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Transcendental Idealism and the Transcendental Deduction

  • Lucy Allais
Chapter
Part of the The New Synthese Historical Library book series (SYNL, volume 66)

Abstract

“Kant was not the sort of person who had the intellectual courage to face up to a dilemma and reject one alternative in favour of the other. Instead, when he felt himself pulled in opposite directions by conflicting imperatives, his preference was to try to work out some way of satisfying both. This intellectual ‘cowardice’ [… ] is the characteristic that led Kant to his most brilliant discoveries” (Falkenstein 1995, 19).

Keywords

Secondary Quality Empirical Concept Transcendental Idealism Middle Road Intellectual Courage 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgements

A version of this article was presented at the conference Kant’s Transcendental Logic & Idealism in Amsterdam, May 2008; thanks to the participants for comments, and to Dennis Schulting for inviting me to speak at the conference. For reading and commenting on the manuscript, thanks to Quassim Cassam and Thad Metz.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of SussexBrightonUK
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of the WitwatersrandJohannesburgSouth Africa

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