Discursivity and Transcendental Idealism

  • Marcel Quarfood
Part of the The New Synthese Historical Library book series (SYNL, volume 66)


A fundamental tenet of Kant’s critical philosophy is that human cognition has two stems, sensibility and understanding. This is stressed early on in the Critique of Pure Reason 1 and never lost sight of. The understanding thinks by means of concepts, but in order for us to obtain cognition there must be some independent source of representations that give us access to objects, so that the concepts can be applied to something.


Intuitive Understanding Pure Reason Human Understanding Regulative Principle Transcendental Idealism 
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I am indebted to the participants at the conference on Kant’s Transcendental Logic and Idealism in Amsterdam 2008, and especially to Dennis Schulting for very helpful comments.


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of UppsalaUppsalaSweden

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