Abstract
The structure of public international law is commonly characterized in terms of its opposition to the structure of the internal law of the State. Whereas the structure of the internal law of the State is vertical, the structure of public international law, in view of the absence of authority above States, is horizontal. Within that structure, the function of public international law—the legal effect that rules of public international law have on the members of international society—is commonly understood in terms of an opposition between two frameworks: rules of public international law either limit the freedoms to act of the members of international society (limiting form) or confer powers to act on the members of international society (conferring form). These frameworks may be regarded as two forms in terms of which the concept of public international law governs relations between States. In either form, rules of public international law are regarded as coterminous with the common good of international society
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- 1.
On the centrality of this definition and its attraction for reform, see Kennedy 2000, p. 343.
- 2.
In relation to the limiting form: Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951, Dissenting Opinion of Judges Guerrero, Sir Arnold McNair, Read and Hsu Mo, ICJ Reports 1951, 15, 46: ‘It is an undeniable fact that the tendency of all international activity in recent times has been towards the promotion of the common welfare of the international community with a corresponding restriction of the sovereign power of individual States.’
- 3.
Koskenniemi 2005, pp. 17–23, 58–69, 563–589.
- 4.
Koskenniemi 2005, pp. 533–561.
- 5.
Kennedy 2000, pp. 346–347.
- 6.
Scobbie 1990, pp. 339–352.
- 7.
Zemanek 1997, paras 5–8.
- 8.
Korhonen 1996, pp. 1–4, 9–22.
- 9.
Kennedy 2000, pp. 346–347.
- 10.
Mahiou 2008, pp. 39–40.
- 11.
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951, Dissenting Opinion of Judges Guerrero, Sir Arnold McNair, Read and Hsu Mo, ICJ Reports 1951, 15, 31–32.
Lauterpacht 1936, p. 54.
- 12.
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951, ICJ Reports 1951, 15, 23.
- 13.
Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (New Application: 1962; Second Phase), Judgment of 5 February 1970, ICJ Reports 1970, 3, paras 33–34.
- 14.
Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002; Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application), Judgment of 3 February 2006, ICJ Reports 2006, 3, para 64.
- 15.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, 226, para 70.
- 16.
Lauterpacht 1933, part I, para 1.
- 17.
Lauterpacht 1933, part VI, para 19.
- 18.
Lauterpacht 1933, part VI, paras 13–17.
- 19.
Lauterpacht 1933, part VI, paras 18, 20–21.
- 20.
Lauterpacht 1933, part II, Chap. V.
- 21.
Lauterpacht 1933, part VI, para 22.
- 22.
Case of the S.S. “Lotus”, Judgment No. 9 of 7 September 1927, Series A.—No. 10, 18.
- 23.
Island of Palmas Case, 875; Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 3 March 1950, Dissenting Opinion Judge Alvarez, ICJ Reports 1950, 4, 13; Dissenting Opinion Judge Azevedo, 26; Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (First Phase), Advisory Opinion of 30 March 1950, Dissenting Opinion Judge Zoričić, ICJ Reports 1950, 65, 99–100; Dissenting Opinion Judge Krylov, 109.
Strupp 1934, pp. 491–497; Fitzmaurice 1957a, para 3; Gilson 1984, pp. 53–58; Onuf 1994, p. 17; Carillo Salcedo 1997, pp. 583–584; Zemanek 1997, para 38; Dupuy 2002, pp. 95–96.
- 24.
Mahiou 2008, pp. 118–119.
- 25.
Weil 1992, pp. 33–39; Zemanek 1997, paras 29–31; Tomuschat 1999, Chap. I, para 23; Kolb 2006, para 52.
- 26.
Strupp 1934, pp. 418–421; Carillo Salcedo 1997, p. 584; Zemanek 1997, para 41; Tomuschat 1999, Chap. I, para 25; Kolb 2000, p. 106.
- 27.
Weil 1992, pp. 53–58, 203–225; Carillo Salcedo 1997, pp. 583–585: ‘As international law is required to govern a fundamentally different society from that within the state, it therefore has specific functions adapted to the needs of that society. Indeed, alleged imperfections so often complained of in international law are for the most part only structural features inherent to the system, since they correspond to the needs of international society. (…) [T]he development and application of law depend on the nature of the social group to which it refers, and it is clear in this connection that the features of international society sharply contrast with those of the political community at the state level. While the latter comprises, if only in principle, centralized and hierarchically organized social groups, international society is essentially a society of sovereign, independent states.’ Kolb 1998, p. 667; Kolb 2000, pp. 104–113: ‘Tout droit s’inscrit dans l‘une des branches d’une alternative. Primo, il peut s’agir d’un droit reposant sur des structures centralisées où les pouvoirs procèdent d’un pôle de pouvoir unique. C’est une forme de droit <étatique>. Il s’agit d’un droit <non-primitif>. Secundo, il peut s’agir d’un droit décentralisé où les pouvoirs restent répartis sur des centres autonomes. C’est une forme de droit de <sociétés-non-étatiques>. Il s’agit dès lors d’un droit <primitif>. Le terme primitif n’est donc qu’un descripteur de toutes les conséquences qui découlent du caractère coordinatif du droit international, du fait que le sujet uti singuli et non la communauté juridiquement organisée détient les pouvoirs constitutionnels, du fait que la souveraineté individuelle n’a pas été expropriée. (…) S’il y a donc primitivité du droit international, c’est par rapport à l’expérience des droits étatiques centralisés. (…) C’est sur ce point empirique, dépourvu de tout jugement de valeur, qu’on peut légitimement parler de <primitivité>, en entendant par là la structure décentralisée de la société internationale et les conséquences que ce fait imprime au droit qui régit cette société.’
- 28.
Case of the S.S. “Wimbledon”, Judgment No. 1 of 17 August 1923, Series A.—No. 1, 25: ‘The Court declines to see in the conclusion of any Treaty by which a State undertakes to perform or refrain from performing a particular act an abandonment of its sovereignty. No doubt any convention creating an obligation of this kind places a restriction upon the exercise of the sovereign rights of the State, in the sense that it requires them to be exercised in a certain way. But the right of entering into international engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty.’
- 29.
Koskenniemi 2005, pp. 17–23, 89–94.
- 30.
Kingsbury et al. 2005, p. 17.
- 31.
Kingsbury 2009, Sections 2, 3.
- 32.
Kingsbury 2005, pp. 53–59; Dyzenhaus 2005, p. 155.
- 33.
Dyzenhaus 2005, pp. 153–165.
- 34.
Koskenniemi 2009, pp. 7–12, 14–18.
- 35.
Bruns 1929, pp. 9–12; Bruns 1933, pp. 459–465.
- 36.
Dekker and Werner 2003, pp. 14–23.
- 37.
Dekker and Werner 2003, pp. 14–23.
- 38.
Kratochwil 1989, pp. 34–43.
- 39.
Kolb 2006, para 18, footnote 67.
- 40.
Scobbie 1990, pp. 339–352.
- 41.
Koskenniemi 2009, p. 8.
- 42.
Kratochwil 1989, pp. 40–43.
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© 2013 J. A. Vos, The Netherlands
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Vos, J.A. (2013). Introduction. In: The Function of Public International Law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-861-3_1
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