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Transcendental Idealism in the Third Critique

  • Ido Geiger
Chapter
Part of the The New Synthese Historical Library book series (SYNL, volume 66)

Abstract

Kant’s assertions about things in themselves in the Critique of Pure Reason are notoriously difficult to understand and indeed to reconcile with one another. The fundamental claim of transcendental idealism is that our experience and knowledge are necessarily shaped by the forms of our intuition (space and time) and ordered by the pure concepts of the understanding (categories). This claim naturally leads to its contrast with philosophical views that assume that we have knowledge of things as they are in themselves. For such viewpoints, true knowledge is knowledge of how things are quite independently of our minds.

Keywords

Natural Kind Empirical Experience Spatial Form Pure Reason Aesthetic Judgment 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

I am deeply indebted to Aviv Reiter, Nir Friedman, Dennis Schulting and Yaron Senderowicz for their comments on this paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyBen-Gurion University of the NegevBeer-ShevaIsrael

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