Winter Games and the XI Paralympic Winter Games 2014 in Sochi, the Development of Sochi as a Mountain Climate Resort and the Amendment of Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation” shall not be deemed to be taxpayers in relation to the transactions made as part of the organisation and holding of the XXII Olympic Winter Games and the XI Paralympic Winter Games 2014 in Sochi’.

  119. 119.

    See the report by Scott, M ‘FIFA’s demand to be exempt of UK money-laundering legislation’ The Guardian, 1 December 2010, available online at the time of writing at http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/dec/01/fifa-government-government-exemptions?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487.

  120. 120.

    From a report available online at the time of writing at http://www.v-brazil.com/world-cup/2014/fifa-claims-full-tax-exemption/.

  121. 121.

    At https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/blg-63037.html.

  122. 122.

    See, for example, the report available online at the time of writing at http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/jul/18/fifa-world-cup-sepp-blatter.

  123. 123.

    See, for example, the discussion on the Tax Justice Network website (e.g. at http://taxjustice.blogspot.com/2010/10/fifa-versus-south-africa-total-victory.html).

  124. 124.

    My thanks to Jon Heshka for reminding me of this point (from personal correspondence with the author, December 2011).

  125. 125.

    Baade, R A and Matheson, V ‘Bidding for the Olympics: Fool’s Gold?’ (at 7)—Undated paper available online at the time of writing at http://harbaugh.uoregon.edu/Readings/Sports/olympics.pdf.

  126. 126.

    Chap. 7 of the South African government’s Bid Book for the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa.

  127. 127.

    Tolsi, N ‘The World Cup Bid Book fiasco’ 13 June 2010, The Mail and Guardian (available online at the time of writing at http://www.mg.co.za/article/2010-06-13-the-completely-miscalculated-world-cup-bid-book-that-cost-us-a-bundle).

  128. 128.

    Cottle, E ‘A preliminary evaluation of the impact of the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa’, 2 September 2010—available online at the time of writing at http://www.sah.ch/data/D23807E0/ImpactassessmentFinalSeptember2010EddieCottle.pdf.

  129. 129.

    Rose and Spiegel 2010, p. 12.

  130. 130.

    It was reported in October 2010 that the nine South African host cities for the tournament were considering taking legal action to recover an amount of approximately ZAR 500 million from FIFA, which FIFA had allegedly contractually undertaken to pay the host cities for certain construction work, for ‘rehabilitation’ of parts of the host cities after the event, and in respect of the host cities’ alleged entitlement to 10% of revenues from ticket sales during the event.

  131. 131.

    See the Mail and Guardian report available online at the time of writing at http://mg.co.za/article/2010-06-08-mg-wins-bid-to-access-world-cup-tender-documents; M and G Media Ltd v 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa Organising Committee Ltd South Gauteng High Court Case No. 09/51422 (unreported at the time of writing).

  132. 132.

    From a report available online at the time of writing at http://mg.co.za/article/2010-05-24-loc-too-busy-for-mg-court-battle.

  133. 133.

    See http://www.gamesmonitor.org.uk/node/935.

  134. 134.

    At http://www.london.gov.uk/freedom-information.

  135. 135.

    See the report by Raquel Rolnik, United Nations Special Rapporteur on adequate housing, of March 2010, which calls on FIFA and the IOC (and host governments) to ensure that mega-events such as the football World Cup and the Olympic Games do not lead to the displacement of the poor, through forced evictions, criminalisation of homeless persons and informal activities, and the dismantling of informal settlements—see the report entitled ‘Olympics and World Cup soccer must take up cause of right to housing—UN expert’, 9 March 2010, available on the web site of the UN News Centre at www.un.org [accessed 20 March 2010]. It was reported on 7 April 2010 that the City of Cape Town’s efforts to move the residents of informal settlements had caused controversy and were claimed to be aimed at removing an ‘eyesore’ for tourists in the run-up to the 2010 FIFA World Cup. City officials denied that such efforts were aimed at city beautification for the event, and claimed that they were part of a longer term strategy to provide permanent housing for such residents.

    At the time of writing (in early 2011) a major Indian housing advocacy group was in the process of taking a claim for compensation and rehabilitation to the high court of Delhi, arguing that a programme of forced evictions ahead of the 2010 Commonwealth Games violated rights. The Housing and Land Rights Network produced a report in February 2011, alleging that the forced evictions by the local government had violated people's rights and even led to a number of deaths before the games in October 2010. Four months before the games, authorities in the city of Delhi announced that street vendors and other stall holders were a 'major security risk' and would be evicted—see the report available online at the time of writing at http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/asiapac/stories/201102/s3144899.htm.

  136. 136.

    Compare the very extensive restrictions on informal street traders as contained in the various 2010 host city municipal by-laws, as referred to in Chap. 7.

  137. 137.

    See the discussion on human rights implications of mega-events commercial rights protection in Chap. 7.

  138. 138.

    Payne 2006, pp. 143, 144.

  139. 139.

    Son of Adi Dassler (founder of Adidas) and brother to Rudi (founder of Puma). See the discussion in Chap. 9.

  140. 140.

    See Schaus and Wenn 2007, p. 316.

  141. 141.

    Which was to become known as ‘TOP I’ and which operated from 1985–1988—see the discussion in the text below.

  142. 142.

    From the preface to Barney et al. 2004.

  143. 143.

    Payne 2006, p. 112.

  144. 144.

    Seguin and O’Reilly 2008, p. 62.

  145. 145.

    Burton and Chadwick 2009, p. 3.

  146. 146.

    See Johnson 2008, p. 3. At the time fewer cities were interested in bidding for the Games: Munich, Madrid, Montreal and Detroit bid for the 1972 Games, Montreal, Los Angeles and Moscow bid for 1976, Moscow and Los Angeles for 1980, and only Los Angeles bid for 1984.

  147. 147.

    Taken from http://www.atkearney.com/index.php/Publications/building-a-legacy.html.

  148. 148.

    Malfas et al. 2004, p. 213.

  149. 149.

    See Matheson, V A and Baade, R A ‘Mega-sporting events in developing nations: Playing the way to prosperity?’ (draft document, March 2003)—available online at the time of writing at http://web.williams.edu/Economics/wp/mathesonprosperity.pdf.

  150. 150.

    The Olympic Act passed by the Parliament of Canada on 27 July 1973.

  151. 151.

    Barney et al. 2004, p. 155.

  152. 152.

    The host city contract was subsequently amended by the IOC.

  153. 153.

    De Lange 1998, p. 105.

  154. 154.

    Barney et al. 2004, p. 155.

  155. 155.

    Ibid. 160.

  156. 156.

    Barney et al. 2004, p. 163.

  157. 157.

    The World Intellectual Property Organisation, a specialised agency of the United Nations established by the WIP Treaty adopted in Stockholm on 14 July 1967.

  158. 158.

    Adopted on 26 September 1981, which in its Article 1 places an obligation on states party to the Treaty ‘to refuse or to invalidate the registration as a mark and to prohibit by appropriate measures the use, as a mark or other sign, for commercial purposes, of any sign consisting of or containing the Olympic symbol, as defined in the Charter of the International Olympic Committee, except with the authorisation of the International Olympic Committee’.

  159. 159.

    Johnson 2008, p. 25.

  160. 160.

    See Barney et al. 2004, pp. 156–163.

  161. 161.

    This television broadcast was famously fictionalised as the first major television broadcast to emanate from Earth and to be received by an alien civilisation, in the 1997 Warner Bros Pictures film Contact, directed by Robert Zemeckis.

  162. 162.

    Toohey and Veal 2007, pp. 153, 154.

  163. 163.

    Brundage, who had been IOC vice-president since 1942 and who was elected president in 1952, was famously instrumental in the removal of the only two Jewish competitors in the US team for the 400 meter race at the Berlin Olympics of 1936. He has been labelled a Nazi sympathiser, who was also opposed to the inclusion of women in the Games.

  164. 164.

    Ibid. Rule 49 of the Olympic Charter (7 July 2007, in force at the time of writing) deals with ‘Media Coverage of the Olympic Games’. Rule 49.2 provides that ‘[a]ll decisions concerning the coverage of the Olympic Games by the media rest within the competence of the IOC’.

  165. 165.

    Ibid.

  166. 166.

    From the 2010 edition of the IOC’s Olympic Marketing Fact File, available online at the time of writing at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/fact_file_2010.pdf.

  167. 167.

    Schaus and Wenn 2007, p. 316.

  168. 168.

    Ibid.; Barney et al. 2004, pp. 170, 171.

  169. 169.

    See Barney et al. 2004, pp. 171–179.

  170. 170.

    Houlihan 2004, p. 66.

  171. 171.

    Pound 2006, p. 150.

  172. 172.

    From the 2010 edition of the IOC’s Olympic Marketing Fact File, available online at the time of writing at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/fact_file_2010.pdf.

  173. 173.

    Organising Committee for the Olympic Games.

  174. 174.

    This issue of ‘centralising’ negotiations for sponsorship rights was specifically cited as one of the reasons for the IOC Executive Board’s approval of the recommendation to pursue the ISL proposal for a new global sponsorship programme—see Barney et al. 2004, p. 171.

  175. 175.

    Pound 1986, p. 84.

  176. 176.

    See discussion in Sect. 2.4.

  177. 177.

    Pound 1986, p. 85.

  178. 178.

    See the 2010 edition of the IOC’s Olympic Marketing Fact File (available online at the time of writing at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/fact_file_2010.pdf).

  179. 179.

    See the letter by John Coates, president of the Australian Olympic Committee and Executive Board Member of the International Olympic Committee, available online the time of writing on the web site of the Australian Olympic Committee at http://corporate.olympics.com.au/news.cfm?ArticleID=10495.

  180. 180.

    Ibid.

  181. 181.

    Ibid.

  182. 182.

    Gruneau 1984, p. 36.

  183. 183.

    Ibid. 24–25. The Winter Games in Albertville in 1992 reportedly made a USD 57 million loss. By way of example, the Sydney 2000 Summer Games cost an estimated USD 3.24 billion to present (including a bid cost of USD 12.6 million) and broke even; The Salt Lake City Winter Games of 2002 cost an estimated USD 1.3 billion to present (including a USD 7 million bid cost) and showed an estimated USD 100 million profit—see Davis 2008, p. 68.

  184. 184.

    See Davis 2008, pp. 163, 164.

  185. 185.

    Schaus and Wenn 2007, pp. 317, 318.

  186. 186.

    Davis 2008, p. 156.

  187. 187.

    Ibid. 157.

  188. 188.

    Pound 1986, p. 85.

  189. 189.

    Davis 2008, p. 157.

  190. 190.

    Schaus and Wenn 2007, pp. 312, 313.

  191. 191.

    Ibid.

  192. 192.

    Andrews 2004, p. 18.

  193. 193.

    Ibid.

  194. 194.

    See the discussion of the 2000 Sydney Olympics in Still et al. (2009), pp. 182, 183.

  195. 195.

    See the letter by John Coates, president of the Australian Olympic Committee and Executive Board Member of the International Olympic Committee, available online the time of writing on the web site of the Australian Olympic Committee at http://corporate.olympics.com.au/news.cfm?ArticleID=10495.

  196. 196.

    Ibid.

  197. 197.

    A separate Winter Olympics dates from 1924—figure skating and ice hockey were Olympic events before 1924, but the larger programme hosted by France in 1924 was so successful that the IOC in 1925 retroactively labelled it the Winter Olympics and subsequently solicited separate bids to host the Winter Olympics. As has been observed (with a bit of tongue-in-cheek, I’m sure): ‘The 1928 Olympics were hosted by Amsterdam, which was not a good location for downhill skiing, and the Winter Olympics were held in St. Moritz, Switzerland’—Pomfret et al. 2009, p. 11.

  198. 198.

    From an article by Phillips, R ‘Big business demands a corporate Olympics’, 16 March 1999, available online at http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/mar1999/olym-m16.shtml; see also Payne 2006, p. 144.

  199. 199.

    I use the word ‘properties’ here in the sense that it is understood in the sponsorship industry. As will be clear from discussion elsewhere in this book I am not convinced that what the sports mega-event rights grantors (the international sports governing bodies) and rights holders (the sponsors or commercial partners) refer to as their ‘property’ necessarily always enjoys such status in the legal sense.

  200. 200.

    Lewis and Taylor 2007, p. 706 (par. D5.4).

  201. 201.

    Ibid.

  202. 202.

    Gardiner et al. 2006, pp. 446, 447.

  203. 203.

    Available online, at the time of writing, at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/fact_file_2010.pdf.

  204. 204.

    Schwab 2006, p. 7.

  205. 205.

    Farrelly and Quester 1997, pp. 5–7.

  206. 206.

    Crompton 2004a, p. 9.

  207. 207.

    See Masterman 2009, p. 305 et seq.

  208. 208.

    See Avenell, P ‘Sharp slips under Sony’s radar to steal Euro 2012 sponsorship’, available online at the time of writing at http://www.current.com.au/2011/05/25/article/Sharp-slips-under-Sonys-radar-to-steal-Euro2012-sponsorship/OBRIXLDFAM.

  209. 209.

    Which, in marketing terms, one could define as ‘the definitional categories within which products and services are positioned, categorized, and described, and within which they are, therefore, considered for purchase by consumers’—see http://welshmktg.com/WMA_thematic_spaces.pdf.

  210. 210.

    Boyle and Haynes 2009, p. 63.

  211. 211.

    More will be said about the (potential) role of social media in this regard in Chap. 10.

  212. 212.

    Boyle and Haynes 2009, p. 63.

  213. 213.

    Crompton 2004b, p. 268.

  214. 214.

    Slack and Amis 2004, p. 270.

  215. 215.

    Cobbs 2011 (my thanks to the author for providing me with an advance copy of the article).

  216. 216.

    Cobbs 2011 , relying on an IEG Sponsorship Report 2009.

  217. 217.

    Cashmore 2010, p. 372.

  218. 218.

    Schaaf 1995, p. 22.

  219. 219.

    Sutton et al. 1997, p. 15 describe the phenomenon of ‘fan identification’ in professional team sports as follows:

    ‘Fan identification is defined as the personal commitment and emotional involvement fans have with a sport organisation. When a customer identifies closely with an organisation, a sense of connectedness ensues and he or she begins to define him- or herself in terms of the organisation… Sport differs from other sources of entertainment through evoking high levels of emotional attachment and identification… Sport promotes communication, involves people jointly, provides common symbols, a collective identity and a reason for solidarity’.

  220. 220.

    Hofacre, writing in Burnett J, Menon A, Smart DT 1993, p. 22.

  221. 221.

    Cooper Dreyfuss 1996, p. 139; Coombe 1991, p. 1877.

  222. 222.

    For some interesting discussion of an example of why advertising during broadcasts may have an ever-increasing bad rap amongst consumers (at least in the United States), see Bollier 2005, pp. 197–201 (‘The quest for perfect control’).

  223. 223.

    See Mullin et al. 2000.

  224. 224.

    See Seguin and O’Reilly 2008.

  225. 225.

    Ibid. 72.

  226. 226.

    Cobbs 2011, with reference to Amis, J; Pant, N and Slack, T ‘Achieving sustainable competitive advantage: A resource-based view of sport sponsorship’ 11(1) Journal of Sport Management (1997), pp. 80–96; and Fahy, J; Farrelly, F and Quester, P ‘Competitive advantage through sponsorship: A conceptual model and research propositions’ 38(8) European Journal of Marketing (2004), pp. 1013–1030.

  227. 227.

    Fortunato and Richards 2007, pp. 40, 41. See also O’Reilly, N; McCarthy, L; Seguin, B; Lyberger, M ‘Sponsorship and the Super Bowl: A longitudinal analysis’ (2005) at 55—available online at the time of writing at http://luxor.acadiau.ca/library/ASAC/v26/03/26_03_p052.pdf.

  228. 228.

    Ibid. 41. See also Grohs et al. 2004, pp. 119–138.

  229. 229.

    Magdalinski and Nauright 2004, p. 185.

  230. 230.

    From the 2010 edition of the IOC’s Olympic Marketing Fact File, available online at the time of writing at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/fact_file_2010.pdf; see also Bacalao-Fleury 2011, p. 198.

  231. 231.

    538 F.3d 736 (2008) at 737–738—for more on this case, see the discussion in Chap. 6.

  232. 232.

    Mishawaka Rubber and Woollen Manufacturing Co. v S S Kresge Co. (1942) 13 US 203, at 205.

  233. 233.

    See Mullin et al. 2007, p. 322.

  234. 234.

    Payne 2006, pp. 142, 143.

  235. 235.

    Govoni 2004, p. 32; see also Carrie Urban Kapraun ‘Fun with category exclusivity’, 7 October 2009, writing on the IEG sponsorship blog available online at the time of writing at http://www.sponsorship.com.

  236. 236.

    Masterman 2009, p. 286.

  237. 237.

    Masterman 2009, p. 300.

  238. 238.

    Cobbs 2011.

  239. 239.

    Fortunato and Martin 2011.

  240. 240.

    Ibid.

  241. 241.

    Compare the facts of Force India Formula 1 Team Ltd v Etihad Airways and Aldar Properties [2010] EWCA Civ 1051.

  242. 242.

    Kapraun supra.

  243. 243.

    Masterman 2009, pp. 300, 301.

  244. 244.

    See Kapraun supra, writing on the IEG sponsorship blog available online at the time of writing at http://www.sponsorship.com. The 2010 edition of the Olympic Marketing Fact File contains the following description of the TOP programme and the benefits that it brings to TOP sponsors:

    ‘The TOP programme provides each Worldwide Olympic Partner with exclusive global marketing rights and opportunities within a designated product or service category. The global marketing rights include partnerships with the IOC, all active NOCs and their Olympic teams, and the two OCOGs and the Games of each quadrennium. The TOP Partners may exercise these rights worldwide and may activate marketing initiatives with all the members of the Olympic Movement that participate in the TOP programme’.

  245. 245.

    Schwab 2006, p. 6.

  246. 246.

    Ibid.

  247. 247.

    See Rule 51.2 of the Olympic Charter (2010):

    ‘No form of advertising or other publicity shall be allowed in and above the stadia, venues and other competition areas which are considered as part of the Olympic sites. Commercial installations and advertising signs shall not be allowed in the stadia, venues or other sports grounds’.

  248. 248.

    Magdalinski and Nauright 2004, p. 196.

  249. 249.

    Burton and Chadwick 2009, p. 9.

  250. 250.

    Gradauskaite 2010, par. 34.

  251. 251.

    Fortunato and Richards 2007, p. 42.

  252. 252.

    AIPPI Resolution on Question Q210: ‘The protection of major sports events and associated commercial activities through Trade Marks and other IPR’, adopted at the AIPPI Executive Committee meeting in Buenos Aires, 14 October 2009—English version available online at the time of writing at https://www.aippi.org/download/commitees/210/RS210English.pdf.

  253. 253.

    Compare the recent litigation involving the Dutch badminton federation and its exclusive equipment sponsor Yonex, which is discussed in Chap. 6.

  254. 254.

    Compare the antitrust litigation between TYR Sports, Inc v Warnaco Swimwear, Inc et al. 679 F. Supp. 2d. 1120 (2009), which included federal antitrust claims in terms of the Sherman Act, of conspiracy and disparagement against Warnaco (manufacturer of the Speedo brand of clothing), U.S. Swimming and the U.S. national swimming coach. The plaintiff’s claims included allegations (which it failed to prove in evidence) that U.S. Swimming had refused it to advertise in its official magazine, Splash, the largest-selling swimming magazine in the USA, and that photographs in the magazine had been airbrushed to remove the logos of competitors of Speedo from view. It was also alleged that Schubert, the U.S. national swimming coach had prior to the 2008 Beijing Games told athletes that ‘I would strongly advise them to wear the [Speedo] at trials, or they may end up at home watching [the Olympics] on NBC’.

  255. 255.

    From the short article entitled ‘Bush-Whackers’, 21 August 2008 in Marketing Week (available online at the time of writing at http://www.mad.co.uk/Main/Home/Articlex/17d67f5e4e9e42fc9cd8d88de18c2749/'Bush-whackers.html).

  256. 256.

    See the 2010 edition of the IOC’s Olympic Marketing Fact File (available online at the time of writing at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/fact_file_2010.pdf).

  257. 257.

    Johnson observes that ‘[t]he rise of ambush marketing was a result of the increasing sophistication of sports sponsorship’, and ‘[t]he rise of ambush marketing is directly related to the media attention given to sporting events’—Johnson 2007, p. 6. Elsewhere (Johnson 2008, p. 24) Johnson also observes:

    ‘In real terms ambush marketing is the result of exclusive sponsorship deals. Sport has involved some form of sponsorship from the very beginning. The early days of sports marketing, during the 1950s and 1960s, witnessed a substantial growth in sponsorship deals and those wanting to be sponsors, but during this period anyone who wanted to become a sponsor could arrange some sort of deal. Accordingly, everyone was welcome and the varying levels of competition that existed meant that there was no need to ever ambush an event. The problem with this open access model was that it did not provide sufficient funds to host major sporting events and, in particular, the Olympic Games. By the late 1970s the International Olympic Committee had serious financial problems and hosting the Olympic Games was seen as an albatross around the neck of the host city’.

  258. 258.

    See, for example, Barney et al. 2004, p. 236:

    ‘The question of whether ambush marketing is an unethical or imaginative practice is widely debated within the sponsorship industry. Arguments for or against ambush marketing vary widely depending on whether one adopts a narrow or broad view of the practice itself. One thing remains certain, however: the growth of Olympic sponsorship expenditure world-wide has been accompanied by a parallel growth in the practice of ambush marketing’.

  259. 259.

    Johnson 2007, p. 6.

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Louw, A.M. (2012). The Commercial Monopoly in Sports Mega-Events. In: Ambush Marketing & the Mega-Event Monopoly. ASSER International Sports Law Series. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-864-4_2

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