Skip to main content

Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Providing Legal Advice on Military Action Against Iraq

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 2011

Part of the book series: Netherlands Yearbook of International Law ((NYIL,volume 42))

Abstract

This article describes the role of legal advice and legal advisers in the policy-making process toward the 2003 invasion of Iraq, on the basis of the report of the Davids Committee in the Netherlands and the documents declassified in the course of the UK’s Chilcot Inquiry. The controversial nature and seemingly weak legal basis for the 2003 invasion of Iraq prompted much public and academic discussion, even leading to the leaking of otherwise confidential legal memoranda from government lawyers to the media. Unprecedented and (semi)public inquiries were carried out into the policy-making processes and motives for resorting to the use of armed force, including the role of legal advice and legal advisers. In the Netherlands, legal advisers were at a disadvantage because of the hierarchical structure in which they are placed, and because the basic policy was set at a very early stage. The legal advice rendered in the United Kingdom was given far more consideration and prominence. Yet, when advice and policy started to diverge, the formal structure in which legal advice had to be requested from the Attorney General became subject to manipulation as to timing and, perhaps, substance. This description and analysis reveal common and familiar themes regarding the role, responsibilities, and perceptions of legal advice in foreign policy.

Assistant Professor of International Law at the Department of Transnational Legal Studies at the Faculty of Law of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, and Executive Director of the Vitoria Institute for International Law and Policy. The author was also an interim legal counsel at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands in 2009. This research topic was in great part inspired by that experience. The author gives thanks to Prof. Wouter Werner and Dr. Erik Denters for reviewing first drafts of this article. Any opinions expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    The Iraq Inquiry in the United Kingdom has not concluded or published any preliminary findings at the time of writing. The analysis here is based on the public oral and written statements from relevant witnesses, as well as numerous declassified documents. Many documents on which the Dutch inquiry was based have not been publicly released. The discussion of these documents relies, therefore, solely on their rendition in the report.

  2. 2.

    A historical narrative approach places the legal advice in the context of historical events and policy-making in order to be able to assess the impact of that advice on the decision-making process. See e.g. Carty and Smith 2000, pp. 2–3.

  3. 3.

    The Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly is the Legal Committee and deals with international legal matters. The International Law Commission also reports to the Sixth Committee.

  4. 4.

    Corell 1991, p. 372.

  5. 5.

    United Nations Office of the Legal Counsel, Background information to the Informal Meetings of Legal Advisers of Ministries of Foreign Affairs, available at http://www.un.org/law/counsel/meetings.htm.

  6. 6.

    Cf. Merillat 1964, pp. 1–8; Berman 1994, p. 82.

  7. 7.

    See Sect. 4.5.1.

  8. 8.

    See e.g. Scharf and Williams 2010, pp. 15–18; Bilder 1962.

  9. 9.

    Corell 1992, p. 4. See also generally on the meetings of the Legal Advisers, Corell 1999.

  10. 10.

    See e.g. for a compact yet comprehensive discussion of the legal issues regarding the Iraq War, Gray 2004, pp. 270–281. See also the transcript public hearing of Sir Michael Wood, 26 January 2010, pp. 48–54, available at www.iraqinquiry.org.uk.

  11. 11.

    UN Doc. S/RES/678, 29 November 1990.

  12. 12.

    UN Doc. S/RES/687, 3 April 1991.

  13. 13.

    For a more elaborate discussion of the meaning and interpretation of resolution 678 (1990) and 687 (1991), and the revival theory see Manusama 2006.

  14. 14.

    See the letters to the Security Council by the UK, US and Australia, UN Docs. S/2003/350, 20 March 2003; S/2003/351, 20 March 2003; S/2003/351, 20 March 2003.

  15. 15.

    See e.g. Murphy 2004, pp. 173–257.

  16. 16.

    Crawford et al. 2003.

  17. 17.

    Joost Oranje, ‘Memorandum DJZ/IR/2003/158–Juristen van Buitenlandse Zaken achtten Irak oorlog van meet af aan onwettig’ [Memorandum DJZ/IR/2003/158–Lawyers from Foreign Affairs considered Iraq War illegal from beginning], NRC Handelsblad, 17 January 2009.

  18. 18.

    Davids Committee 2010. Chapter 8 of the report on legal issues was translated in English and published in its entirety in the Netherlands International Law Review (NILR 2010, pp. 81–137).

  19. 19.

    Riphagen 1964, p. 79.

  20. 20.

    Davids Committee 2010, note 48, p. 243; NILR 2010, note 48, p. 107.

  21. 21.

    Cf. Riphagen 1964, pp. 80–83 and Lammers 2009.

  22. 22.

    Davids Committee 2010, p. 47 and sources cited therein.

  23. 23.

    Davids Committee 2010, p. 243; NILR 2010, p. 107.

  24. 24.

    Davids Committee 2010, p. 244; NILR 2010, p. 108.

  25. 25.

    Davids Committee 2010, note 28, p. 50.

  26. 26.

    UN Doc. S/RES/1205, 5 November 1998.

  27. 27.

    Letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 13 December 1998, Kamerstukken II, 1998/99, 21 664, nr. 100; Cf. Davids Report 2010, p. 52. In the report, the relevant passage from the letter is paraphrased as if the question was whether Iraq’s noncompliance with the relevant resolutions offered a sufficient legal basis. In the view of this author this is an incorrect reflection of the letter and the Government’s position.

  28. 28.

    Letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 17 December 1998, Kamerstukken II, 1998/99, 21 664, nr. 102; Cf. Davids Committee 2010, p. 53.

  29. 29.

    In the report, the relevant passage from the letter of 13 December is paraphrased as if the question was whether Iraq’s non-compliance with the relevant resolutions offered a sufficient legal basis. In the view of this author, this is an incorrect reflection of the letter and the Government’s position. The Government was of the opinion that Iraq’s non-compliance justified military action on the basis of the preceding resolutions, not solely on the basis of non-compliance. As is widely accepted, there exists no unilateral right to enforce UNSC resolutions when these resolutions do not contain an authorization to use force. The Dutch Government, with the US and UK, considered that the original authorization in resolution 678 (1990) was revived due to Iraq’s non-compliance.

  30. 30.

    Davids Committee 2010, p. 244; NILR 2010, p. 108.

  31. 31.

    Davids Committee 2010, p. 56.

  32. 32.

    Davids Committee 2010, p. 245; NILR 2010, p. 109.

  33. 33.

    Ibid.

  34. 34.

    Davids Committee 2010, p. 84.

  35. 35.

    Davids Committee 2010, p. 85.

  36. 36.

    Davids Committee 2010, pp. 247, 251; NILR 2010, pp. 111, 114. Contrary to the actual position of the Legal Adviser, the dossier noted that the Legal Adviser was of the opinion that the legal basis for regime change was very thin, and that resolution 678 (1990) was temporally unlimited and unlimited in purpose.

  37. 37.

    Davids Committee 2010, p. 246; NILR 2010, p. 110.

  38. 38.

    Davids Committee 2010, p. 251; NILR 2010, p. 114.

  39. 39.

    Davids Committee 2010, p. 247; NILR 2010, p. 111. The Davids Report only acknowledges similarities between the legal standpoints in 1998 and 2002. In the view of this author, the two views do not merely share similarities, but share the core standpoint that a new authorization would not be legally necessary.

  40. 40.

    For a more elaborate analysis of resolution 1441 (2002) see Manusama 2006, pp. 214–217. The Davids Report concludes that resolution 1441 does not contain any authorization to use force without further UNSC decision making. Davids Committee 2010, p. 241.

  41. 41.

    Letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 11 November 2002, Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 63.

  42. 42.

    Davids Committee 2010, pp. 247–248; NILR 2010, pp. 111–112.

  43. 43.

    Letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 18 March 2003, Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 94.

  44. 44.

    Davids Committee 2010, pp. 248–249, 261; NILR 2010, p. 112.

  45. 45.

    Davids Committee 2010, p. 249; NILR 2010, pp. 111–112.

  46. 46.

    Foreign Affairs, DJZ/IR/NA/00195, memorandum from DLA to minister via the SG, ‘Iraq—Legal basis for military action’, 29 April 2003, Memorandum DJZ/IR/2003/158. See also Oranje 2009.

  47. 47.

    NILR 2010, p. 108.

  48. 48.

    See paragraph 1 of the leaked memo, Ibid.

  49. 49.

    Davids Committee 2010, p. 531 (conclusions in English).

  50. 50.

    Ibid.

  51. 51.

    Ibid.

  52. 52.

    Davids Committee 2010, p. 251; NILR 2010, p. 115.

  53. 53.

    All documents, statements and testimonies are publically available on the website of the Inquiry, www.iraqinquiry.org.uk. Unless considered necessary for the sake of clarity, the titles of the documents as used by the Chilcot Inquiry on the website are maintained, although the titles do not seem to reflect a concise and consistent system of referencing.

  54. 54.

    See the outstanding article on how legal advice was rendered, weighed, and used in the Suez-Canal crisis by Watson 1988. The British Government in that case bypassed the negative legal opinions of the AG, as well as the Legal Adviser from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and instead relied on the unofficial views of the Lord Chancellor.

  55. 55.

    House of Lords and House of Commons, Joint Committee on the Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill, Draft Constitutional Renewal BillVolume I: Report, HL Paper 166-I/HC Paper 551-I, 31 July 2008, para 77; Butler Report 2004, para 372; see also the excellent statement by David Brummell (Legal Secretariat to the Law Officers) to the Inquiry, 14 January 2010.

  56. 56.

    Parry 1964, pp. 122–123. Butler Report 2004, paras 368–373.

  57. 57.

    Statement by Sir Michael Wood, 15 January 2010, para 8. See also Weller 2010, p. 191.

  58. 58.

    Transcript public hearing of Rt Hon. Lord Goldsmith QC, 27 January 2010, p. 20.

  59. 59.

    See e.g. transcript public hearing of Simon Webb, Sir Peter Ricketts, William Patey, 24 November 2009, pp. 12–26. Transcript public hearing of Rt Hon. Jack Straw MP, 21 January 2010, p. 39.

  60. 60.

    Ibid. See also e.g. Letter from Tom McKane (Cabinet Office) to Alan Goulty (FCO) on Iraq Future Strategy, 20 October 2000; Letter from John Sawers (Prime Minister’s Private Secretary) to Sherard Cowper-Coles (FCO) on a new Iraq policy framework, 7 March 2001; Memorandum by the Rt Hon. Jack Straw MP to the Inquiry, 21 January 2010, paras 1–23.

  61. 61.

    Transcript public hearing of Rt Hon Tony Blair, 29 January 2010, p. 7.

  62. 62.

    See e.g. Note from PM Tony Blair to Jonathan Powell (PM Chief of Staff), 17 March 2002; Transcript public hearing of Sir Peter Rickets and Edward Chaplin, 1 December 2009, pp. 6–8. See also the earlier leaked so-called ‘Iraq Options Paper’, Memorandum from the Overseas and Defence Secretariat Cabinet Office, 8 March 2002. This memo was part of the so-called “Downingstreet Memos” that were published on 18 September 2004 in The Observer newspaper. These memoranda are available in transcribed form on www.downingstreetmemo.com.

  63. 63.

    Statement by Sir Michael Wood, 15 January 2010, para 8; Transcript public hearing of Sir Michael Wood, 26 January 2010, pp. 14–15.

  64. 64.

    Ibid. See also Letter from Simon McDonald (FCO) to Michael Tatham Esq. (Cabinet Office) on Iraq: Options, 3 December 2001, p. 1; Weller 2010, pp. 232, 244.

  65. 65.

    Memorandum from Jack Straw (Foreign Secretary) to Tony Blair (PM), 25 March 2003, para 9. See also the Memorandum by the Rt Hon. Jack Straw MP to the Inquiry, paras 24–25. Straw also seemed adamant that he unequivocally supported the position that a second resolution was never, but that for political and strategic reasons, he publicly left room to maneuver. Transcript public hearing of Rt Hon. Jack Straw MP, 8 February 2010, pp. 3–4.

  66. 66.

    Transcript public hearing of Sir Michael Wood, 26 January 2010, pp. 16–17, 19–20.

  67. 67.

    Letter from Sir Michael Wood (FCO Legal Adviser) to the Foreign Secretary’s Private Secretary on Iraq, 26 March 2002, para 5.

  68. 68.

    Letter from Lord Goldsmith (Attorney General) to Geoff Hoon (Defence Secretary), 28 March 2002.

  69. 69.

    Transcript public hearing of Rt Hon. Lord Goldsmith QC, 27 January 2010, pp. 16–18. The AG met with William Howard Taft IV, Legal Adviser of the US State Department on 22 May 2002, but apparently did not discuss the legal issue in depth.

  70. 70.

    Memorandum from Matthew Rycroft to David Manning, 23 July 2002 on Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting, 23 July, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article387374.ece.

  71. 71.

    Ibid, pp. 21–23; Advice from Lord Goldsmith QC (Attorney General) to Tony Blair (Prime Minister), 30 July 2002, para 13.

  72. 72.

    Letter from Sir Michael Wood (FCO Legal Adviser) to Stephen Wright (FCO) re Iraq, Legality of the use of force, 15 August 2002.

  73. 73.

    See e.g. Letter from Simon McDonald (FCO) to Sir David Manning (Cabinet Office), 27 August 2002, p. 2; Transcript from public hearing of Rt Hon. Lord Goldsmith QC, 27 January 2010, pp. 25–26.

  74. 74.

    Note from Michael Wood (FCO Legal Adviser) to Catherine Adams (Legal Secretariat Law Officers), 24 September 2002, para 2.

  75. 75.

    Minute from Peter Rickets (FCO) to Foreign Secretary’s Private Secretary re Iraq Resolutions, ‘The Kosovo Option’, 3 October 2002; Note from Michael Wood (FCO Legal Adviser) to Edward Chaplin (Foreign Secretary’s Private Secretary) re Iraq and authorization to use force, 17 October 2002.

  76. 76.

    Note from Michael Wood (FCO Legal Adviser) to Edward Chaplin (Foreign Secretary’s Private Secretary) on Iraq: International Law, 4 October 2002.

  77. 77.

    Transcript public hearing of Sir Michael Wood, 26 January 2010, p. 18.

  78. 78.

    Note from the Simone McDonald (Foreign Secretary’s Private Secretary) to Michael Wood (FCO Legal Adviser) re Iraq. 15 October 2010.

  79. 79.

    Note from Michael Wood (FCO Legal Adviser) to Cathy Adams (Legal Secretariat of the Law Officers—Attorney General’s Chambers), 18 October 2002, para 4.

  80. 80.

    See e.g. Transcript public hearing of Cathy Adams, 30 June 2010, pp. 9–11.

  81. 81.

    Transcript public hearing of the Rt Hon Lord Goldsmith QC, 27 January 2010, p. 36.

  82. 82.

    Statement by the Rt Hon Lord Goldsmith QC, 17 January 2011, paras 1.3, 1.15–1.17.

  83. 83.

    Ibid., para 1.3.

  84. 84.

    Ibid., paras 2.7, 2.8 and 3. The record of the meeting with the Prime Minister on 22 October, in which the AG’s advice was noted, was laid down in a note to the Prime Minister on 23 October. This record has not been published by the Inquiry at the time of writing.

  85. 85.

    Transcript public hearing of the Rt Hon Lord Goldsmith QC, 27 January 2010, p. 32.

  86. 86.

    UN Doc. S/RES/1441, 8 November 2002; UN Doc. S/PV.4644, 8 November 2002.

  87. 87.

    Ibid., operative para 1.

  88. 88.

    Ibid., operative para 2.

  89. 89.

    Ibid., operative para 4.

  90. 90.

    Ibid., operative para 12.

  91. 91.

    Ibid., operative para 13.

  92. 92.

    Iraq: Note of telephone conversation between the Attorney General and Jonathan Powell—Monday, 11th November 2002, by David Brummell; Iraq: Note of telephone conversation between the Foreign Secretary and the Attorney General on Tuesday, 12 November 2002, by David Brummell.

  93. 93.

    Iraq: Note of telephone conversation between the Foreign Secretary and the Attorney General on Tuesday, 12 November 2002, by David Brummell.

  94. 94.

    See e.g. respectively, the transcript public of the Rt Hon Lord Goldsmith QC, 27 January 2010, p. 47.

  95. 95.

    Note from Michael Wood (FCO Legal Adviser) to Catherine Adams (Legal Secretariat of the Law Officers—Attorney General’s Chambers), 9 December 2002.

  96. 96.

    The Chilcot Inquiry heard Cathy Adams, legal counselor to the Attorney General, on 30 June 2010, at which time it was still trying to “clarify the point at which Lord Goldsmith was formally instructed to advise.” Transcript public hearing of Cathy Adams, 30 June 2010, p. 17.

  97. 97.

    Note from Michael Wood (FCO Legal Adviser) to the Foreign Secretary’s Private Secretary re Iraq: legal basis for the use of force, 24 January 2003.

  98. 98.

    Transcript public hearing of Michael Wood, 26 January 2010, p. 31.

  99. 99.

    Note from Foreign Secretary Jack Straw to Michael Wood (FCO Legal Adviser) re Iraq: legal basis for use of force, 29 January 2003.

  100. 100.

    Note from Attorney General Lord Goldsmith to Foreign Secretary Jack Straw re legal advice and law officers, 3 February 2003, para 2.

  101. 101.

    Transcript public hearing of the Rt Hon Jack Straw MP, 8 February 2010, pp. 5–6.

  102. 102.

    Ibid., p. 6; Note from Attorney General Lord Goldsmith to Foreign Secretary Jack Straw re legal advice and law officers, 3 February 2003, para 3.

  103. 103.

    Note from the Attorney General’s Office of meeting at No. 10, 19 December 2002, para 10.

  104. 104.

    Attorney General’s draft advice to Prime Minister, 14 January 2003, para 4.

  105. 105.

    Note from Lord Goldsmith to Prime Minister, 30 January 2003.

  106. 106.

    Letter from Foreign Secretary Jack Straw (signed by Simon McDonald) to Attorney General Lord Goldsmith re Iraq: Second Resolution, 6 February 2003.

  107. 107.

    Attorney General Lord Goldsmith’s draft advice, ‘Iraq: Interpretation of Resolution 1441’, 12 February 2003, para 12 (emphasis added).

  108. 108.

    Ibid., para 13.

  109. 109.

    Attorney General Lord Goldsmith’s legal advice, ‘Iraq: Resolution 1441’, 7 March 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/28_04_05_attorney_general.pdf.

  110. 110.

    Sands 2005, p. 197.

  111. 111.

    Note from Simon McDonald (FCO) about the meeting between Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and the Attorney General on 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Meeting with the Attorney General’, 17 March 2003, para 1.

  112. 112.

    Reproduced in Warbrick and McGoldrick 2003, pp. 811–814.

  113. 113.

    Letter from Elizabeth Wilmshurst (FCO Deputy Legal Adviser) to Michael Wood (FCO Legal Adviser) on early retirement/resignation, 18 March 2003.

  114. 114.

    Weller 2010, p. 249.

  115. 115.

    Corell 1999, p. 105.

  116. 116.

    See e.g. Corell, ibid.; Statement by Sir Michael Wood, 15 January 2010, para 32.

  117. 117.

    Corell, ibid.

  118. 118.

    Answers from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the questions of MP Timmermans, 3 March 2011, Handelingen II (Aanhangsel), 2010/11, nr. 1635.

  119. 119.

    Berman 1994, p. 86.

  120. 120.

    In both capacities, the independent legal adviser and judge interpret ‘international law as applied to a particular set of circumstances and advising on whether proposed actions would be consistent with the law.’ Scharf and Williams 2010, p. 17.

  121. 121.

    Cf. Scharf and Williams 2009, p. 67.

  122. 122.

    See e.g. the discussion among former US Legal Advisers, as recorded by Scharf and Williams 2010, pp. 151–154. Also largely reproduced in Scharf and Williams 2009.

  123. 123.

    See e.g. Butler Report 2004, para 372.

  124. 124.

    See e.g. AJIL 1991, pp. 366–367.

  125. 125.

    See e.g. Note from Foreign Secretary Jack Straw to Michael Wood (FCO Legal Adviser) re Iraq: legal basis for use of force, 29 January 2003; Scharf and Williams 2010, pp. 204–205.

  126. 126.

    Sir Michael Wood stated to the Chilcot Inquiry: ‘[t]he events leading up to the use of force against Iraq in 2003 also raise the question of the role of government lawyers advising on public international law, in circumstances as acute as this, where the likelihood of the matter coming before an international or national court is remote. In my view, the seriousness of the matter and the absence of a court places a special responsibility on the lawyer to do his or her best that the law is upheld.’ Statement by Sir Michael Wood, 15 January 2010, para 37.

  127. 127.

    Berman 1994, p. 86. Cf. Macdonald who also noted from legal adviser other descriptions of the role of legal advisers. Macdonald 1977, pp. 389–390.

  128. 128.

    Koskenniemi 1999, p. 511.

  129. 129.

    Koskenniemi 1999, p. 496.

  130. 130.

    Riphagen 1964, p. 83.

References

  • AJIL (1991) Current developments: the role of the legal adviser of the Department of State—a report of the Joint Committee established by the American Society of International Law and the American Branch of the International Law Association. Am J Int L 85:366–367

    Google Scholar 

  • Attorney General Lord Goldsmith’s legal advice, ‘Iraq: Resolution 1441’, 7 Mar 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/28_04_05_attorney_general.pdf

  • Berman FD (1994) The international lawyer, inside and outside Foreign Ministries. In: Hill C, Beshoff P (eds) Two worlds of international relations. Routledge, London, pp 79–92

    Google Scholar 

  • Bilder RB (1962) The Office of the Legal Adviser: the State Department Lawyer and Foreign Affairs. Am J Int L 56:633–684

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Butler Report (2004) Review of intelligence on weapons of mass destruction report of a committee of Privy Counsellors, Chairman: The Rt Hon The Lord Butler of Brockwell KG GCB CVO (hereafter ‘Butler Report’). http://www.butlerreview.org/

  • Carty A, Smith R (2000) Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and the world crisis: a legal adviser in the Foreign Office, 1932–1945. Kluwer Law International, The Hague

    Google Scholar 

  • Corell H (1991) Current development: legal advisers meet at UN headquarters in New York. Am J Int L 85:371–373

    Google Scholar 

  • Corell H (1992) Second legal advisers’ meeting at UN headquarters in New York. Nordic J Int L 61/62:3–6

    Google Scholar 

  • Corell H (1999) Cooperation among legal advisers on public international law. In: Collection of essays by legal advisers of states, legal advisers of international organizations and practitioners in the field of international law. United Nations, New York, pp 97–119

    Google Scholar 

  • Crawford J et al (2003) Letters: war would be illegal. In: The Guardian, 7 March 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2003/mar/07/highereducation.iraq. Accessed 18 Sept 2011

  • Davids Committee (2010) Rapport: Commissie van onderzoek besluitvorming Irak. Boom, Amsterdam

    Google Scholar 

  • Gray C (2004) International law and the use of force, 2nd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Koskenniemi M (1999) Between commitment and cynicism: outline for a theory of international law as practice. In: Collection of essays by legal advisers of states, legal advisers of international organizations and practitioners in the field of international law. United Nations, New York, pp 495–523

    Google Scholar 

  • Lammers JG (2009) The role of the legal adviser of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: the Dutch approach and experience. Tulane J Int Comp L 18:177–205

    Google Scholar 

  • Macdonald RStJ (1977) The role of the legal adviser in Ministries of Foreign Affairs in 156 Recueil des Cours. In: Collected courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, 1977-III. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, pp 377–482

    Google Scholar 

  • Manusama K (2006) The United Nations Security Council in the post-cold war era: applying the principle of legality. Brill, Leiden

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Merillat HCL (1964) The legal adviser’s place in government. In: Merillat HCL (ed) Legal advisers and Foreign Affairs. Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, New York, pp 1–14

    Google Scholar 

  • Murphy SD (2004) Assessing the legality of invading Iraq. Georgetown L J 92:173–257

    Google Scholar 

  • NILR (2010) Report of the Dutch committee of inquiry on the war in Iraq—Chapter 8: The basis in international law for the military intervention in Iraq. Netherlands Int L Rev 57:81–137

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Parry C (1964) United Kingdom—background paper. In: Merillat HCL (ed) Legal advisers and Foreign Affairs. Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, New York, pp 101–152

    Google Scholar 

  • Riphagen W (1964) The Netherlands—background paper. In: Merillat HCL (ed) Legal advisers and Foreign Affairs. Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, New York, pp 79–83

    Google Scholar 

  • Scharf MP, Williams PR (2009) International law in crisis: a qualitative empirical contribution to the compliance debate. Cardozo L Rev 31:45–97

    Google Scholar 

  • Scharf MP, Williams PR (2010) Shaping foreign policy in times of crisis—the role of international law and the State Department legal adviser. Cambridge University Press, New York

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Warbrick C, McGoldrick D (2003) The use of force against Iraq. ICLQ 52:811–814

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Watson G (1988) Armed intervention in the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis: the legal advice tendered to the British Government. Int Comp L Q 37:773–817

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weller M (2010) Iraq and the use of force in international law. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Kenneth M. Manusama .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2012 Stichting T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The Hague, and the authors

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Manusama, K.M. (2012). Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Providing Legal Advice on Military Action Against Iraq. In: Dekker, I., Hey, E. (eds) Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 2011. Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, vol 42. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-849-1_4

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Societies and partnerships