Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Anticipative Criminal Investigation pp 37–159Cite as

The System of Criminal Investigation in the Netherlands

  • Chapter
  • First Online:

  • 1099 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter provides the legal background to the criminal investigation in Dutch law, which concerns the knowledge required in order to assess the adoption of a system of anticipative criminal investigation. An in-depth analysis of the complex entity of regulations demonstrates how the synthesis between the sword and the shield objective was embodied in the regulation of the criminal investigation until changes were adopted due to counterterrorism measures. The analysis is based upon the statutory regulation of criminal procedure, the regulation of intelligence powers and administrative supervisory powers in relation to criminal justice and the judicial interpretation of the law (in both domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights). For this purpose, the sword and shield tasks and the responsibilities of the different relevant actors are described, as well as the investigative powers attributed in the law for criminal investigative ends. The fundamental rights and principles underpinning the shield function of the criminal investigation are identified and their regulatory influence is analyzed. In that regard, specific attention is paid to the scope of the criminal investigative phase, the threshold of reasonable suspicion and the manner in which control over legitimate and fair criminal investigative activities is realized.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    See in more detail the introduction to Sect. 2.1.3.

  2. 2.

    This view was also adopted by the research into Criminal Procedure in 2001 (an extensive research project into the fundaments of criminal procedural law as a proposal for a possible new Code of Criminal Procedure): Groenhuijsen and Knigge 2001.

  3. 3.

    Groenhuijsen and Knigge 2001, 17-18.

  4. 4.

    Brants et al. 2003, 2-6. The authors consider the Criminal Procedure 2001 researchers’ view on the objectives of criminal procedural law to be too restrictive: the shield function of criminal procedural law has been reduced to a function, instead of the (main) function of criminal procedural law. In this book the approach has been taken that criminal procedural law has two main objectives: a shield and a sword objective (see Chap. 1, Sect. 1.2.4). The shield objective will, however, be described more broadly than only making sure that the innocent are not convicted. It has a general protective function against the arbitrary and unnecessary use of criminal procedural powers, which is connected to the ultimum remedium character of criminal procedural law.

  5. 5.

    Groenhuijsen and Simmelink 2008, 379.

  6. 6.

    Lindenberg 2002, 424 (MvT 17).

  7. 7.

    Reijntjes 2006, 11.

  8. 8.

    Currently, two types of investigative phases can be initiated pre-trial: the criminal investigation and the preliminary judicial investigation. Because the Act on Strengthening the Position of the Examining Magistrate, by which the preliminary judicial investigation will be abolished, has been adopted by the Second Chamber of Parliament on June 30, 2011 and, because it can be expected that also the First Chamber of Parliament will adopt the Act in due time, in this book the law is described according to the changes following from this Act. See on this in more detail Sects. 2.2.1.3 and 2.3.1.3.

  9. 9.

    HR 20 December 1926, NJ 1927, 85.

  10. 10.

    Pompe 1959, 141-151.

  11. 11.

    ECHR 28 August 1991, App. no. 11170/84; 12876/87; 13468/87 (Brandstetter v. Austria), para 66-67. This does not imply that only Anglo-American adversarial systems should be considered as fair considering their adversarial character. The Court emphasizes that various systems of domestic law can be used to comply with this requirement. Every system, however, should ensure that each party has equal access to filed observations and an equal opportunity to comment on the evidence (para 67). See also: ECHR 23 June 1993, App. no. 12952/87 (Ruiz-Mateos v. Spain), para 63.

  12. 12.

    Corstens 2008, 11-12. The Dutch criminal justice system provides for the possibility to settle criminal cases by way of a transaction which takes the form of a settlement penalty. A transaction involves the voluntary payment of a sum of money to the Treasury in order to avoid further criminal prosecution and a public trial. Entering into such a settlement does not require the offender to admit his or her guilt. The offender even has a right not to be prosecuted if the crime is only punishable by a fine and if he or she pays the maximum fine that can be imposed. Articles 74 and 74A CCP.

  13. 13.

    See on the role of the public prosecutor as a ‘magistrate’: Verrest 2011, 221-244.

  14. 14.

    ECHR 14 September 2010, App. no. 38224/03 (Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. The Netherlands), para 93.

  15. 15.

    As, upon the soon to be expected entry into force of the Act on Strengthening the Position of the Examining Magistrate (Kamerstukken I 2010/11, 32177, no. A), provided in Article 182 CCP (currently: Articles 36a-e CCP).

  16. 16.

    A proposal to amend the Constitution in order to introduce the authority for the courts to examine statutes on the basis of Constitutional provisions is currently pending as the required second round in order to amend the Constitution is still to take place (private member’s bill by Halsema). See Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 331, nos. 2 and 3, Kamerstukken I 2008/09, 28331, Stb. 2009, 120 and Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32334, nos. 1-3.

  17. 17.

    See on this subject: Coomans and Kamminga 2007, 492-493, Besselink and Wessel 2009 and Lawson 1999, 1-132.

  18. 18.

    Article 7 ECHR embodies the observance of the principles “nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege”, a prohibition on construing the criminal law “extensively (…) to an accused’s detriment, for instance by anology”, the requirement that “an offence must be clearly defined in the law” and the prohibition of “retrospective application of the criminal law to an accused’s disadvantage.” ECHR 25 May 1993, App. no. 14307/88 (Kokkinakis v. Greece), para 52. See also: Bleichrodt 2006, 651-652. The Court has formulated the goal of Article 7 as offering “essential safeguards against arbitrary prosecution, conviction and punishment.” ECHR 22 November 1995, App. nos. 20166/92 and 20190/92 (S.W. and C.R. v. The United Kingdom), para 34 and 33.

  19. 19.

    See on this in more detail Sect. 2.1.3.2.1.

  20. 20.

    Compare: ECHR 22 November 1995, App. nos. 20166/92 and 20190/92 (S.W. and C.R. v. The United Kingdom), para 35 and 33.

  21. 21.

    See in this regard also the Opinion of Advocate General Van Dorst para 2 at HR 19 December 1995, NJ 1996, 249.

  22. 22.

    See also: Knigge and Kwakman 2001, 244.

  23. 23.

    Ibid., 244-245.

  24. 24.

    See also ECHR 26 April 1979, App. no. 6538/74 (Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom), para. 49: “the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances.” See also: Berkhout-van Poelgeest 2001, 25-27.

  25. 25.

    Rozemond 1998, 202.

  26. 26.

    ‘t Hart 1994, 210-212.

  27. 27.

    The provisions of the ECHR are directly binding on all subjects in the Member States. According to the Dutch Constitution the provisions of international treaties with such a character become an integral part of the Dutch legal order, without it being necessary to implement them in national law. They only need to be properly announced (Article 93 Constitution). The provisions of the ECHR prevail over conflicting national provisions (Article 94 Constitution).

  28. 28.

    ECHR 27 October 1994, App. no. 18535/91 (Kroon and Others v. The Netherlands), para 31.

  29. 29.

    ECHR 24 June 2004, App. no. 59320/00 (Von Hannover v. Germany), para 57.

  30. 30.

    Ibid., para 31.

  31. 31.

    Loof 2005, 204.

  32. 32.

    See e.g.: ECHR 24 June 2004, App. no. 59320/00 (Von Hannover v. Germany) para 50 and ECHR 25 September 2001, App. no. 44787/98 (P.G. and J.H. v. The United Kingdom), para 56, ECHR 25 October 2007, App. no. 38258/03 (Van Vondel v. The Netherlands), para 48, and ECHR 2 September 2010, App. no. 35623/05 (Uzun v. Germany), para 43.

  33. 33.

    ECHR 25 September 2001, App. no. 44787/98 (P.G. and J.H. v. The United Kingdom), para 57 and ECHR 2 September 2010, App. no. 35623/05 (Uzun v. Germany), para 44.

  34. 34.

    ECHR 2 September 2010, App. no. 35623/05 (Uzun v. Germany), para 44.

  35. 35.

    ECHR 25 June 1997, App. no. 73/1996/692/884 (Halford v. The United Kingdom), para 45. See also ECHR 24 June 2004, App. no. 59320/00 (Von Hannover v. Germany), para 51.

  36. 36.

    ECHR 2 September 2010, App. no. 35623/05 (Uzun v. Germany), para 44-46 and 52.

  37. 37.

    ECHR 15 June 1992, App. no. 12433/86 (Lüdi v. Switzerland), para 40.

  38. 38.

    Corstens 2008, 278.

  39. 39.

    Article 8(2) ECHR.

  40. 40.

    In the Netherlands, the Constitution requires that the ‘basis in law’ has been established by Act of Parliament. See on this the next section (2.1.3.2.2).

  41. 41.

    ECHR 24 April 1990, App. no. 11801/85 and App. no. 11105/84 (Kruslin v. France and Huvig v. France), para 29/28; ECHR 2 August 1984, App. no. 8691/79 (Malone v. The United Kingdom), para 66.

  42. 42.

    ECHR 2 August 1984, App. no. 8691/79 (Malone v. The United Kingdom), para 67 and ECHR 25 March 1983, App. no. 5947/72; 6205/73; 7052/75; 7061/75; 7107/75; 7113/75; 7136/75 (Silver and Others v. The United Kingdom), para 90.

  43. 43.

    ECHR 25 March 1998, App. no. 13/1997/797/1000 (Kopp v. Switzerland), para 55; ECHR 16 February 2000, App. no. 27798/95 (Amann v. Switzerland), para 50 (and 56); ECHR 26 April 1979, App. no. 6538/74 (Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom), para 49; ECHR 24 April 1990, App. no. 11801/85 and App. no. 11105/84 (Kruslin v. France and Huvig v. France), para 30/29.

  44. 44.

    ECHR 26 April 1979, App. no. 6538/74 (Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom), para 49. The principle applies mutatis mutandis to Article 8: ECHR 25 March 1983, App. no. 5947/72; 6205/73; 7052/75; 7061/75; 7107/75; 7113/75; 7136/75 (Silver and Others v. The United Kingdom), para 85.

  45. 45.

    ECHR 26 April 1979, App. no. 6538/74 (Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom), para 49.

  46. 46.

    ECHR 2 August 1984, App. no. 8691/79 (Malone v. The United Kingdom), para 66 and ECHR 24 April 1990, App. no. 11801/85 and App. no. 11105/84 (Kruslin v. France and Huvig v. France), para 30/29.

  47. 47.

    ECHR 26 March 1987, App. no. 9248/81, para 58 (Leander v. Sweden). See also ECHR 25 March 1983, App. no. 5947/72; 6205/73; 7052/75; 7061/75; 7107/75; 7113/75; 7136/75 (Silver and Others v. The United Kingdom), para 97.

  48. 48.

    Article 10(1) Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands [Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden].

  49. 49.

    See, for instance, HR 19 March 1996, NJ 1997, 85, para 6.2 and the annotation by Knigge, para 2 and 3.

  50. 50.

    In common law countries the principle of legality may be served by referring to a legal basis in case law, which is thus also a permitted interpretation of Article 8(2) ECHR.

  51. 51.

    The aspects covered by the right to a fair trial were considered as an inherent part of the requirement of an independent judiciary, a fundamental principle of the ‘Rechtsstaat’ and, hence, implied in the Constitutional provisions requiring an independent judge to decide on legal conflicts (as guaranteed in the Constitution, Articles 112 and 113(1)). Corstens 2008, 53. Currently the inclusion of the right to a fair trial in the Constitution is being considered. The ‘State Commission on the Constitution’ (Staatscommissie Grondwet) concluded in its report of November 2010 in favor of including the right to a fair trial in the Constitution. Rapport Staatscommissie Grondwet 2010. See also: Mevis 2009A.

  52. 52.

    See also the Preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights.

  53. 53.

    See on this Chap. 8, Sects. 8.3.1.1 and 2.3.2.3.3.

  54. 54.

    ECHR 25 March 1983, App. no. 8660/79 (Minelli v. Switzerland), para 30, ECHR 6 February 2007, App. no. 14348/02 (Garycki v. Poland), para 68.

  55. 55.

    ECHR 25 March 1983, App. no. 8660/79 (Minelli v. Switzerland), para 37. See also: ECHR 28 October 2003 App. no. 44320/98 (Baars v. The Netherlands), para 26.

  56. 56.

    Van Sliedregt 2009, 22 and 27.

  57. 57.

    Ashcroft 2009, 72.

  58. 58.

    ECHR 5 July 2001, App. no. 41087/98 (Philips v. The United Kingdom), para 32.

  59. 59.

    ECHR 25 March 1983, App. no. 8660/79 (Minelli v. Switzerland), para 37. See also: ECHR 28 October 2003 App. no. 44320/98 (Baars v. The Netherlands), para 26, ECHR 28 October 2004, Requêtes nos 48173/99 et 48319/99 (Y.B. et autres c. Turquie), para 43 and ECHR 6 February 2007, App. no. 14348/02 (Garycki v. Poland), para 66.

  60. 60.

    ECHR 28 October 2004, Requêtes nos. 48173/99 et 48319/99 (Y.B. et autres c. Turquie), para 47, ECHR 28 October 2003 App. no. 44320/98 (Baars v. The Netherlands), para 28, ECHR 6 February 2007, App. no. 14348/02 (Garycki v. Poland), para 67.

  61. 61.

    ECHR 8 February 1996, Case no. 41/1994/488/560 (John Murray v. The United Kingdom), para 51-54.

  62. 62.

    Stuckenberg 1997, 74.

  63. 63.

    Lindenberg 2002, 420 (MvT 3) and Groenhuijsen and Knigge 2001, 17-18.

  64. 64.

    Krauß 1971, 156 and 176.

  65. 65.

    More on the presumption of innocence as a fundamental principle under the rule of law regulating the criminal process, including the use of criminal investigative powers, in Chap. 8, Sect. 8.3.1.1.

  66. 66.

    See Sect. 2.1.3.4.1.

  67. 67.

    See Sect. 2.1.3.4.2.

  68. 68.

    Ölçer 2008, 71.

  69. 69.

    See e.g.: ECHR 16 December 1992, App. no. 13071/87 (Edwards v. The United Kingdom), para 34 and ECHR 9 June 1998, case 44/1997/828/1034 (Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal), para 34.

  70. 70.

    E.g.: ECHR 12 July 1988, App. no. 10862/84 (Schenk v. Switzerland), para 46, ECHR 18 March 1997, Reports 1997-III (Van Mechelen v. The Netherlands), para 50, ECHR 9 June 1998, case 44/1997/828/1034 (Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal), para 34, and ECHR 12 May 2000, App. no. 35394/97 (Khan v. The United Kingdom), para 34.

  71. 71.

    ECHR 22 July 2003, App. no. 39647/98 and 40461/98 (Edwards and Lewis v. The United Kingdom), para 52: “(i)t is in any event a fundamental aspect of the right to a fair trial that criminal proceedings, including the elements of such proceedings which relate to procedure, should be adversarial and that there should be equality of arms between the prosecution and defence. The right to an adversarial trial means, in a criminal case, that both prosecution and defence must be given the opportunity to have knowledge of and comment on the observations filed and the evidence adduced by the other party.”

  72. 72.

    ECHR 20 November 1989, App. no. 11454/85 (Kostovski v. The Netherlands), para 41 and ECHR 10 November 2005, App. no. 54789/00 (Bocos-Cuesta v. The Netherlands), para 67-68.

  73. 73.

    See Sect. 2.1.2.

  74. 74.

    ECHR 9 June 1998, case 44/1997/828/1034 (Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal), para 36.

  75. 75.

    ECHR 24 November 1993, App. no. 13972/88 (Imbriosca v. Switzerland), para 36.

  76. 76.

    ECHR 16 December 1992, App. no. 13071/87 (Edwards v. The United Kingdom), para 36.

  77. 77.

    ECHR 25 September 2001, App. no. 44787/98 (P.G. and J.H. v. The United Kingdom), para 68.

  78. 78.

    ECHR 26 March 1996, Reports 1996-II (Doorson v. The Netherlands), para 70. See also: ECHR 18 March 1997, Reports 1997-III (Van Mechelen v. The Netherlands), para 52-53.

  79. 79.

    ECHR 25 September 2001, App. no. 44787/98 (P.G. and J.H. v. The United Kingdom), para 68.

  80. 80.

    ECHR 9 June 1998, case 44/1997/828/1034 (Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal), para 36 and 39.

  81. 81.

    ECHR 20 November 1989, App. no. 11454/85 (Kostovski v. The Netherlands), para 44, ECHR 26 March 1996, Reports 1996-II (Doorson v. The Netherlands), para 69.

  82. 82.

    This assessment has led to the conclusion in ECHR 20 November 1989, App. no. 11454/85 (Kostovski v. The Netherlands), para 43-45 and ECHR 18 March 1997, Reports 1997-III (Van Mechelen v. The Netherlands), para 59-65, that the right to a fair trial had been violated. In ECHR 26 March 1996, Reports 1996-II (Doorson v. The Netherlands), para 74-76, the use of anonymous witnesses endured the test of the ECHR.

  83. 83.

    ECHR 12 July 1988, App. no. 10862/84 (Schenk v. Switzerland), para 46-48 and ECHR 12 May 2000, App. no. 35394/97 (Khan v. The United Kingdom), para 36-40.

  84. 84.

    See on the relevant domestic law Sect. 2.3.1.4 and Franken 2004A, 14-16.

  85. 85.

    Corstens 2008, 62-63.

  86. 86.

    HR 12 December 1978, NJ 1979, 142 ann. GEM.

  87. 87.

    Corstens 2008, 71.

  88. 88.

    HR 12 December 1978, NJ 1979, 142 ann. GEM.

  89. 89.

    Ibid.

  90. 90.

    E.g. HR 12 December 1978, NJ 1979, 142 ann. GEM (where the violation of the principle of subsidiarity resulted in the exclusion of evidence), see also HR 30 March 2004, NJ 2004, 376, ann. YB. See in more detail on the manner in which the trial judge exerts control on the criminal investigation in observance of the principles of the due administration of justice Sects. 2.3.1.4 and 2.3.2.4.2.

  91. 91.

    Compare: Franken 2009, 83-84.

  92. 92.

    As also explicitly mentioned in the Guide for the Criminal Investigative Practice [Handboek voor de opsporingspraktijk], supplement: Stcrt. 10 December 2007, no. 239/p. 11, 1 and 2. This Guide is not an independent source of regulation, but concerns an explanation of the Directive for criminal investigative powers [Aanwijzing opsporingsbevoegdheden], Stcrt. 24 February 2011, no. 3240, 2. (the directive also refers in some places to the applicability of the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity).

  93. 93.

    The actual protective meaning of the principles seems to be currently limited in practice. Franken 2009, 83-84. More on this in Chap. 4, Sect. 4.2.3.2.

  94. 94.

    As the purpose of the criminal investigation has been described in Article 132a CCP, which provides for the definition of the criminal investigation.

  95. 95.

    Corstens 2008, 69-70.

  96. 96.

    Although during a covert criminal investigation the suspect will not yet be able to contribute to truth-finding, the suspect, once indentified as such, is entitled to certain procedural protection. See on this Sect. 2.3.1.5.

  97. 97.

    Article 182 CCP replaces the ‘mini-investigation’ on the basis of Articles 36a-36d CCP, as a consequence of the soon to be expected entry into force of the Act on Strengthening the Position of the Examining Magistrate (Kamerstukken I 2010/11, 32177, no. A and Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32177, no. 3).

  98. 98.

    Section 2.3.1.5 will provide a brief description of these pre-trial investigative possibilities for the suspect.

  99. 99.

    The Board of Procurators General [College van procureurs-generaal] is in command of the public prosecutor’s department and has the authority to give general and more specific directions to the public prosecutor’s department. The board consists of five members with one chairman. Corstens 2008, 119-120.

  100. 100.

    Articles 141 and 142 CCP.

  101. 101.

    This will be dealt with in Sect. 2.2.2.1.

  102. 102.

    Title Va (Article 126v-z) of the CCP.

  103. 103.

    Articles 126v-126z CCP. For terrorism investigations: Articles 126zt-126zu CCP.

  104. 104.

    Articles 21, 24, 38 and 43 Police Act 1993 [Politiewet 1993].

  105. 105.

    Regeling nationale en bovenregionale recherche, Stcrt. 2004, 19.

  106. 106.

    Regeling criminele inlichtingen eenheden, Stcrt. 2000, 198, Articles 2 and 4.

  107. 107.

    Until 14 October 2010, the Minister of the Interior controlled the Police. See Organisatieregeling Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, Stcrt 2011, no. 1003 and 1004.

  108. 108.

    Article 2 Police Act 1993.

  109. 109.

    Article 7 Police Act 1993.

  110. 110.

    Article 12 Police Act 1993. When the task of maintaining public order has a character which exceeds the normal tasks of the municipality the governor of the province [Commissaris van de Koningin] can supervise the police in their task of maintaining public order (Article 16(1) Police Act 1993). When the breach of public order has a national character, the Minister of the Interior, at present the Minister of Security and Justice, can instruct the mayor and governor as to the task of the police and can order that certain objects or facilities be guarded or made secure (Article 15a and Article 16(2) Police Act 1993).

  111. 111.

    Article 13 Police Act 1993.

  112. 112.

    See in more detail Sects. 2.2.1.2 and 2.3.1.2. In addition, see for the precise understanding of the formal position of the public prosecutor as part of the judiciary Sect. 2.1.2.

  113. 113.

    Buruma 2007, 525.

  114. 114.

    Article 14 Police Act 1993.

  115. 115.

    Buruma 2007, 555. See also: Krommendijk et al. 2009, 15-16. The PPS has a larger influence in more complex criminal investigations, for example by having the power to order the use of special investigative techniques. For the use of some special investigative techniques the authorization of the examining magistrate is also required. Nevertheless, the primary responsibility for the criminal investigation remains with the PPS. See on this subject in more detail Sects. 2.2.1.2 and 2.2.1.3.

  116. 116.

    Articles 125, 130 and 136 Judiciary Organization Act [Wet op de rechterlijke organisatie], Stb. 1999, 195, as amended (2011). Hereafter referred to as ‘RO’. The public prosecutors at the Courts of Appeal are referred to as Advocates General (Article 138 RO).

  117. 117.

    Article 127 RO.

  118. 118.

    Article 129(1) RO.

  119. 119.

    Article 129(2) RO.

  120. 120.

    See e.g. Article 128 RO. In more detail: Corstens 2008, 112-115.

  121. 121.

    Corstens 2008, 119.

  122. 122.

    A responsibility which can be derived from Article 124 RO and Articles 148 and 132a CCP.

  123. 123.

    ’t Hart 1983, 137-138.

  124. 124.

    Corstens 2008, 91, 92, 247 and 248.

  125. 125.

    Simmelink en Baaijens-van Geloven 2001, 395-396. See also Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 392 no. 3, 3.

  126. 126.

    Hielkema 2005, 259.

  127. 127.

    Franken 2006, 267.

  128. 128.

    Reijntjes already concluded in 2001 that, in fact, at that time the preliminary judicial investigation had already been abolished. However, the abolition is not yet formal. Reijntjes 2001, 297. This last step will only be taken by the entry into force of the Act on Strengthening the Position of the Examining Magistrate, Kamerstukken I 2010/11, 32177, no. A.

  129. 129.

    On June 30, 2011 the Second Chamber of Parliament adopted the bill. On November 29, 2011 also the First Chamber adopted the bill. It can be expected that the act will enter into force shortly after this book has been finalized. See for the Bill: Kamerstukken I 2010/11, 32177, no. A.

  130. 130.

    Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32177, no. 3, 1-2 and 10. See on the recent Act to Strengthen the Position of the Examining Magistrate also Van der Meij 2010B and Mevis 2009B.

  131. 131.

    In addition, the examining magistrate has, as a judge, an independent general supervisory role over the course of events pre-trial. This ‘shield’ role will be dealt with in Sect. 2.3.1.3.

  132. 132.

    In addition, the examining magistrate bears the important responsibility for determining the legitimacy of pre-trial detention (remanding in police custody [inverzekeringstelling] on the order of the public prosecutor or deputy public prosecutor for a period not exceeding 3 days, with the possibility of an extension for another 3 days; Articles 57, 58 and 59a CCP) and has the power to order, upon the request of the public prosecutor, a further extension of pre-trial detention for a period of 14 days [bewaring] (Article 63 CCP).

  133. 133.

    Muller 2007, 178-179.

  134. 134.

    Stb. 2002, 148.

  135. 135.

    Article 6 WIV 2002 (as amended by Stb. 2006, 574, adding the task under e to Article 6). Official translation of the WIV 2002 available at: https://www.aivd.nl/english/aivd/the-intelligence-and/ (accessed February 18, 2011). The five tasks of the AIVD are summarized, maybe more clearly, on their website as follows: (1) To investigate people and organizations reasonably suspected of representing a serious danger to the democratic legal order, national security or to other important interests of the Dutch State; (2) To screen candidates for the so-called “positions involving confidentiality” (this task is provided for under separate legislation, the Security Screening Act or Wvo); (3) To support the institutions responsible for maintaining the security of those sections of the national infrastructure, in both the public and the private sectors, which are vital to maintaining the fabric of Dutch society; (4) To investigate other countries in respect of activities jointly designated by the Prime Minister, the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Defence; (5) As part of the national Safety and Security System, to supply risk and threat analyses concerning property, services and individuals.”

  136. 136.

    Muller 2007, 171.

  137. 137.

    The transfer of information from the AIVD to law enforcement services is dealt with in detail in Sect. 2.2.2.4.2.

  138. 138.

    See Article 1 WIV 2002. The Minister of Defense is responsible for the Military Intelligence and Security Service.

  139. 139.

    Muller 2007, 179-180.

  140. 140.

    Lindenberg 2002, 424 (MvT 16).

  141. 141.

    Stb. 1999, 245, Stb. 2000, 32.

  142. 142.

    Compare Article 132a CCP.

  143. 143.

    Police Act 1993.

  144. 144.

    Coercive methods are understood to concern freedom-restricting methods, such as arrest and pre-trial detention.

  145. 145.

    See for example Article 54 CCP for the coercive method of arrest and Article 126g for the special investigative technique of systematic observation. The most significant and general requirement before coercive methods or special investigative techniques can be applied against someone concerns the establishment of a reasonable suspicion as to Article 27(1) CCP.

  146. 146.

    Article 126gg CCP.

  147. 147.

    Article 126hh CCP.

  148. 148.

    Van Zuijlen 2008, 116-117.

  149. 149.

    Articles 12 and 13 Police Act 1993 (supervision).

  150. 150.

    For the regulation of the administrative task of the police, see: Title 5.2 of the General Administrative Law Act [Algemene wet bestuursrecht]. Stb 1992, 315 (as amended in 2011).

  151. 151.

    February 1, 2000, Stb. 1999, 245 and Stb. 2000, 32. The implications of this Act on Special Investigative Techniques will be extensively dealt with in Sect. 2.2.2.2.1.

  152. 152.

    Elzinga et al. 1995, 38-42.

  153. 153.

    See Sect. 2.1.3.4.2.

  154. 154.

    The distinction between investigation for the purpose of administrative supervision and for the purpose of criminal investigation, and the overlap between these two functions, will be dealt with more extensively in Sect. 2.3.2.2.2.

  155. 155.

    HR 14 October 1986, NJ 1987, 564 and HR 14 October 1986, NJ 1988, 511, ann. ThWvV.

  156. 156.

    HR 19 December 1995, NJ 1996, 249, ann. Sch.

  157. 157.

    HR 19 December 1995, NJ 1996, 249, ann. Sch., para 6.4.5, see also the annotation by Sch. para 3 and 4. HR 14 October 1986, NJ 1988, 511, ann. ThWvW, para 6.2. See also Fokkens and Kirkels-Vrijman 2009, 109.

  158. 158.

    HR 19 December 1995, NJ 1996, 249 (Zwolsman), para 6.4.4 and 6.4.5 and HR 14 October 1986, NJ 1987, 564 para 7.3 and HR 14 October, NJ 1988, 511, ann. ThWvV para 6.2 (Shadow Judgments).

  159. 159.

    Rapport van de Parlementaire Enquêtecommissie Opsporingsmethoden 1996, 455.

  160. 160.

    Rapport van de Parlementaire Enquêtecommissie Opsporingsmethoden 1996, 432-437 and HR 19 December 1995, NJ 1996, 249, para 6.4.4.

  161. 161.

    Stb. 1999, 245.

  162. 162.

    Stb. 2000, 32.

  163. 163.

    This definition was in place until 2007. The Act of 2006 to Broaden the Possibilities to Investigate and Prosecute Terrorist Crimes (Act on the Criminal Investigation of Terrorist Crimes) amended Article 132a CCP by eliminating the threshold of a reasonable suspicion or a reasonable suspicion that crimes are being planned or committed in an organized context from the definition. See on the current demarcation of the criminal investigation phase Sect. 2.3.2.2.

  164. 164.

    Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 403, no. 7, 17.

  165. 165.

    As adopted by the Act of 20 November 2006, Stb. 2006, 580.

  166. 166.

    This subject will be dealt with in more detail in Sect. 2.3.2.2.1.

  167. 167.

    See the subsequent section for the legal bases of special investigative techniques.

  168. 168.

    Compare: Fokkens and Kirkels-Vrijman 2009, 123.

  169. 169.

    HR 19 December 1995, NJ 1996, 249, para 6.4.4 and 6.4.5.

  170. 170.

    HR 20 January 2009, NJ 2009, 225, ann. Borgers, see annotation para 7.

  171. 171.

    For example, HR 5 June 2001, NJ 2001, 518, para 1.4 and 4.3 and HR 29 March 2005, LJN AS27527, para 3.1.

  172. 172.

    HR 25 January 2000, NJ 2000, 279, para 3.5 (concerning observations of business premises for the purpose of determining whether the conditions for a particular permit were being observed) and HR 19 December 1995, NJ 1996, 249, para 9.7, 9.8 and 9.9.

  173. 173.

    HR 14 October 1986, NJ 1988, 511, para 6.3.

  174. 174.

    Private homes are considered to be places where people have a pre-eminent right to freedom and respect for their private life. This is also explicitly stated in Article 8 ECHR, Article 17 ICCPR, as well as protected by Article 138 and 370 Penal Code and Article 12 Constitution. The ECHR has extended the interpretation of the terms “private life” and “home” under Article 8 ECHR to include certain professional or business activities or premises. ECHR 16 December 1992, App. no. 13710/88 (Niemietz v. Germany), para 29.

  175. 175.

    HR 20 April 2004, NJ 2004, 525, para 3.3.

  176. 176.

    Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 403, no. 3, 70-71. And: HR 29 March 2005, LJN AS27527, para 3.2.

  177. 177.

    Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage 15 November 2002, NJ 2003, 23, para 3.

  178. 178.

    HR 12 February 2002, NJ 2002, 301, para 3.4 and HR 29 March 2005, LJN AS27527, para 3.1 and 3.3. See in this regard also Sect. 2.3.2.3 concerning the threshold of a reasonable suspicion. In balancing the interests involved for adopting a threshold of application for SIT, the seriousness of the crime is also an important factor which has to be considered.

  179. 179.

    Stb. 1999, 245.

  180. 180.

    Stb. 2000, 32.

  181. 181.

    Stb. 2006, 580.

  182. 182.

    Compare Corstens 2008, 257.

  183. 183.

    Ordering of identifying information.

  184. 184.

    Systematic observation, infiltration, pseudo-dealing or serving, systematic gaining of information, and entering private places.

  185. 185.

    Interception of private communications and ordering (personal) information other than identifying information.

  186. 186.

    For more information on these specific special investigative techniques, see Buruma 2001 and Corstens 2008, 441-471.

  187. 187.

    The requirement of ‘suspicion’ is defined in Article 27(1) CCP. According to Article 27(1) CCP, a person can be considered to be a suspect, before the prosecution has been initiated, when a reasonable suspicion to believe that he or she is guilty of having committed a criminal offense can be derived from the facts or circumstances. The importance and influence of the central position of this definition of a suspect as a threshold for using SIT will be dealt with in more detail in Sect. 2.3.2.3.

  188. 188.

    Compare Corstens 2008, 257-258 and 269. Corstens identifies proactive investigation as ‘early detection’ [vroegsporing].

  189. 189.

    See in more detail: Krommendijk et al. 2009, 119-123, Sikkema 2008, para 4.10, and Van Sliedregt 2006, 9.

  190. 190.

    HR 7 October 2003, NJ 2004, 118, para 3.3.

  191. 191.

    Kamerstukken II 1995/96, 24 072, nos. 10-11, 413-415 (Rapport van de Parlementaire Enquêtecommissie Opsporingsmethoden 1996). See also Krommendijk et al. 2009, 10.

  192. 192.

    HR 19 December 1995, NJ 1996, 249, ann. Sch., para 6.4.4.

  193. 193.

    Kamerstukken II 1995/96, 24 072, nos. 10-11, 413-414 and 451 (Rapport van de Parlementaire Enquêtecommissie Opsporingsmethoden 1996) and Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 403, no. 3, 4.

  194. 194.

    Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 403, no. 3, 4.

  195. 195.

    Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 403, no. 3, 4 and 5.

  196. 196.

    Regardless of the fact that the limited availability of proactive investigative means must be put into perspective because of the possibility of a ‘reactive’ criminal investigation of preparatory acts, which still means that, except for clarifying a reasonable suspicion of that crime having been committed, also proactive goals will be realized.

  197. 197.

    Krommendijk et al. 2009, 11.

  198. 198.

    Article 142 CCP.

  199. 199.

    Article 157 CCP. In addition, also ‘regular’ law enforcement officers (Article 141 CCP) are authorized to investigate criminal activities criminalized in the special criminal acts.

  200. 200.

    Article 50(1) Weapons and Ammunition Act.

  201. 201.

    Article 50(2) Weapons and Ammunition Act.

  202. 202.

    Article 50(3) Weapons and Ammunition Act.

  203. 203.

    Article 51 Weapons and Ammunition Act.

  204. 204.

    This division of responsibility between the public prosecutor and the mayor on the basis of their respective responsibility for the criminal investigation and the maintenance of order (Articles 2, 12 and 13 Police Act 1993) is not always self-evident. The issue of responsibility for investigative officers exerting administrative supervisory powers, such as for example the power to stop a car in order to control observance with the Road Traffic Act (Article 160 WVW 1994), is less clear, considering that sometimes also persons other than police officers may use this controlling power (compare Article 159 WVW 1994) and, more in general, that the use of administrative supervisory powers on behalf of law enforcement officers very often overlaps or concurs with their criminal investigative task. Luchtman argues on the basis of this latter argument for supervision by the PPS also concerning the use of administrative supervisory powers. Luchtman 2007B, 669-672.

  205. 205.

    Identified as the ‘cumulating of spheres’ by Luchtman. Luchtman 2007A, 133-142 and 645-651. See also: Luchtman 2007B, 660-661.

  206. 206.

    HR 26 April 1988, NJ 1989, 390, ann. ThWvV (Leidraadarrest) and HR 21 November 2006, NJ 2006, 653.

  207. 207.

    HR 21 November 2006, NJ 2006, 653.

  208. 208.

    A distinction between administrative supervision and criminal investigation was, in the first place, intended to serve a shield goal, considering that in order to protect the rights of citizens the more far-reaching power of the government to act in the context of criminal procedural law is subjected to more restraints and includes more safeguards than the power of the government to act in the context of administrative law. For this reason the demarcation of the criminal investigation from administrative supervision is dealt with in more detail in Sect. 2.3.2.2.2.

  209. 209.

    Persons subjected to administrative supervisory powers are obliged to cooperate, whereas under criminal procedural law someone has the right to remain silent as part of the right not to cooperate in someone’s own conviction. See HR 26 April 1988, NJ 1989, 390.

  210. 210.

    Buruma 2001, 134.

  211. 211.

    Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 403, no. 3, 49.

  212. 212.

    See Act on Police Information [Wet politiegegevens], Stb. 2007, 300.

  213. 213.

    According to Article 126dd CCP, information obtained through some SIT can be used in a different criminal investigation, which includes the preliminary investigation.

  214. 214.

    Personal Data Protection Act [Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens], Article 9(1).

  215. 215.

    Article 6 WIV 2002 (see Sect. 2.2.1.4).

  216. 216.

    The AIVD collects information, which is subsequently combined and analyzed by the AIVD resulting in intelligence. Muller 2007, 171.

  217. 217.

    Muller 2007, 173.

  218. 218.

    Article 20-30 WIV 2002. For a translated version of the full list of the AIVD’s investigative powers see Articles 20-30 of the English version of the WIV 2001, available at: https://www.aivd.nl/english/aivd/the-intelligence-and/ (accessed July 19, 2011).

  219. 219.

    The power to open personal correspondence is provided with an additional check, because the confidentiality of mail is protected as a Constitutional right in Article 13 Constitution.

  220. 220.

    Article 32 WIV 2002.

  221. 221.

    Article 33 WIV 2002.

  222. 222.

    Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 877, no. 3, 78-79.

  223. 223.

    Article 64 WIV 2002.

  224. 224.

    Article 74-79 WIV 2002.

  225. 225.

    Article 34 WIV 2002.

  226. 226.

    Article 47 WIV 2002.

  227. 227.

    Compare: Vis 2010A, 421.

  228. 228.

    Kamerstukken II 1991/92, 22 463, no. 4, 2 and 6. During the discussion of the bill underlying the current WIV 2002, the responsible Ministers concluded that the main lines of the note of 1992 still concerned the correct and practicable description of the manner in which information gathered by the BVD can be used in furtherance of a criminal investigation. Kamerstukken II, 1997/98, 25 877, no. 14, 12. See also Hirsch Ballin 2009, 289.

  229. 229.

    Muller 2007, 180.

  230. 230.

    Articles 85-86 WIV 2002.

  231. 231.

    HR 5 September 2006, NJ 2007, 336, para 4.5.1. Also the development where courts give more leeway to the possibility of using intelligence information in criminal investigations and further proceedings will be dealt with in Chap. 3.

  232. 232.

    HR 13 November 2007, NJ 2007, 614, para 3.5.2.

  233. 233.

    Kamerstukken II 2003/04, 29 743, no. 7, 23.

  234. 234.

    HR 13 November 2007, NJ 2007, 614, para 3.4.2 and HR 5 September 2006, NJ 2007, 336, para 4.7.2 and 6.4.2.

  235. 235.

    HR 13 November 2007, NJ 2007, 614, para 5.2.2.

  236. 236.

    Article 61 WIV 2002.

  237. 237.

    Article 62 WIV 2002.

  238. 238.

    Vis 2010B, 130.

  239. 239.

    Article 63 WIV 2002.

  240. 240.

    Lindenberg 2002, 424 (MvT 16-17).

  241. 241.

    Brants et al. 1995, 44. According to Damaška, this system of realizing state accountability is typical for legal systems with a civil law origin. Damaška 1986, 47-50.

  242. 242.

    See also HR 11 October 2005, NJ 2006, 625, para 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 and HR 21 November 2006, NJ 2007/233, ann. Mevis, para 3.4 and annotation para 3.

  243. 243.

    Compare Article 2 Police Act 1993.

  244. 244.

    Muller et al. 2007, 559-560.

  245. 245.

    See on this in more detail Sect. 2.3.1.4.

  246. 246.

    See Sect. 2.1.3.4. The applicability of these administrative law principles to a criminal investigation has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court in HR 12 December 1978, NJ 1979, 142 ann. GEM. Muller, Dubelaar and Cleiren formulate 15 different principles for police work which are relevant for all the tasks of police officers. Muller et al. 2007, 597. The mentioned principles nevertheless apply in particular to the criminal investigative activities of the police.

  247. 247.

    See Sect. 2.1.3.4 and Corstens 2008, 62-73.

  248. 248.

    See on the contents of these principles Sect. 2.1.3.4.1.

  249. 249.

    HR 12 December 1978, NJ 1979, 142, ann. GEM.

  250. 250.

    According to Naeyé criminal investigative methods based upon Article 2 Police Act 1993 shall comply with the following fundamental principles for police action: proportionality, subsidiarity, reasonableness and moderateness (J. Naeyé, De reikwijdte van fundamentele rechten, Handelingen NJV 1995-I, 272), referred to in: Fokkens and Kirkels-Vrijman 2009, 124.

  251. 251.

    See also HR 11 October 2005, NJ 2006, 625, para 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 and HR 21 November 2006, NJ 2007, 233, ann. Mevis, para 3.4 and annotation para 3. See also Franken 2009, 84-85.

  252. 252.

    Franken 2009, 82.

  253. 253.

    Article 148 CCP and Article 13 Police Act 1993.

  254. 254.

    Rapport van de Parlementaire Enquêtecommissie Opsporingsmethoden 1996, 439.

  255. 255.

    This supervisory role for the PPS has been maintained in the new definition adopted by the Act on the Criminal Investigation of Terrorist Crimes of November 2006, Stb. 2006, 580.

  256. 256.

    Mevis 2005B, 454.

  257. 257.

    Beijer et al. 2004, 160.

  258. 258.

    Baaijens-van Geloven and Simmelink 2002, 562.

  259. 259.

    Franken has analyzed the case law in the period 2000–2009 to formulate this conclusion. Franken 2009, 87-92.

  260. 260.

    Aanwijzing opsporingsbevoegdheden, Stcrt. 2004, 227, para 4.1.2.

  261. 261.

    Ibid., para 4.1.1.

  262. 262.

    Ibid., para 4.1.3.

  263. 263.

    Beijer et al. 2004, 163.

  264. 264.

    HR 20 June 2000, NJ 2000, 502, para 3.3 and 3.4.

  265. 265.

    See also: See e.g. Schalken 2006, 72-73. In recent years the development described in this Article may have been further accelerated under the influence of a societal and political call for safety, which includes the expectation that a tougher prosecution and punishment policy contributes to a safer society. See on this Chap. 4, Sect. 4.2.3.1.

  266. 266.

    ECHR 14 September 2010, App. no. 38224/03 (Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. The Netherlands), para 93. See also Sect. 2.1.2.

  267. 267.

    Van der Meij 2010A, 60.

  268. 268.

    Compare: Van der Meij 2010A, 64-65. Van der Meij concludes that (also) for this reason, the regulation does not provide for a balanced triangular relationship between the examining magistrate, the public prosecutor and the defense. Ibid.

  269. 269.

    Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 877, no. 3, 99.

  270. 270.

    HR 11 October 2005, NJ 2006, 625, para 3.5.2. A similar consideration can be found in HR 21 November 2006, NJ 2007, 233, ann. Mevis, para 3.4.

  271. 271.

    Corstens 2008, 313.

  272. 272.

    Rapport van de Parlementaire Enquêtecommissie Opsporingsmethoden 1996, 389.

  273. 273.

    Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 26 269, no. 4-5 (Rapport Commissie Kalsbeek), 175 and Mevis 2005B, 455.

  274. 274.

    Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 403, no. 7, 23.

  275. 275.

    Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 403, no. 7, 24.

  276. 276.

    Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage 22 February 2005, LJN AU0235.

  277. 277.

    Compare: HR 11 October 2005, NJ 2006, 625, para 3.5.2 and HR 21 November 2006, NJ 2007, 233, ann. Mevis, para 3.4.

  278. 278.

    Beijer et al. 2004, 149-155 and Franken 2006, 267.

  279. 279.

    Franken 2006, 269.

  280. 280.

    Kamerstukken I 2010/11, 32177, no. A. Considering that the Act has been adopted by the First Chamber of Parliament, it can be expected, at the time of concluding this book, that it will soon enter into force.

  281. 281.

    Van der Meij 2010A, 549.

  282. 282.

    Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32177 no. 3, 8-9.

  283. 283.

    Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32177 no. 3, 10-11.

  284. 284.

    Article 185 CCP, Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32177 no. 3, 17.

  285. 285.

    Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32177 no. 3, 18.

  286. 286.

    Act of 18 September 2006, Stb. 2006, 460.

  287. 287.

    See Chap. 3, Sect. 3.3.2.

  288. 288.

    See e.g. ECHR 12 May 2000, App. no. 35394/97 (Khan v. The United Kingdom), para 34. See also Sect. 2.1.3.3.

  289. 289.

    E.g.: ECHR 24 November 1994, App. no. 13972/88 (Imbrioscia v. Switzerland), para 34. See also Sect. 2.1.3.3.

  290. 290.

    Kamerstukken I 2010/11, 32177, no. A.

  291. 291.

    Until the entry into force of the Act on Strengthening the Position of the Examining Magistrate, the suspect could under Article 36a-36e CCP request the examining magistrate to investigate in the context of the preliminary judicial investigation some specified aspects.

  292. 292.

    As suggested in the explanatory memorandum of this Act, Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32177 no. 3, 18.

  293. 293.

    HR 7 May 1996, NJ 1996, 687 ann. Sch, para 5.9.

  294. 294.

    ECHR 16 December 1992, App. no. 13071/87 (Edwards v. The United Kingdom), para 36.

  295. 295.

    See Corstens 2008, 249.

  296. 296.

    Article 126aa(3) CCP.

  297. 297.

    Corstens 2008, 249.

  298. 298.

    Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 403, no. 3, 84.

  299. 299.

    Buruma 2001, 28.

  300. 300.

    Article 315 and 326 CCP.

  301. 301.

    ECHR 16 December 1992, App. no. 13071/87 (Edwards v. The United Kingdom), para 36.

  302. 302.

    Buruma 2001, 27.

  303. 303.

    Myjer 1997, 742.

  304. 304.

    Article 126bb(2) CCP.

  305. 305.

    Article 126bb(3) CCP.

  306. 306.

    Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 403, no. 3, 85.

  307. 307.

    Article 126bb (1) CCP. See in detail on the manner in which the duty of notification shall be exerted, including the possible exceptions: ‘Aanwijzing opsporingsbevoegdheden, Stcrt 2011, no. 3240, under 5.4.

  308. 308.

    ECHR 24 April 1990, App. no. 11801/85 and App. no. 11105/84 (Kruslin v. France and Huvig v. France).

  309. 309.

    ECHR 6 September 1978, App. no. 5029/71 (Klass and others v. Germany), para 71-72.

  310. 310.

    See: HR 21 November 2006, NJ 2007, 233, ann. Mevis, annotation para 2. See also: Baaijens-van Geloven and Simmelink 2002, 588 and 593.

  311. 311.

    Beijer et al. 2004, 145.

  312. 312.

    Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 29 940, no. 4, 1-2 (Letter of the Minister of Justice regarding the evaluation of the Act on SIT).

  313. 313.

    Although based to a large extent upon the French Code d’Instruction Criminelle, used in the Netherlands for the preceding 27 years.

  314. 314.

    As to J. de Bosch Kemper (1838): Simmelink 1987, 39-40.

  315. 315.

    Simmelink 1987, 40 and 41, Berkhout-van Poelgeest 2001, 30.

  316. 316.

    J. de Bosch Kemper (1838), cited in Simmelink 1987, 39.

  317. 317.

    See: Knigge and Kwakman 2001, 181.

  318. 318.

    Ibid., 311.

  319. 319.

    See Sect. 2.1.3.2.1.

  320. 320.

    ECHR 26 April 1979, App. no. 6538/74 (Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom), para 49; ECHR 25 March 1998, case 13/1997/797/1000 (Kopp v. Switzerland), para 55; ECHR 16 February 2000, App. no. 27798/95 (Amann v. Switzerland), para 50 (and 56); ECHR 24 April 1990, App. no. 11801/85 and App. no. 11105/84 (Kruslin v. France and Huvig v. France), para 30/29). See in more detail Sect. 2.1.3.2.1.

  321. 321.

    ECHR 26 April 1979, App. no. 6538/74 (Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom), para 49.

  322. 322.

    ECHR 30 March 1989, App. no. 10461/83 (Chapell v. The United Kingdom), para 56.

  323. 323.

    See ECHR 29 June 2006, App. no. 54934/00 (Weber and Saravia v. Germany) (admissibility decision), para 93-94 and ECHR 1 July 2008, App. no. 58243/00 (Liberty and others v. The United Kingdom), para 62, for a summary of the Court’s case law on the interpretation of and the conditions following from the requirement of foreseeability.

  324. 324.

    ECHR 2 August 1984, App. no. 8691/79 (Malone v. The United Kingdom), para 67 and ECHR 24 April 1990, App. no. 11801/85 and App. no. 11105/84 (Kruslin v. France and Huvig v. France), para 30/29.

  325. 325.

    ECHR 2 August 1984, App. no. 8691/79 (Malone v. The United Kingdom), para 79.

  326. 326.

    See e.g. ECHR 2 September 2010, App. no. 35623/05 (Uzun v. Germany), para 63.

  327. 327.

    ECHR 23 September 1998, App. no. 72/1997/856/1065 (McLeod v. The United Kingdom), para 41, and ECHR 26 April 1979, App. no. 6538/74 (Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom), para 49.

  328. 328.

    ECHR 2 September 2010, App. no. 35623/05 (Uzun v. Germany), para 62.

  329. 329.

    ECHR 2 September 2010, App. no. 35623/05 (Uzun v. Germany), para 63.

  330. 330.

    ECHR 12 January 2010, App. no. 4158/05 (Gillan and Quinton v. The United Kingdom), para 77.

  331. 331.

    ECHR 2 August 1984, App. no. 8691/79 (Malone v. The United Kingdom), para 68.

  332. 332.

    ECHR 2 August 1984, App. no. 8691/79 (Malone v. The United Kingdom), para 67 and ECHR 24 April 1990, App. no. 11801/85 and App. no. 11105/84 (Kruslin v. France and Huvig v. France), para 30/29.

  333. 333.

    E.g. ECHR 2 August 1984, App. no. 8691/79 (Malone v. The United Kingdom), ECHR 24 April 1990, App. no. 11801/85 and App. no. 11105/84 (Kruslin v. France and Huvig v. France), ECHR 29 June 2006, App. no. 54934/00 (Weber and Saravia v. Germany) (admissibility decision) and ECHR 1 July 2008, App. no. 58243/00 (Liberty and others v. The United Kingdom).

  334. 334.

    ECHR 24 April 1990, App. no. 11801/85 and App. no. 11105/84 (Kruslin v. France and Huvig v. France), para 33/32. ECHR 25 March 1998, case 13/1997/797/1000 (Kopp v. Switzerland).

  335. 335.

    ECHR 29 June 2006, App. no. 54934/00 (Weber and Saravia v. Germany) (admissibility decision), para 93 and ECHR 1 July 2008, App. no. 58243/00 (Liberty and others v. The United Kingdom), para 62.

  336. 336.

    Internal citations omitted, ECHR 29 June 2006, App. no. 54934/00 (Weber and Saravia v. Germany) (admissibility decision), para 95. See also: ECHR 1 July 2008, App. no. 58243/00 (Liberty and others v. The United Kingdom), para 62.

  337. 337.

    ECHR 28 October 1994, App. no. 14310/88 (Murray v. The United Kingdom), para 88.

  338. 338.

    ECHR 2 September 2010, App. no. 35623/05 (Uzun v. Germany), para 29 and 68-74.

  339. 339.

    ECHR 26 March 1987, App. no. 9248/81 (Leander v. Sweden), para 58.

  340. 340.

    ECHR 15 June 1992, App. no. 12433/86 (Lüdi v. Switzerland), para 39. Furthermore, the Court ruled in this case that the use of an undercover agent, who observed the defendant committing a drugs crime, did not violate the privacy of the defendant (Article 8(1)) because the defendant should have been aware of the risk of being observed in that situation. Ibid., para 40.

  341. 341.

    Loof 2005, 211.

  342. 342.

    See e.g. ECHR 23 September 1998, App. no. 72/1997/856/1065 (McLeod v. The United Kingdom), para 52. See in general: Arai 2006, 340-341.

  343. 343.

    Loof 2005, 213-214.

  344. 344.

    See also Chap. 1, Sect. 1.3.2.

  345. 345.

    Rapport van de Parlementaire Enquêtecommissie Opsporingsmethoden 1996, 419-420.

  346. 346.

    HR 19 December 1995, NJ 1996, 249, para 6.4.4 and 6.4.5. Although, in this case, the Supreme Court made no explicit reference to either Article 8 ECHR or Article 10 of the Constitution, its judgment can clearly be seen in relation to the forms of protection provided in these Articles.

  347. 347.

    HR 19 December 1995, NJ 1996, 249, para 6.3.2 and 6.4.5.

  348. 348.

    HR 19 December 1995, NJ 1996, 249, para 8.3.

  349. 349.

    HR 2 June 1998, NJ 1998, 783, para 6.2, HR 13 June 1995, NJ 1995, 684, HR 11 October 1986, NJ 1988, 511, para 6.3.

  350. 350.

    ECHR 2 August 1984, App. no. 8691/79 (Malone v. The United Kingdom), para 67. Repeated in: ECHR 24 April 1990, App. no. 11801/85 and App. no. 11105/84 (Kruslin v. France and Huvig v. France), para 30/29.

  351. 351.

    ECHR 2 August 1984, App. no. 8691/79 (Malone v. The United Kingdom), para 68.

  352. 352.

    Ibid., para 79.

  353. 353.

    Stb. 1999, 245.

  354. 354.

    Beijer et al. 2004, 29. See also the explanatory memorandum in which codification, enhanced hierarchical supervision and controllability were formulated as the main objectives of the new Act. Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 403, no. 3, 3.

  355. 355.

    See in this regard HR 19 December 1995, NJ 1996, 249, ann. Sch, annotation para 29. Before 1999 the Supreme Court often set standards for using specific investigative authorities for which an explicit basis in law was not yet established. For example: the establishment of the so-called Tallon criterion for the use of investigative infiltration. The Tallon criterion prohibits undercover agents from acting in such a way that the person being investigated commits criminal offenses other than those which were already the object of his criminal intent. HR 4 December 1979, NJ 1980, 356. A similar criterion has also been upheld by the ECrtHR: ECHR 9 June 1998, case 44/1997/828/1034 (Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal), para 32.

  356. 356.

    Kamerstukken II 199/97, 25 403, no. 3, 49-51.

  357. 357.

    See ‘Aanwijzing opsporingsbevoegdheden, Stcrt 2011, no. 3240, 25 and Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 403, no. 3, 50 (expressing the intention to establish such a guideline).

  358. 358.

    Knigge and Kwakman 20010, 311-314.

  359. 359.

    Handboek voor de opsporingspraktijk 2000-2007, aanv. 5 July 2004 AI 1.1-6.

  360. 360.

    See e.g. HR 11 October 2005, NJ 2006, 625, para 3.5.2.

  361. 361.

    Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 877, no. 3, 2-3.

  362. 362.

    Compare: Borgers 2011, 457.

  363. 363.

    See also Sect. 2.1.3.4.2.

  364. 364.

    Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 403, no. 7, 17 and Handelingen II 1998/99, no. 24, 1549.

  365. 365.

    Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 403, no. 7, 18.

  366. 366.

    Knigge and Kwakman 2001, 300-347.

  367. 367.

    Stb. 2006, 580.

  368. 368.

    Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 164, no. 3, 17 and Borgers 2009, 40 and 46. See also Sect. 2.1.3.4.2.

  369. 369.

    See also: Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 164, no. 7, 25.

  370. 370.

    Sikkema 2008, para 4.1. The Supreme Court seems to retain the older interpretation of the criminal investigation when addressing the applicability of Article 152 CCP and distinguishes, for that purpose, a criminal investigation under Article 132a CCP and an investigation for the purpose of gathering information in relation to criminal offenses ‘preceding’ the criminal investigation (although with the same outcome; Article 152 CCP also applies to the investigative activities ‘preceding’ the criminal investigation when these activities are conducted for the purpose of collecting information for criminal prosecution). See HR 5 October 2010, LJN BL5629. Borgers 2011, 462.

  371. 371.

    Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30 164, no. 7, 26.

  372. 372.

    Borgers 2009, 53.

  373. 373.

    Ibid., 57-59. This approach also seems to be the correct one according to the Supreme Court (upholding the reasoning of the Court of Appeal). HR 7 July 2009, NJ 2009 528, para 6.2.3 and 8.4 and Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage 1 March 2007, LJN AZ9644, para 5.1.1.

  374. 374.

    Nevertheless, the exact scope of the criminal investigation has been, especially before the entry into force of the Act of 2006, rather ambiguous. On the one hand, the scope of Article 132a CCP was explained as separating criminal investigation from administrative supervision on the basis of the threshold of a reasonable suspicion. On the other hand, Article 148 CCP has been interpreted as referring to a broader definition of criminal investigation, namely also covering the investigative powers attributed in special criminal law, which can be applied ‘in the interest of criminal investigation’ and, hence, in the absence of a reasonable suspicion. Borgers 2011, 460. Because especially this ambiguity has been overcome by the definition adopted in 2006, the previous lack of clarity as to the scope of the criminal investigation will further be left out of consideration.

  375. 375.

    One could also argue that these activities concern criminal investigation and, consequently, the officers shall act under the responsibility of the public prosecutor. In that view, the element of supervision by the public prosecutor in Article 132a CCP is a regulatory element instead of also being a defining element for criminal investigation. In this line: Luchtman 2007B, 669-672, see also footnote 204 of this Chap. 3, and: Peçi and Sikkema 2008.

  376. 376.

    Luchtman 2007A, 133-142 and Borgers 2011, 455.

  377. 377.

    HR 2 December 1935, NJ 1936, 250, ann. WP.

  378. 378.

    Corstens 2008, 273.

  379. 379.

    According to Borgers those investigative activities conducted for the purpose of making prosecutorial decisions and conducted on behalf of investigative officers under Articles 141 and 142 CCP meet the definition of a criminal investigation under Article 132a CCP. Borgers 2009, 50. Kamerstukken II 2005/6, 30 164, no. 7, 57-59.

  380. 380.

    Borgers 2011, 478.

  381. 381.

    See on this subject and in particular the use of administrative supervisory powers under the Tax Act (also) for the benefit of gathering evidence for criminal offenses (such as tax fraud): Luchtman 2007A.

  382. 382.

    Borgers 2011, 481-492 and Van Sliedregt 2006, 18-19.

  383. 383.

    See on this framework Sect. 2.2.2.4.1.

  384. 384.

    With that, the Act also meets the concerns of the Van Traa Parliamentary Inquiry Commission regarding the possibility of an overlap between intelligence investigation and law enforcement investigations (and consequently an abuse of power) due to a lack of statutory separation between the two communities. Rapport van de Parlementaire Enquêtecommissie Opsporingsmethoden 1996, 358.

  385. 385.

    Although Article 139c(2)(3) CCP also excludes tapping for a criminal investigation from this prohibition, the statutory basis for the powers are the provisions in Articles 126l to 126m CCP.

  386. 386.

    ’t Hart 1983, 158.

  387. 387.

    Kamerstukken II 2004/04, 30 164, no. 3, 17.

  388. 388.

    Compare Peçi and Sikkema 2008, 361.

  389. 389.

    Feuth 2002, 110-112 and Borgers 2009, 50. Kamerstukken II 2005/6, 30 164, no. 7, 53.

  390. 390.

    Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 30 164, no. 3, 17.

  391. 391.

    Compare HR 8 September 2009, NJ 2009, 427, Opinion of Advocate General Jörg para 9. The same position has also been taken by Corstens 2008, 260 and Borgers 2009, 50. Kamerstukken II 2005/6, 30 164, no. 7, 53.

  392. 392.

    Sikkema 2008, para 3.1 and Van Sliedregt 2006, 5.

  393. 393.

    The second section of Article 27 CCP provides for the definition of a suspect during the trial phase, which will be left out of consideration.

  394. 394.

    Article 27(1) CCP. The original wording of Article 27(1) CCP is: “Als verdachte wordt vóórdat de vervolging is aangevangen, aangemerkt degene te wiens aanzien uit feiten of omstandigheden een redelijk vermoeden van schuld aan eenig strafbaar feit voortvloeit.” The latter part of ‘eenig strafbaar feit’ (any criminal offense) is translated as having committed a criminal offence, because the relation of this part of the sentence with ‘reasonable suspicion of guilt’ implies the fulfillment of the provision defining the criminal offence, and, hence, the commission of the criminal offense described in that provision. Compare: Sikkema 2008, para 7.1 and Van Sliedregt 2006, 8.

  395. 395.

    Article 30 CCP (as amended by the Act on strengthening the position of the examining magistrate, Kamerstukken I 2010-2011, 32 177, no. A). Article 31 CCP provides what particular records must be disclosed to the suspect during the pre-trial phase (such as records of his/her interrogation and records of investigative activities that could be attended by the suspect or his/her lawyer). Disclosure may be delayed if it would obstruct the interest of the investigation (Article 30(2) CCP). During the covert criminal investigation disclosure is, obviously, not yet warranted. Suspects in the criminal investigation will normally not be aware of their status as a suspect, until the (ex post) notification (Article 126bb(3) CCP) or the disclosure of the evidence gathered against him on the basis of Article 126aa(1) and (4) as soon as the interest of the investigation so allows (which will usually concur with the first interrogation of the suspect).

  396. 396.

    Compare: Knigge 2005, 353.

  397. 397.

    The element of ‘facts and circumstances’ has no further specific legal relevance. It only requires a degree of objectivity, rather than that only certain information can be defined as either a fact or a circumstance or that both a fact or a circumstance are, as a minimum, required. Compare: Sikkema 2008, para 9.

  398. 398.

    See Kamerstukken II 1913/14, 286, no. 3, 39.

  399. 399.

    Sikkema 2008, para 8.1.

  400. 400.

    Compare: ECHR 28 October 1994, App. no. 14310/88 (Murray v. The United Kingdom), para 51.

  401. 401.

    Van Sliedregt 2006, 7.

  402. 402.

    Gerechtshof Amsterdam 3 June 1977, NJ 1978, 601.

  403. 403.

    HR 8 February 2000, NJ 2000, 316.

  404. 404.

    HR 6 September 2005, NJ 2006, 447.

  405. 405.

    HR 4 April 2000, NJ 2000, 735, 3.4 and 3.5.

  406. 406.

    Compare: Van Sliedregt 2006, 16.

  407. 407.

    As also follows from the described cases, the circumstance that the observed behavior occurs at a place ‘known as a place where drugs trading takes place’, or the knowledge that persons from the western part of the Netherlands transport drugs to the northern provinces, were relevant circumstances for establishing a reasonable suspicion. See, furthermore, HR 14 January 1975, NJ 1975, 207, para 4 and HR 20 March 1984, NJ 1984, 549, para 2 and Sikkema 2008, para 9.

  408. 408.

    HR 7 November 2006, NJ 2007, 108, para 3.2.2 and Opinion Advocate-General para 6.

  409. 409.

    E.g.: HR 18 November 1980, NJ 1981, 125, para 6, HR 13 June 2006, NJ 2006, 346, para 3.5, HR 22 January 2008, LJN BC1375 and HR 11 March 2008, NJ 2008, 328, para 3.5. See also: Brinkhof 2008, 1224-1228.

  410. 410.

    ECHR 20 November 1989, Kostovski v. The Netherlands, App. no. 11454/85, para 44: “The Convention does not preclude reliance, at the investigation stage of criminal proceedings, on sources such as anonymous informants. However, the subsequent use of anonymous statements as sufficient evidence to found a conviction, as in the present case, is a different matter.”

  411. 411.

    HR 13 June 2006, NJ 2006, 346, para 3.4 and 3.5, HR 22 January 2008, LJN BC1375 and HR 11 March 2008, NJ 2008, 328, Opinion of Advocate General Machielse para 3.3 and HR 3.5.

  412. 412.

    See also: Annotation Borgers, HR 11 March 2008, NJ 2008, 329, ann. Borgers, para 4 and Sikkema, 2008, para 11.1.

  413. 413.

    HR 14 September 1992, NJ 1993, 83, para 5.3, HR 25 September 2001, NJ 2002, 97, para 3.5, HR 22 December 2009, LJN BJ8622, para 2.4 See also HR 12 May 2009, LJN BH: 5249, para 9, referring to a guideline of the PPS, where it has been indicated that CIE information can be used, when it is sufficiently concrete, to establish a reasonable suspicion. However, the reports cannot be used as evidence because the information concerns intelligence, which still needs to be checked (e.g. in the context of a criminal investigation aimed at clarifying a reasonable suspicion). Nevertheless, the Head of the regional CIE unit can be heard as a witness regarding information obtained by the CIE from secret informants and his testimony may then be used as evidence. See e.g. HR 5 October 1982, NJ 1983, 297 and HR 2 March 1982, NJ 1982, 460. See on the use of CIE information as starting information also in detail Brinkhoff 2009, 117-122.

  414. 414.

    See e.g. HR 14 September 1992, NJ 1993, 83, para 5.3.

  415. 415.

    Sikkema 2008, para 11.2.

  416. 416.

    The control exerted by the CIE public prosecutor may de facto be rather limited, considering that control over specific CIE reports used as starting information for criminal investigations is not exerted. Brinkhoff, 2009, 114-116.

  417. 417.

    HR 5 September 2006, NJ 2007, 336, para 6.2 and para 6.3.2.

  418. 418.

    HR 11 March 2008, NJ 2008, 329, para 3.4.

  419. 419.

    HR 5 September 2006, NJ 2007, 336, para 4.7.2.

  420. 420.

    See Chap. 3, Sects. 3.3.1 and 3.3.3.

  421. 421.

    Compare Corstens 2008, 88.

  422. 422.

    See also Supplement to ‘Handboek voor de opsporingspraktijk’ (2004), Stcrt 10 December 2007, no. 239/p. 11, 2.

  423. 423.

    Kamerstukken II 1996/1997, 25 403, no. 3, 23.

  424. 424.

    See HR 23 October 2007, LJN BB3067 (Opinion of the Advocate General).

  425. 425.

    Kamerstukken II 1995/96, 24 072, nos. 10-11, 25 and Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 403, no. 3, 4. HR 7 November 2000, LJN AA8207 and HR 7 October 2003, NJ 2004, 118, para 34.

  426. 426.

    HR 7 November 2000, LJN AA8207 and HR 7 October 2003, NJ 2004, 118, para 34.

  427. 427.

    Supplement to ‘Handboek voor de opsporingspraktijk’ (2004), Stcrt 10 December 2007, no. 239/p. 11, 2.

  428. 428.

    Beijer et al. 2004, 114.

  429. 429.

    ‘Aanwijzing opsporingsbevoegdheden’ 24 February 2011, Stcrt 2011, 3240, 2 and Krommendijk et al. 2009, 115.

  430. 430.

    Krommendijk et al. 2009, 115.

  431. 431.

    Corstens 2005, 259-260.

  432. 432.

    Knigge and Kwakman 2001, 131.

  433. 433.

    Bokhorst et al. 2002, 53.

  434. 434.

    Krommendijk et al. 2009, 21 and Supplement to ‘Handboek voor de opsporingspraktijk’ (2004), Stcrt. 10 December 2007, no. 239/p. 11, 2.

  435. 435.

    Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 403, no. 3, 24-25.

  436. 436.

    HR 21 November 2006, NJ 2007, 233, para 3.5. See also: Blom 2007, 626 ff.

  437. 437.

    HR 30 March 2010, NJ 2010, 201.

  438. 438.

    HR 16 November 2004, NJ 2005, 171. See, furthermore, HR 22 March 2011, NJ 2011, 144, para 2.3.1, 2.3.2 and 2.5 where the Supreme Court considered that serial poaching, in an organized context, amounted to a serious infringement of the legal order. The Court of Appeal of Amsterdam rejected that fact that the offense of social security fraud (without other facts and circumstances) was a serious infringement of the legal order (Gerechtshof Amsterdam 24 June 2004, NJ 2004, 531) and, likewise, the District Court did not accept that breaking and entering was a serious infringement of the legal order (Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage 15 January 2004, NJ 2004, 276).

  439. 439.

    Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 403, no. 3, 23.

  440. 440.

    Beijer et al. 2004, 111 and Krommendijk et al. 2009, 46-47.

  441. 441.

    Krommendijk et al. 2009, 41-44.

  442. 442.

    Krommendijk et al. 2009, 44-46.

  443. 443.

    Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 403, no. 3, 23-24.

  444. 444.

    Gerechtshof’s-Gravenhage 2 October 2008, LJN BF3987.

  445. 445.

    See the Opinion of the Advocate General referring to the argumentation of the Court of Appeal of Den Bosch, para 4, HR 23 October 2007, LJN BB3067.

  446. 446.

    Krommendijk et al. 2009, 38-39.

  447. 447.

    Ibid., 53.

  448. 448.

    Ibid., 84-86 and 97.

  449. 449.

    Ibid., 71.

  450. 450.

    Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 24 403, no. 3, 49-50.

  451. 451.

    Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 24 403, no. 3, 23.

  452. 452.

    Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 24 403, no. 3, 23 and 57.

  453. 453.

    HR 8 September 2009, NJ 2009, 427 and HR 8 April 2003, NJ 2003, 420.

  454. 454.

    Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage 31 May 2002, LJN AE3708.

  455. 455.

    Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage 21 November 2000, LJN AA 8414.

  456. 456.

    HR 9 March 1993, NJ 1993, 633, para 7-9.

  457. 457.

    Bijl. Handelingen II, 1968/69, 9608, no. 5, 2 and HR 9 March 1993, NJ 1993, 633, para 5.2.

  458. 458.

    Rechtbank Amsterdam 29 June 2007, LJN BA9602 en LJN BA9586, para 3.1.

  459. 459.

    HR 27 May 1997, NJ 1997, 550, Opinion of Advocate General Fokkens, para 11-13.

  460. 460.

    HR 30 October 1984, NJ 1985, 275, para 6.4.

  461. 461.

    This goal of controlling the observance of a Special Act should not be confused with the ‘administrative supervision’ as part of policing tasks.

  462. 462.

    This would be insufficient under the firearms legislation of the Netherlands Antilles, where indications must also be present that the firearm will in fact be used. HR 10 June 2008, NJ 2008, 348, Opinion of Advocate General Vellinga, para 10 and see also: Kamerstukken II, 1999-2000, 26 865, no. 5, 7-8.

  463. 463.

    HR 23 March 2010, NJ 2010, 197.

  464. 464.

    HR 17 October 2006, NJ 2007, 80, Opinion of Advocate General Wortel, para 19.

  465. 465.

    With the exception of searching and frisking powers introduced by the Criminal Investigation of Terrorist Crimes Act (2006). These powers will be dealt with in the next chapter.

  466. 466.

    Rozemond 1998, 359.

  467. 467.

    Vaststelling van een Wetboek van Strafvordering, Memorie van toelichting [Explanatory Memorandum for Establishing a Code of Criminal Procedure 1912-1913], in: Lindenberg 2002, 436.

  468. 468.

    ECHR 24 April 1990, App. no. 11801/85 and App. no. 11105/84 (Kruslin v. France and Huvig v. France), para 33/32.

  469. 469.

    ECHR 24 April 1990, App. no. 11801/85 and App. no. 11105/84 (Kruslin v. France and Huvig v. France), para 33/32 and 36/35.

  470. 470.

    These procedural rights are mainly relevant for those suspects who are arrested or detained pre-trial. For the suspect (or other person) under investigation, these rights will not yet take effect, considering that the application of investigative powers will be covert. A different threshold than a reasonable suspicion for coercive measures such as arrest is therefore impossible. However, a different view can be defended for the threshold of application concerning investigative powers in the pre-trial investigation, a threshold which should therefore be considered as flexible. See also: Knigge 2005, 360.

  471. 471.

    See Sect. 2.1.2.

  472. 472.

    See in this regard: HR 7 February 2006, NJ 2007, 396, para 3.3 and 3.4.

  473. 473.

    Lindenberg 2002, 421.

  474. 474.

    HR 19 December 1995, NJ 1996, 249, ann. Sch para 11.2.2. See also: Rozemond 2000.

  475. 475.

    Rapport van de Parlementaire Enquêtecommissie Opsporingsmethoden 1996, 432-433.

  476. 476.

    Aanwijzing opsporingsbevoegdheden, Stcrt. 2004, 227.

  477. 477.

    Aanwijzing opsporingsbevoegdheden, Stcrt. 2004, 227.

  478. 478.

    Article 126aa CCP applies to the investigative powers under Title IVa-Vc (see Article 126aa(1) CCP).

  479. 479.

    Article 126aa(4) CCP.

  480. 480.

    Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 403, no. 3, 16.

  481. 481.

    HR 26 June 1962, NJ 1962, 470 ann. WP. The use of evidence obtained by an investigative method that illegitimately—because a statutory basis was lacking—intruded upon someone’s physical integrity violated the rights of the defense and, therefore, the results of the blood test had to be excluded as evidence.

  482. 482.

    See e.g. Gerechtshof Amsterdam 3 June 1977, NJ 1978, 601. The evidence was excluded as a consequence of the use of investigative methods in the absence of a reasonable suspicion. See also, HR 24 February 2004, NJ 2004, 226, para 3.6, where the Supreme Court did not exclude the evidence, because the evidence had not been obtained through the alleged illegitimate arrest. Because of this conclusion, the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the question whether the arrest was illegitimate because a reasonable suspicion was lacking. And: HR 6 September 2005, NJ 2006, 447, para 3.6: in this case the use of a blood test in the absence of a reasonable suspicion, but with the permission of the person in question, violated statutory law. The Supreme Court upheld the decision to mitigate the sentence, instead of imposing the more ‘severe’ sanction of excluding the evidence, because the person’s physical integrity had not been violated without his permission.

  483. 483.

    For example HR 19 December 1995, NJ 1996, 249, ann. Sch, para 11.3, HR 30 June 1998 NJ 1998, 799 ann. Sch, para 9.5, HR 2 November 1999, NJ 2000, 162, para 5.3 and 5.4 and HR 30 November 1999 NJ 2000, 344 en 345 ann. Mevis, where the court did not impose sanctions because the nonobservance of the duty could be repaired and had not been done intentionally or in order to substantially limit the controlling function of the judge.

  484. 484.

    See e.g. HR 12 February 2008, NJ 2008, 248, para 4.3, an arrest in violation of the principles of the due administration of justice did not have to result in the sanction of barring the prosecution, because this violation did not deprive the defendant of her right to a fair trial. And HR 14 January 2003, NJ 2003, 288, where the Supreme Court acknowledged that violations of the principles of the due administration of justice by investigative officers as well as by actions of private persons may be sanctioned; in this case the respective violations of the principles of the due administration of justice (as well as Article 8 ECHR) were not of such a nature that excluding the evidence or barring the prosecution should follow (Ibid. para 3.6, 4.3 and 4.4).

  485. 485.

    See e.g. HR 18 March 2003, NJ 2003, 527, para 3.5.1, where the method of collecting evidence (by a private detective) may have violated Article 8 ECHR, but did result in a violation of the principles of the due administration of justice or the rights of the defense in such way that the exclusion of the evidence was warranted.

  486. 486.

    See Sects. 2.3.1.2 and 2.3.1.3 and compare: HR 11 October 2005, NJ 2006, 625, para 3.5.2 and HR 21 November 2006, NJ 2007, 233, ann. Mevis, para 3.4.

  487. 487.

    Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32177 no. 3, 18.

  488. 488.

    Which would thus also imply (without the sanctioning) a violation of Article 6 ECHR. See HR 30 March 2004, NJ 2004, 376, para 3.4.3.

  489. 489.

    Compare: HR 19 December 1995, NJ 1996, 249, ann. Sch, para 11.3, HR 30 June 1998, NJ 1998, 799 ann. Sch, para 9.5, HR 2 November 1999, NJ 2000, 162, para 5.3 and 5.4 and HR 30 November 1999, NJ 2000, 344 en 345 ann. Mevis.

  490. 490.

    Article 359a(1) CCP. See in general on noncompliance with procedural requirements and the procedural sanctions of Article 359a: Franken 2004A.

  491. 491.

    Article 359a(2) CCP and HR 30 March 2004, NJ 2004, 376, para 3.5.

  492. 492.

    HR 30 March 2004, NJ 2004, 376, para 3.6.3.

  493. 493.

    HR 30 March 2004, NJ 2004, 376, para 4.4.

  494. 494.

    HR 30 March 2004, NJ 2004, 376, para 3.6.4.

  495. 495.

    HR 30 March 2004, NJ 2004, 376. para 3.6.5, firstly adopted in Zwolsman, HR 19 December 1995, NJ 1996, 249, ann. Sch.

  496. 496.

    HR 30 March 2004, NJ 2004, 376, para 3.7.

  497. 497.

    For the latter compare HR 11 March 2008, NJ 2008, 329, ann. Borgers, annotation para 6.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Pels Rijcken & Droogleever Fortuijn N.V., PO Box 11756, 2502 AT, The Hague, Zuid-Holland, The Netherlands

    Dr. Marianne F. H. Hirsch Ballin

Authors
  1. Dr. Marianne F. H. Hirsch Ballin
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2012 T.M.C. ASSER PRESS, The Hague, The Netherlands, and the authors

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Hirsch Ballin, M.F.H. (2012). The System of Criminal Investigation in the Netherlands. In: Anticipative Criminal Investigation. T.M.C. Asser Press. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-843-9_2

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Societies and partnerships

Search

Navigation